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Home PageThe American Philosophical Association
Newsletter on
Computer Use in Philosophy
Jesse Yoder, editor
Issue no. 95:1 Fall 1995
From the Editors
Submission Guidelines
We welcome your contributions! We publish the following kinds of items:
Discussions of electronic mail, electronic texts, multimedia articles for philosophy teaching, philosophical programs using artificial intelligence, and other aspects of the impact of computers on the philosophical profession.
Reviews and discussions of computer software and hardware of interest to philosophers.
Brief articles that demonstrate the impact of computers on philosophical concepts. For example, in philosophy of mind, items on artificial intelligence, computer models of the mind, and more general issues relating to the nature of the mind. In computer ethics, cases in computer ethics, items on the computability of ethical decisions, etc.
Please send all announcements, reviews, and articles for publication in this newsletter to:
Jesse Yoder
Department of Philosophy
Lafayette College
Easton, MA 18042
610-294-9049
Fax: 610-294-8083
Internet: yjx0@lafayette.edu
or to
G.J. Mattey, Associate Editor
Department of Philosophy
University of California - Davis
Davis, CA 95616
916-752-0609
BitNet: gjmattey@ucdavis
InterNet: gjmattey@ucdavis.edu
All submissions should be in electronic form if possible; in order of preference: WordPerfect or ASCII format. Please send a diskette along with a hard copy of your contribution to one of the above addresses.
If you cannot submit in electronic form, please send a hard copy version to one of the above addresses.
We especially welcome letters to the editor!
Electronic Addresses
Committee Chair
Terry Bynum (1997) bynum@scsu.ctstateu.edu
Southern Connecticut State University
Committee Members
David Benfield (1997) benfield@apollo.montclair.edu
Montclair State College
Jacques Catudal (1998) cat@duvm.ocs.drexel.edu
Drexel University
Robert L. Causey (1997) rlc@cs.utexas.edu
University of Texas
Robert Cavalier (1998) rc2z@andrew.cmu.edu
Carnegie Mellon University
Lawrence Hinman (1997) hinman@acusd.edu
University of San Diego
James Moor (1996) james.h.moor@dartmouth.edu
Dartmouth College
William Rapaport (1996) rapaport@cs.buffalo.edu
SUNY-Buffalo
Saul Traiger (1998) traiger@oxy.edu
Occidental College
Jesse Yoder (ex officio) yjx0@lafayette.edu
Lafayette College, Idea Network
The Editor of the Newsletter is an ex officio member of the Committee.
Subcommittees
The various subcommittees of the Committee on Philosophy and Computers are being restructured to reflect the Committee's broadened purview. Membership of the subcommittees will be announced in the next issue of the Newsletter. The subcommittees are:
Subcommittee on Computer-Assisted Research in Philosophy
Subcommittee on Electronic Publishing
Subcommittee on Computer-Assisted Teaching of Philosophy
Subcommittee on the Electronic Cooperation of Philosophers
Subcommittee on Computer Ethics
From the Committee
Committee On Philosophy And Computers
Terry Bynum, Chair
The impact of computers on the philosophical profession is growing exponentially. As a result, computers are changing not only how philosophers communicate and cooperate with each other, but also how they conduct research and how they teach their courses. More importantly, fundamental concepts of philosophy- e.g., reasoning, rationality, the mind, consciousness, knowledge, truth, creativity-are being altered in important ways. For these reasons, the interests of the Committee have broadened during the past several years. They now include:
How computing is affecting PROFESSIONAL INTERACTION among philosophers (e.g., committee work, correspondence, conference planning, etc.).
How computing is affecting philosophical RESEARCH activities (e.g., electronic searching of books, articles and other resources; computer analysis of concepts, cases, proofs; research collaboration and sharing of ideas, etc.).
How computing is affecting the TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY (e.g., on-line discussion groups, courses on the InterNet, teaching philosophy with multimedia materials, computer assisted independent study, etc.).
How computing is changing fundamental philosophical concepts (e.g., rationality, mind, knowledge, life, creativity, etc.).
To reflect the Committee's broader purview, the APA Board of Officers voted last October to change its name to "The Committee on Philosophy and Computers."
In 1993, the APA Board decided to "review" non-standing committees in order to gain a better understanding of their activities and their continuing relevance to APA needs. As part of the review process, Committee Chair Terry Bynum attended the October 1994 APA Board meeting in California. He explained the activities of the Committee and vigorously advocated the continuing relevance of the Committee.
Given the growing importance of computing in philosophy, Bynum recommended to the Board of Officers that the APA InterNet Bulletin Board be shifted to the National Office in Newark, Delaware. Saul Traiger of Occidental College has done a superb job during the past several years creating and overseeing the Bulletin Board; but as more and more philosophical activities move into cyberspace, computer connections to the world will become central to the functioning and existence of the APA. Oversight and control of the Bulletin Board (or World-Wide-Web Page, etc.), therefore, should be moved to the National Office. Several members of the Committee have been exploring the suggestion with APA Executive Director Eric Hoffman, and the proposed move will be an agenda item at the Autumn 1995 Board meeting.
COMMITTEE PROJECTS
1. Papers at Divisional Meetings
The Committee is sponsoring a series of papers at Eastern, Central and Pacific divisional meetings during 1994 through 1997. The papers all address the issue of "how computers are changing philosophy." Committee members Terry Bynum and James Moor have arranged to publish the series (plus additional materials) in a book entitled The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing Philosophy, available in Spring 1997. (Negotiations with prospective publishers are currently underway.)
2. Dissemination of a Related Questionnaire
To help assess the impact of computing upon the philosophical profession, the Committee plans to disseminate a questionnaire to all APA members during the coming year.
3. Expansion and Restructuring of the Newsletter
Given the broader purview of the Committee, its Newsletter will be expanded and enhanced to include sections on research, teaching, professional cooperation and changing philosophical concepts. All APA members are invited to submit ideas, examples and comments to the Committee through its Chair.
4. Subcommittee on Computer-Assisted Research in Philosophy
A subcommittee is currently being formed to prepare a comprehensive report on computer-assisted research in philosophy. APA members are encouraged to submit suggestions to the Committee. The report should be available next year. A summary of the findings will be included in the Committee Newsletter, and the report will be made available over the InterNet and World-Wide-Web.
5. Electronic Publishing Subcommittee
A subcommittee is currently being formed to prepare a comprehensive report on electronic publishing in philosophy. APA members are encouraged to submit suggestions to the Committee. The report should be available next year. A summary of the findings will be included in the Committee Newsletter, and the report will be made available over the InterNet and World-Wide-Web.
6. Subcommittee on Computer-Assisted Teaching of Philosophy
A subcommittee is currently being formed to prepare a comprehensive report on computer-assisted teaching of philosophy. APA members are encouraged to submit suggestions to the Committee. The report should be available next year. A summary of the findings will be included in the Committee Newsletter, and the report will be made available over the Internet and World-Wide-Web.
7. Subcommittee on the Electronic Cooperation of Philosophers
A subcommittee is currently being formed to prepare a comprehensive report on computer-assisted professional cooperation in philosophy. APA members are encouraged to submit suggestions to the Committee. The report should be available next year. A summary of the findings will be included in the Committee Newsletter, and the report will be made available over the InterNet and World-Wide-Web.
8. Subcommittee on Computer Ethics
Because there is currently growing world-wide interest in computer ethics, a subcommittee is being formed to prepare a report on this rapidly growing branch of applied ethics. APA members are encouraged to submit suggestions to the Committee. The report should be available next year. A summary of the findings will be included in the Committee Newsletter, and the report will be made available over the InterNet and World-Wide-Web.
CALL FOR PARTICIPATION
All members of the APA are encouraged to participate in the Committee-led consideration of the impact of computer technology on the philosophical profession. Members who have suggestions, comments or time to volunteer should contact the Committee Chair, Terry Bynum at bynum@scsud.ctstateu.edu or (203) 392-6790 (voice mail) or (203) 392-6805 (FAX).
Reports
CAP '95 Conference Report
The 1995 Computing and Philosophy Conference was held on the campus of Carnegie Mellon University, August 10th to 12th. The conference, which was jointly sponsored by Carnegie Mellon University and the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers, was very successful and very well attended. The conference demonstrated the growing impact of computers upon the philosophical profession. The diversity of presentations illustrated the impact of computing on philosophical research, the teaching of philosophy, professional interaction among philosophers, and fundamental philosophical concepts like 'the mind', 'rationality', 'reasoning', 'knowledge', and 'betrayal'.
The first Keynote Speaker was Professor Herbert Simon of Carnegie Mellon University whose topic was Human Reasoning and Formal Logic: Using Production Systems to Show Their Congruence. The second Keynote Speaker was John Pollock of the University of Arizona whose topic was Interfacing Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. Other presentations included the following.
The Virtual Classroom: Network-Based Multimedia Environments for Course Development and Course Delivery, Robert Cavalier, Carnegie Mellon University
Demonstrations of the APA Web Site, Saul Traiger, Occidental College
Computer Simulations in the Philosophy of Mind, John Barker & David Anderson, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville
Teaching Philosophy of Intelligence, Teddy Seidenfeld, Carnegie Mellon University
Computational Linguistics, Chris Manning, Carnegie Mellon University
Philosophical Perspectives on Computer-Mediated Communication, Charles Ess, Drury College; Dag Elgesem, National Committee for Research Ethics, Norway; John Lawrence, Morningside College
Quality of Life in the Global Village, Deborah Johnson, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Wobbly Training Wheels: Moral Incentive Compatible Devices, Peter Danielson, University of British Columbia
Computer Ethics in Europe and Around the Globe, Terry Bynum, Southern Connecticut State University
CAI for Logic and Critical Thinking, Nelson Pole, Cleveland State University; Robert Redmon, Virginia Commonwealth University; Fred Portoraro, University of Toronto; Jim Bode, Ohio State University-Lima; Rob Brady, Stetson University
On Defining Betrayal, Selmer Bringsjord, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Moral Mazes: Interactive Multimedia Course Materials in Ethics, Peter Madsen and Robert Mertzman, Carnegie Mellon University
Computers and Philosophy: A Publisher's Perspective, Adrian Driscoll, Routledge Publishing Company, England
Glymour's Book Thinking Things Through, Eric Palmer, Allegheny College; Clifton McIntosh, University of Utah; Cassandra Pinnick, Western Kentucky University; Catherine Womack, Union College; Clark Gylmour, Carnegie Mellon University
Virtual Philosophy Courses, Ron Barnette, Valdosta State University; Jon Dorbola, Oregon State University; Yuan-lih Lin, DePaul University
Computer-Based Explorations of Natural Kinds, Larry Crocket, Augsburg College
Computational Monadology, Eric Steinhart, SUNY at Stony Brook
Databases and the History of Ideas, Mark Rooks, InteLex
Teaching Introduction to Philosophy with Text Databases of the "PastMasters," George Leiner, St. Vincent College
The Conference Director was Robert Cavalier; the Program Chair was Marvin Croy; the Conference Coordinator was Sandra Harris; and the Paper Reviewers were Martin Fricke, James Moor and Saul Traiger.
Another Perspective on the Computing and
Philosophy Conference
Ralph Slaght
Lafayette College
The Tenth Annual Conference on Computing and Philosophy, with 75 registrants, opened on the campus of Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with a wine-and-cheese reception on Thursday evening, August 10, 1995. Interspersed with the convivialities were two presentations, one by Robert Cavalier, of CMU, who demonstrated World-Wide Web features, especially related to course development, syllabi, and course materials. He uses the Web to link pictures, text, and sound, with materials from the American Philosophical Association Web site, among others. Also shown were the interactive conferencing features of the Web. Concerns were raised about copyright and privacy issues. The other presentation was by Saul Traiger, of Occidental College, who displayed the features of the American Philosophical Association bulletin board and Web site, following which was discussion of what's now available and what could become available.
Friday morning began with a keynote address by Herbert Simon, who presented the group with a proposed answer to the question of why the conclusions of valid deductive arguments are so readily accepted once the premises have been accepted. Following the Simon address, John Barker, of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, demonstrated his ProtoThinker software, which has been designed to "stimulate thinking about thinking." A collaborator, David Anderson, of Illinois State University, demonstrated his Larry Learner program, a program designed to get students thinking about what "intelligence" is. Teddy Seidenfeld, of CMU, outlined his course on the philosophy of intelligence, a course which is jointly offered by three senior professors at Carnegie-Mellon, whose expertise involves animal intelligence, psychological measurements, statistics, and philosophy. Just before lunch, Christopher Manning, also of CMU, gave us a description of the Computational Linguistics Program of the CMU Philosophy Department. He also outlined some of his research interest in the area of indexing and computerized searching of indexes.
Three contributors to the book Philosophical Perspectives on Computer-Mediated Communication, editor Charles Ess of Drury College, Dag Elgesem of the National Committee for Research Ethics in Norway, and John Lawrence of Morningside College, talked about their various interests. Ess was concerned about whether or not the Habermasian account of democracy was being actualized on the Internet; Elgesem's work concerned issues of privacy; and Lawrence was interested in the question of academic prestige associated with electronic publications as contrasted with paper publications. Deborah Johnson, of RPI, argued that the increased use of the Internet raised two big problems: (1) problems of accountability due to the anonymity which the Internet permits, and (2) problems of integrity due to the unlimited modifiability of textual material presented on the Internet. She also expressed concern about personal and national identity. Peter Danielson, of the University of British Columbia, showed how artificial moral agents can be used to investigate empirical claims of human behavior. In the particular case he showed that it is far better to not ever institutionalize moral controls than to institutionalize them and then take the controls away at some point. Terry Bynum, of Southern Connecticut State University, discussed the growth of the field of computer ethics, citing as evidence his involvement with a committee of the British Parliament, his interviews with the Canadian Broadcasting System, Minnesota Public Radio, and a forthcoming CNN story. He believes that computer technology will radically affect the world and that it is a good thing that philosophers are on top of the ethical issues that these changes will present.
The last set of presentations Friday afternoon pertained to computer-aided instruction for logic and critical thinking. We heard from Nelson Pole of Cleveland State University, author of LogicCoach, and from Robert Redmon, Virginia Commonwealth University, a LogicCoach user. Fred Portoraro, from the University of Toronto and author of Symlog, talked about plans for enhancements to the current version. Jim Bode, Ohio State University at Lima, presented his ArguDraw and ArguGrade, the former being software designed to assist the students in learning how to diagram arguments and the latter being software designed to assist the instructor in evaluating the students' work.
Saturday morning's keynote address was given by John Pollock of the University of Arizona and his recent creation, OSCAR. Pollock described his OSCAR project, concentrating on three main areas: (1) Defeasible reasoning, (2) Fitch-style natural deduction, and (3) Interest-Driven Suppositional Reasoning. Most of his work to date has been to implement the general theory. Now his work is directed towards specific applications against which to test the general theory. Following the keynote address, Peter Madsen and Robert Mertzman, both of Carnegie Mellon University, described their Moral Mazes Project, an undertaking of the Center for the Advancement of Applied Ethics at Carnegie-Mellon University. Working under grants from the Annenberg Foundation and CPB to produce marketable educational products, they hope to produce 13 1/2 hour videos; 8 interactive multi-media CD-Roms, involving text, audio, graphics and video clips; and 4 virtual classrooms, utilizing the World-Wide Web. They hope to produce videos of the quality of PBS's Civil War series. [While this session was going on, there was a concurrent session with Selmer Bringsjord of RPI entitled On Defining Betrayal.] There was a brief report from the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers, given by Terry Bynum; and a discussion of a publisher's perspective of all this Internet activity from the London-based Philosophy editor of Routledge, Adrian Driscoll.
After lunch a panel consisting of Eric Palmer of Allegheny College, Cassandra Pinnick of Western Kentucky University, Clifton McIntosh of the University of Utah, and Catherine Womack of Union College discussed their use of, problems with, and praise for Clark Glymour's text, "Thinking Things Through," as an introductory text, either to philosophy in general or to logic. Glymour himself responded. While Ron Barnette of Valdosta State University in Georgia demonstrated his resource-rich World-Wide Web site and talked a bit about his distance learning course and Jon Dorbolo of Oregon State University described and defended his Introduction to Philosophy course which makes use of the Internet facilities, there was a concurrent session entitled Philosophy of Mind with Larry Crocket of Augsburg College and Eric Steinhart at SUNY/Stony Brook. The conference closed with a session on electronic texts, but this reporter found it necessary to leave before that session began.
Publicly-expressed sentiments indicated that this was an excellent conference.
Some Useful Home Page addresses:
http://www.valdosta.peachnet.edu/~rbarnett/phi/
http://www.udel.edu/apa/apa.hmtl
http://www.routledge.com/routledge.hmtl
Ralph Slaght
Philosophy
Lafayette College
Easton, Pennsylvania 18042
Bulletin Board
The APA maintains a home page on the World Wide Web. The URL is http\\www.oxy.edu\apa\apa.html. It contains links to the APA's gopher service as well as to many other philosophical resources on the Internet. For gopher users without access to the Web, the APA's gopher location is apa.oxy.edu. Many gopher servers may be located under the listing "All the Gopher Servers in the World."
Call for Papers
The Pacific Division of the Association for Philosophy of Education (APE) is pleased to announce a call for papers for its March 1996 meeting to be held in conjunction with the Pacific Division Convention of the American Philosophical Association. The theme for the session will be technology and education. We are particularly interested in philosophically illuminating contributions to ongoing and evolving policy discussions as educators and educational institutions grapple with emerging information technologies. Papers will be blind refereed and should be prepared and submitted accordingly. Papers should be approximately 12 pages in length (20 minutes reading time). Send five copies to Professor Joel Rudinow, Department of Philosophy, Sonoma State University, 1801 E. Cotati Ave., Rohnert Park, CA 94928. Submission deadline: November 15, 1995.
Articles
A Definition of Artificial Intelligence
Jesse Yoder
Lafayette College
Some writers have despaired of the possibility of providing a general definition of intelligence. For example, consider the following comments from A.R. Mirzai in his forward to the book, Artificial Intelligence: Concepts and Applications in Engineering:
Artificial intelligence is the study of intelligence using the ideas and methods of computation. Unfortunately, a definition of intelligence seems impossible at the moment, because intelligence appears to be an amalgam of so many information-processing and information-representation abilities.
Of course, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and related disciplines offer various perspectives and methodologies for studying intelligence. For the most part, however, the theories proposed in these fields are too incomplete and too vaguely stated to be realized in computational terms. Something more is needed, even though valuable ideas, relationships, and constraints can be gleaned from the traditional studies of what are, after all, impressive existence proofs that intelligence is, in fact, possible.
Artificial intelligence offers a new perspective and a new methodology. Its central goal is to make computers intelligent, both to make them more useful and to understand the principles that make intelligence possible.
It is interesting and instructive to compare the above, which was written in 1990, to the following quote from Patrick Henry Winston in the first chapter of his book Artificial Intelligence, which was written thirteen years earlier in 1977. The similarity of these two quotes suggests that not much progress has been made recently in defining intelligence:
Artificial intelligence is the study of ideas which enable computers to do the things that make people seem intelligent. But then, what is human intelligence? Is it the ability to reason? Is it the ability to acquire and apply knowledge? Is it the ability to manipulate and communicate ideas? Surely all of these abilities are part of what intelligence is, but they are not the whole of what can be said. Indeed, a definition in the usual sense seems impossible because intelligence appears to be an amalgam of so many information-processing and information-representation talents.
Nevertheless, one can define the goals of the field of artificial intelligence: The central goals of artificial intelligence are to make computers more useful and to understand the principles which make intelligence possible.
A different kind of approach is taken by Sam Herb in his tutorial entitled Understanding Fuzzy Logic, Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms. Rather than defining intelligence, Mr. Herb approaches the topic of intelligence by listing seven basic kinds of intelligence in people. They are as follows:
Interpersonal (ability to perceive others)
Intrapersonal (ability to understand yourself)
Special intelligence
Musical intelligence
Body and aesthetic intelligence
Mathematical and logical intelligence
Verbal intelligence
One complication in defining the term "intelligent" in an industrial automation environment is that the term "intelligence" is applied to machines. Is there a concept of intelligence that is unique to machines, or does the concept of intelligent machines necessarily derive from the concept of human intelligence? A study of the literature of artificial intelligence, especially that of expert systems, suggests that the concept of machine intelligence is, in fact, based on some type of analogy with human intelligence. In fact, Patrick Henry Winston's definition of artificial intelligence is, "the study of ideas which enable computers to do the things that make people seem intelligent."
An expert system is a software product that attempts to duplicate the process of reasoning in which a human being would engage when trying to solve a problem. In fact, expert systems are created by a lengthy process of interviewing experts on a particular subject, and trying to create a computer program that contains the rules an expert uses in his or her decision-making procedure. Hence, the intelligence embodied in expert systems derives from and depends upon the intelligence of human experts.
An additional complication in defining the term "intelligent" as applied to machines or human beings is that the problem of defining intelligence is really a philosophical issue. It is ironical then that a study of the literature in philosophy of mind, and a study of the philosophical literature surrounding the definition of intelligence and artificial intelligence, reveal that philosophers themselves look to machines and to computers to provide a model for the human mind and for the definition of intelligence.
For example, one method of approaching this problem is to view all mental functions as forms of information processing. John Searle summarizes this form of reasoning in his discussion of what he calls the research program of cognitivism. In his book, Minds, Brains and Science, Mr. Searle addresses efforts to explain mind by relying on analogies between human beings and digital computers. He identifies one view, which he calls strong artificial intelligence, according to which, "the brain is a digital computer and the mind is just a computer program. . . . A related attempt to fill the gap is often called 'cognitivism', because it derives from work in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, and it forms the mainstream of a new discipline of 'cognitive science'." Mr. Searle comments on cognitivism as follows:
If one had to summarize the research program of cognitivism it would look like this: Thinking is processing information, but information-processing is just symbol manipulation. Computers do symbol manipulation. So the best way to study thinking (or, as they prefer to call it, 'cognition') is to study computational symbol-manipulating programs, whether they are in computers or in brains. On this view, then, the task of cognitive science is to characterize the brain, not at the level of nerve cells, nor at the level of conscious mental states, but rather at the level of its functioning as an information-processing system.
There appears to be a type of circularity in the reasoning of cognitivism that is discussed by John Searle. If, in fact, the concept of machine intelligence derives from the concept of human intelligence, then we cannot hope to explain the concept of human intelligence or the concept of what it is to have a mind by looking to machines or to machine intelligence.
Because of these conceptual problems, the concept of intelligence as applied to machines does not derive from or depend upon the concept of human intelligence. The concept proposed here is very simple-namely:
A machine or field device is considered to be intelligent if it automates mental tasks.
Mental tasks are ones that involve the use of one's mind. Examples of mental tasks include reasoning, decision-making, thinking, error-correction, calculating, remembering, and communicating. Mental tasks stand in contrast to physical tasks, which involve the use of one's body. Examples of physical tasks (a subset of which is manual labor) include lifting, construction work, washing clothes, and plant assembly work.
While the idea of a mental task clearly involves some reference to a human mind, this definition is not circular (unlike Winston's definition). Furthermore, the notion of "mental task" is sufficiently intuitive to need no further definition.
The distinction drawn here between mental and physical tasks is not as clear-cut as our language would suggest. For example, while mounting a tire on a car is a physical task, it also requires the use of one's mind. In order to mount a tire, one has to figure out where to place the tire, then test the lug nuts to make sure they are tight enough. Likewise, the assembly of an automobile in an automotive plant involves many physical tasks, but many of these tasks require the use of a person's mind. Painting a car is mainly a physical task, but it requires a knowledge of paint colors, an awareness of what parts of the car get painted what color, and a knowledge of how much paint to put on the car. Even an action as simple as picking up a hammer requires an awareness of where the hammer is located.
The preceding examples suggest that there is no sharp distinction between tasks that are purely mental and purely physical, and that most tasks involve a combination of mental and physical tasks.
Industrial robots provide a good example of this combination. Industrial robots used in automotive or computer chip assembly plants are not the friendly, personal robots of Star Wars fame. Instead, they are highly specialized industrial control devices that automate a single human function. For example, a robot used in chip assembly might specialize in mounting a computer chip on a board. Using a camera, such a robot might visually identify the chip and determine its location (mental task), then pick the chip up (physical task) and mount it at the correct location on the board. The latter is both a physical and mental task-i.e., the robot must perform the mental task of determining the correct location for the chip, then the physical task of placing the chip on the board. It is actually easier to identify purely mental tasks (e.g., calculating a square root, deciding what to wear, thinking about tomorrow's schedule), than to identify purely physical tasks.
An awareness that some tasks are both mental and physical does not require a modification of the definition of intelligent machines or field devices as ones that involve automation of mental tasks. If a machine automates a task that is both mental and physical (e.g., a pick and place machine, or a robot that mounts computer chips on a board), it is intelligent to the extent that it automates the mental component of the task. Thus, a robot mounting a computer chip can be considered intelligent if a part of this task involves mental functions such as seeing where the chip is located (which it can do with a camera), and determining where the chip should be placed on the board (which requires mathematical calculations). Likewise, an actuator can be considered intelligent if it decides how far to open or close a valve (a mental task), even if part of its task is the physical one of opening or closing the valve.
Note: The preceding was excerpted from chapter two of The World Market for Fieldbus and Intelligent Field Devices, by Jesse Yoder. This report is available from FIND/SVP in New York and can be purchased from FIND/SVP for $3,250. Call 212-645-4500 for more information.
Additional Note: In a conversation with Patrick Henry Winston at MIT after the above text was written had the following result. Professor Winston conceded the circularity of his own definition of "artificial intelligence." He also raised the following objection to the definition of "artificial intelligence" as "automation of mental tasks": If a computer adds 2+2 to get 4, is this artificial intelligence? My reply is that yes it is, since adding 2+2 is a mental task which is automated by the computer. I see no reason to say that a computer performing addition is not an example of artificial intelligence.
Another interesting question relating to artificial intelligence is this. If artificial intelligence is defined in terms of machines or computers, where does this leave us with respect to the possibility of intelligence residing in natural phenomena such as hurricanes? This may sound like a silly question, but when functionalists claim that a group of people in India can instantiate a mental function and hence have consciousness, or that a computer can be conscious in virtue of some function it instantiates, one wonders whether intelligence can reside in natural phenomena other than machines or animals. For example, does a tree have consciousness? Or, alternatively, could a hurricane have consciousness? Should intelligence be defined in such a way as to rule this out? When forecasters talk about the path of a hurricane, they often talk as if the hurricane makes decisions about where it wants to go, and then goes there. When I asked Professor Winston if hurricanes have consciousness, he said, "I wouldn't think so."
One final thought. Some philosophers have argued that it is a mistake to draw a firm mental/physical distinction, and that mental phenomena have a physical aspect. If this is so, could a human mind team up with a physical system to direct its energy? If, for example, a human being could figure out how to manipulate the underlying variables of a physical system so as to direct it to move in a certain way, would this person's mind then be called the "mind" of the hurricane? After all, why should the physical aspect of a mental process always be a human or animal brain? If this is possible, then physical systems can have minds, albeit human minds.
A Word About Non-Academic Philosophy Careers
Jesse Yoder
Lafayette College
This newsletter in the past has taken up the banner of unemployed philosophers, or of philosophers who find themselves unable to find gainful employment within the philosophy profession. Some possibilities for using analytical skills do exist within the computer industry, especially in the areas of computer programming, market research, and technical writing.
One possible area for development is the area of definitions. Scientists, government agencies, and private organizations need consistent, logical, clearly written definitions. One possible task that philosophers could perform would be to approach such groups, including government agencies, and offer to write definitions for these groups to use. Why shouldn't such efforts be funded as a form of research, just as many other research projects are? A group of clearly written and consistent definitions would be especially helpful for government agencies, especially when different agencies have different definitions of the same thing. Such definitions could also be used by the U.S. Congress in writing legislation. There are some especially difficult terms, such as 'wetland,' which become the focus of political debate. The definition of the term 'wetland,' has itself become a political issue, as evidenced by the recent debate over the renewal of the Clean Water Act.
A second difficulty faced by nonacademic philosophers is that not only are there no jobs available, there is no prospect of jobs becoming available. Many departments that have retiring philosophers simply choose to reduce their numbers by attrition, so these people are not replaced. Budget cuts at the federal and state level mean that overall department sizes are being reduced.
What are philosophy Ph.D.s supposed to do? Of course, there are always adjunct jobs, which pay at graduate-school level or even lower. This is simply slave labor. While the APA is allegedly coming up with a policy statement on the issue of adjunct professors, as long as the members of the committee making up this policy are full-time, tenured faculty members, they have no incentive to represent the interests of adjuncts.
One solution is to abolish tenure. Where else in America does anyone have a legal right to lifetime employment? Such a luxury is pretty much reserved for employees in Japan, which has a completely different social system from our own. Furthermore, the current situation in which very little new blood is admitted to academic positions is inherently conservative, in that it is the older, established professors who get published and whose work is elaborated on by graduate students. New ideas get squelched because their promoters or originators aren't on the "inside" and simply don't have the time to work out the implications of their ideas in enough detail to get them published.
It is completely unjust for adjunct professors to work for one-third the pay as fulltime, tenured faculty get. Whatever happened to equal pay for equal work? Furthermore, it is completely unjust for universities to perpetuate a system in which new ideas cannot be heard and in which there is simply no hope of employment for new philosophy Ph.D.s. In addition, some universities require that adjuncts take a year off every other year so they cannot possibly have a basis for claiming the right to tenure if they teach for seven years. The problem is further complicated by affirmative action rules, which often amount to giving a preference to female or minority candidates. When universities openly discriminate against white males and then lie about it, those who are discriminated against have no recourse beyond an expensive court battle. The situation is worsened by the fact that state appeal agencies naturally tend to side with established universities as opposed to the victims of discrimination when the decision-making of the university is challenged. This is simply a form of totalitarianism.
The situation will not change until adjunct professors and other victims of discrimination exert political pressure on universities to change their policies. One way for this to happen is for adjuncts to organize into a union. Another way would be to simply abolish tenure. Neither of these possibilities seems likely in the near-term; at least not until adjunct professors start speaking out against their exploiters. After all, all we have to lose is our chains.