The following appeared in Volume 96, Number 2 (Spring 1997) of the APA Newsletters.

Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, edited by Louis P. Pojman, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994). 578pp. 42.95. Reviewed by Stephen A. Kennett, Rend Lake College.

Pojman’s Philosophy of Religion is an anthology of seventy articles covering the following topics: The traditional arguments for the existence of God; the argument from religious experience; the problem of evil; the attributes of God; miracles and revelation; death and immortality; faith and reason; religion and ethics; and religious pluralism. Pojman’s introduction to the book defines religion, discusses Freud’s and Marx’s criticisms of religion and defends the philosophical scrutiny of religion. Introductions to the individual selections are included. This anthology has readings appropriate for both undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of religion.

Part I of the text presents the traditional arguments for the existence of God, and a section on the relevance of these arguments to religion. Section I.A. of Part I examines the cosmological argument and includes Thomas Aquinas’s The Five Ways as I. A. 1. In I. A. 2, Samuel Clarke bases the cosmological argument upon the principal that the contingency of human existence implies the necessary existence of God. Paul Edwards, in I. A. 3, criticizes Aquinas’s argument for confusing the notion of causality as it applies to individual objects with the notion of causality as it applies to the universe. As a whole he also attacks Clarke’s form of the cosmological argument by arguing that nothing is gained by claiming that the universe’s existence is necessary. In I. A. 4, William Rowe analyzes the cosmological argument and objections to it with reference to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which he states as "there must be an explanation (a) of the existence of any being, and (b) of any positive fact whatever (19)." The final selection, I. A. 5, is Richard Taylor’s defense of Aquinas’s Third Way in the form given it by Clarke.

From an analytical approach these selections are excellent, but the addition of David Hume’s criticisms of Clarke’s argument would have given the chapter a better historical perspective. Section I. B. on the teleological argument contains William Paley’s watchmaker analogy, Hume’s objections to teleological arguments, and Richard Swinburne’s inductive argument for God’s existence based on confirmation theory. The ontological argument for God’s existence is covered in section I. C. and begins with selections from Anselm and Gaunilo, followed by Immanuel Kant’s critique that existence is not a predicate. The last two selections center on a modal version of the ontological argument presented and defended by Alvin Plantinga (I. C. 3) and criticized by William Rowe (I. C. 4). In I. D. there is a debate about the relevance of the proofs for theism. Steven M. Cahn (I. D. 1) argues that neither unbelievers nor theists are influenced by these proofs while Stephen T. Davis ( I. D. 2) asserts that the proofs are valuable for both religion and philosophy.

Part II contains arguments concerning religious experience. Section II. 1 presents selections from Isaiah, St. Teresa of Avila, Hinduism, and Buddhism. While brief, these selections show the nature and role of mysticism in a variety of religious contexts. Section II. 2 contains William James’s description and analyses of mystical experience, which he believed to be the most profound of all religious experiences. Section II. 3 is C. D. Broad’s argument that religious experience allows the inference to God’s existence, but he insists that this experience, if it is to be genuine needs to continue and evolve into a better expression of the facts used as a basis for religious beliefs. II. 4, by Wallace Matson, analyses religious experience by the standards of scientific perception and finds religious experience lacking in epistemic authority. Gary Gutting in II. 5 explains that belief in God is based on religious experience, but the religious experience must meet certain criteria: the experience must be repeatable; the experience must be universal; the experience "must issue forth in morally better lives (139)." Pojman critiques Gutting’s claims in II. 6, and in II. 7 William P. Alston argues that religious experience provides valid grounds for religious belief that is different from scientific perception. While all these readings are excellent, the inclusion of a sustained and direct critique of James’s Varieties, like W. T. Stace’s article in The Teachings of the Mystics would give a certain balance to this section of readings by challenging the claim that the mystic’s experience can be identified with the experience of God.

Part III studies the problem of evil. III. 1 is Hume’s argument against God from the presence of evil in the world. Liebniz’s theodicy is presented in III. 2. In III. 3 John Hick presents a theodicy based upon the requirements of free will, i.e., that God is helping humanity develop into a state of self-realization by the experimental use of freedom. Hare and Madden criticize Hick in III. 4 by questioning if the amount of evil present in the world is really needed to insure humanity’s development. In III. 5 J. L. Mackie explains that it is illogical to believe in a benevolent, omnipotent and omniscient God in light of existing evil because a good being abolishes all the evil it can. Alvin Plantinga, in III. 6, objects to Mackie’s attribution of irrationality to theism by asserting that it might be reasonable to believe that God has a purpose for evil. In III. 7 William Rowe develops an inductive argument from evil to argue that God does not exist.

Part IV of the book concerns the implications of traditional attributes of God; his eternity, omniscience, omnipotence. In IV. A, on time and eternity, Stephen T. Davis, IV. A. 1, agues that timeless eternity is incoherent because God’s creation infers a temporal creator, a personal and caring God, and timeless eternity makes time illusory. Hugh McCann in IV. A. 2 believes in an atemporal God because such atemporality makes better sense of omniscience. Section IV. B examines God’s omniscience and human freedom. Augustine, IV. B. 1, found no contradiction between God’s knowledge of our actions and our freedom but, in IV. B. 2, Nelson Pike explains that God’s knowledge demands that we act out of necessity. IV. B. 3, by Alvin Plantinga, uses the theory of possible worlds to argue against Pike’s view. The last subsection, IV. C., examines God’s omnipotence, and starts with Aquinas’s arguments that God’s omnipotence includes only those things that are logically possible in IV. C. 1. George Mavrodes’s article, IV. C. 2, finds a solution to the famous "paradox of the stone" while Harry G. Frankfurt, IV. C. 3, criticizes Mavrodes and offers that based on the Thomistic argument of God’s omnipotence the stone paradox can be resolved. Nelson Pike’s article, IV. C. 4, asserts that omnipotence is not limited even by sin because omnipotence is not an essential property of God. However, God refrains from sinful actions if the Thomistic view of omnipotence is correct. The final reading, IV. C. 5, by Peter Geach, argues that omnipotence is a defective notion and is an Hellenistic influence and is not found in the Bible.

Part V of the anthology studies miracles and revelation. Part V. 1 contains Hume’s classic argument against the belief in miracles because sense perception gives us tremendous evidence for the laws of nature and each profession of a miracle must be evaluated against the overwhelming evidence for the uniformity of nature and its laws. Richard Swinburne, in V. 2, attacks Hume’s argument and offers that a supernatural entity is capable of causing supernatural events. In V. 3 J. L. Mackie argues against miracles on the epistemological grounds that miracles, while they may be logically possible, we are never justified in believing in them because a report of a miracle may follow an unknown natural law or it is a violation of natural law and likely never happened. Richard L. Purtill, in V. 4, attacks Hume’s critique of the epistemic status of miracles and, like Swinburne, believes that if there is a God who is active in the human realm, then miracles are likely. The last reading, V. 5, by Swinburne, gives the criteria by which a religion could claim that it is the revelation of God working in human history.

Part VI examines death and immortality. VI. 1 is a reading from Plato’s Alcibiades I and the Phaedo where in both of which Socrates argues for the immortality of the soul and how a belief in an afterlife might influence our behavior. Hume, VI. 2, argues for the mortality of the soul for three reasons: the notion of the soul separate from the body is incoherent; that God’s justice demands an afterlife for proper rewards and punishments for our mortal actions is nonsensical; physical analogies for the mortality of the soul, like the temporary extinction of sleep, the parallel development of the mind and body throughout life and ending in dissolution and annihilation, point to death because the analogical arguments for the soul are based on nature where death is requisite. In VI. 3 Bertrand Russell objects to the doctrine of an afterlife and argues that belief in immortality is promoted by psychological need. John Hick, VI. 4, argues for immortality on the basis of an analogy between reappearances of persons in this world and the expectation of a reappearance of persons in a future life. Antony Flew, in VI. 5, argues against Biblical and Platonic-Cartesian conceptions of the soul and asserts an astral-body view of immortality. The sixth reading contains Jeffrey Olen’s argument that if different computers can process the same information, then human beings can survive death by transferring their memories to other bodies. Employing some arguments by Aristotle, Peter Van Invagen, VI. 7, argues for the Christian notion of bodily resurrection.

Part VII entitled "Faith and Reason" examines four issues: challenges to faith and reason, the pragmatic attempt to justify religious belief, fideism, and rationally-justified religious belief. VII. A. 1 is a debate between Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell on the reasonableness of faith. Flew argues that theists must state the conditions for the falsification of their beliefs because truth claims must be testable. Hare argues against the rational criticism of belief because religion is may be opposed to reason. Mitchell contends that rational considerations play an important but qualified role in a theist’s beliefs because the believer must decide when accumulated evidence counts against further belief. In VII. A. 2 Michael Scriven challenges theists to give rational arguments for their justification of belief when the traditional arguments for God’s existence fail to give rational justification. C. S. Lewis, in VII. A. 3, explains that rational considerations play an important role early in the development of a theistic belief but play less of a role in a more developed belief. In VII. B., three classical essays on the justification of religious belief are given: Blaise Pascal’s "The Wager," W. K. Clifford’s "The Ethics of Belief," and William James’s "The Will to Believe." VII. C is on fideism, or the view that reason is not needed for faith in religious belief. VII. C. 1 is a reading from the work of Soren Kierkegaard in which he observes that true faith is attended by the failure of reason. In VII. C. 2 Robert M. Adams critiques Kierkegaard’s view. Ludwig Wittgenstein explains that the language game of fideism is special, and outsiders cannot understand it in VII. C. 3. Building on Wittgenstein’s work, Norman Malcolm in VII. C. 4 believes that religion and science are two different language games neither of which need justification. The final reading, VII. C. 5 by Michael Martin explains that while religion should be understood before it is criticized, even atheists can understand and justifiably criticize religious belief. VII. D. debates rationality and justified religious belief. In VII. D. 1, among other things, John Hick argues that theists rely upon evidence of their religious experience, but that such experience is unavailable to the nonbeliever. Nonetheless, he holds this evidence is rational. Alvin Plantinga in VII. D. 2 argues that, paradoxically, theism is rational even though evidence is lacking for the belief; and Michael Martin critiques Plantinga’s view as a form of extreme relativism in VII. D. 3. Pojman in VII. D. 4 gives a coherence theory of meaning to religious belief.

Part VIII of the book concerns religious pluralism. John Hick, in VIII. 1, argues that all the major religions lead to the same Ultimate Reality. The opposing argument is stated by Plantinga, who argues in VIII. 2 that a religious system may properly demand religious exclusivism. In VIII. 3, Paul Tillich develops the definition of faith as ultimate concern. The object of this concern while approachable through religious theism, is beyond the concept of a personal God.

Part IX of the book studies morality and religion. Plato’s Euthyphro is the first essay; IX. 1, it raises the question of the divine command theory of ethics. In IX. 2 Patrick Nowell-Smith contends that deontological religious ethics is far less responsive to the open-ended demands of the world than secular ethics. In IX. 3 George Mavrodes explains that secular ethics cannot attend to problems arising from the sacrificing of personal welfare for moral duty while religious ethics succeeds in giving a foundation for moral duty.

In sum, Pojman’s Philosophy of Religion is a comprehensive and thorough resource for courses in the philosophy of Western religion. All the selections are authoritative and presented in a context of open debate. This anthology should be seriously considered for undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of religion. The only caveat is that it is an analytical approach to the subject. While Pojman discusses Freud and Marx in the introductions, no selections by them are included in the anthology. Also, Nietzsche’s criticisms of religion and Ludwig Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums are omitted, as are any continental perspectives. Omissions that are not as easy to forgive in an analytical approach to the philosophy of religion are the study of religious language and A. J. Ayer’s criticisms of religion. Yet, this is a first-rate text in the philosophy of religion.

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