The following appeared in Volume 97, Number 2 (Spring, 1998) of the APA Newsletters

The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and many subsequent declarations, including the two International Covenants, proclaim the equal rights of human beings without regard to their sex. It now seems quite startling that the Universal Declaration should have so clearly repudiated distinctions of sex, since there was not a country in the world at the time whose laws did not routinely make such distinctions, often on matters of basic rights. France and Italy had only just enfranchised women and, in Switzerland, women could not vote in national elections until 1973. All countries had laws that discriminated between the sexes in many respects, such as family law, employment, and civic duties such as jury duty and military service.

Though much has changed, women are still discriminated against in various ways in all of the world's countries, though to a widely varying extent. Accordingly, there has been even more discrepancy between countries' stances in ratifying treaties proclaiming women's rights and their actual laws and practices than is the case with other human rights. Moreover, sex discrimination has been, and still is in many places, seen as far more natural, inevitable, and benign than other grounds for distinction between persons that are ruled out by human rights declarations- such as race, religion, or political opinion. Indeed, as I shall explain, religion, and more generally culture, are often the justifications given for the unequal treatment of women.

In general, the early human rights documents proclaimed women's equal rights without acknowledging that some of these rights might be any different from men's rights. Sometimes the documents used the then supposedly generic male pronouns; sometimes they used gender-neutral language. But even the latter, as two feminist commentators have recently noted, can be "a double-edged instrument if it is used to punish women for failing to conform to the conventional norms expected of men."¹ The first human rights document to challenge such expectations was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979), which spelled out women's rights in considerable detail. It departs from gender-neutral language to address issues such as maternity leave, pregnancy-related health care, and affirmative action for women in education and employment. More reservations were expressed by governments ratifying CEDAW than regarding any other human rights document, most of them on the grounds that certain of the rights proclaimed were incompatible with the religions or cultures of their countries. The CEDAW undoubtedly made progress in thinking about women's human rights. However, as I shall explain, within the last fifteen years it has been increasingly recognized that taking women seriously as equal human rights claimants with men requires considerable further rethinking of the concept of human rights. This reconceptualization has resulted from the work of the global movement to recognize women's rights as human rights, which was catalyzed by the growth of a vast network of grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These facilitated the communication of concerns emerging from the experiences of women's day-to-day lives, to regional women's NGOs or to the more mainstream human rights organizations, and thence to the level of international conferences.² By 1993, women's human rights advocates were "[b]y far the most organized and vocal of the NGO participants" at the Vienna Human Rights Conference, and they had considerable impact on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.³ In September 1995 in Beijing, despite considerable obstacles-including opposition from both the Vatican and some Islamic fundamentalists-important further steps were taken.

Why has rethinking human rights been necessitated by the movement to put women's rights on the mainstream human rights agenda?⁴ Because both the early conception of "the rights of man" in the 17th century and the original conception of international "human rights" in the 20th century were formulated with male family heads in mind. They were conceived of as rights of such individuals against each other and, especially, against the governments under which they lived. It was generally recognized that there existed a sphere of privacy, protected by rights from intrusion from the outside, but not necessarily governed internally in accordance with the rights of its members. John Locke gives, as an example of the private matters that no one would consider interfering with, a man's right to marry off his daughter.⁵ Any rights the daughter herself might have claimed in the matter go unmentioned. About two and a half centuries later, Article 12 of the UDHR asserts, in part: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation." This seemingly benign statement now sounds far more ominous and objectionable than it presumably did when adopted, due to our heightened awareness of both the prevalence of violence within the "privacy" of family homes and the practice in some cultures of the confinement, beating, and even murder of women if their sexual behavior (in some contexts, even their having been raped) is considered to have tainted their families' "honor". There can be little doubt that not only Locke but also the framers of the UDHR had male household heads foremost in mind when thinking about the holders of the "natural" rights for which they argued, or the "human" rights which they proclaimed.⁶

A growing body of feminist human rights literature argues that existing theories, compilations, and prioritizations of human rights have been constructed after this male model.⁷ When women's life experiences are taken equally into account and the private sphere is not neglected, these theories, compilations and prioritizations must be seen in a significantly different light. Considerably more attention needs to be paid to what happens within families, not just what happens to their "heads." Examples of issues that come to the forefront, rather than being virtually ignored, include rape (including marital rape) and domestic violence, reproductive freedom, inequalities in marriage and divorce, the valuation of child care and other domestic labor as work, and inequality of opportunity between the sexes in education, employment, housing, credit, and health care. The aim is to incorporate into the discourse of human rights issues that are often matters of life and death for women (and children) but that, as "women's rights", have been "perceived as...marginal to international law's more 'serious' responsibility for human rights."⁸

Some generally recognized human rights abuses have specifically gender-related forms, which have not been or have less generally been recognized as human rights abuses. For example, slavery is generally recognized as a fundamental violation of human rights. But for parents to give their daughter in marriage while still a child or in exchange for money, to refuse her her own choice of marriage partner, or even to sell her to a pimp, have not typically been seen as instances of slavery. If a husband pays a bride price for his wife or marries her without her adult consent, confines her to their home, forbids her to work for pay or appropriates her wages, beats her for disobedience or mishap, or divorces her unilaterally and without adequate support, these manners of treatment, though quite similar to some forms of slavery, are not recognized as violations of human rights in many parts of the world.⁹ In various parts, such acts are regarded as quite within the limits of normal, culturally appropriate and sanctioned behavior in parents or husbands. Also, many cultures (including European and North American ones until very recently) have regarded husbands' sexual access to their wives as an inherent part of marriage; it was not until the Beijing Conference in 1995 that women's right to say "no" to sexual intercourse was recognized. Nor would most mainstream human rights activists, until recently, have been willing to recognize such abuses of women as serious violations of human rights. But only when all such instances of gender-based rights are recognized as human rights will women's rights be fully understood as human rights. Promoting women's human rights clearly involves making changes within areas of life usually considered private, and "[c]alling for government accountability in these areas requires a considerable reorientation of human rights law." (Friedman, 20)

Those seeking to establish women's rights as human rights point out that much of earlier human rights thinking focuses on governments as the most likely violators of human rights. This is readily apparent from the wording of most of the international agreements.¹⁰ But whereas governments can often affect, and act to reduce or eliminate many violations of women's human rights, the violations themselves are much more likely to be carried out by individual men (and sometimes women, too) than by governments. As we have seen, a large part of the reason for the "invisibility" of many gender-based rights violations has been due to the neglect in human rights talk of the domestic sphere of family life. For it is in this sphere that great numbers of the world's women live most (in some cases virtually all) of their lives, and in which vast numbers of violations of women's human rights take place. (See Peters and Wolper, "Introduction," 2.) In many countries-at least during peace time-a woman's most dangerous environment is the home she lives in. Thus the public/private dichotomy, which leads to the assumption that the rights bearer is the head of a household and that an important one of "his" rights is the right to privacy in his personal and family life, places serious obstacles in the way of protecting the rights of women and children.¹¹ This problem is compounded by both the neglect and the denial of power differentials between family members, and the unfounded assumption that families can be relied upon to operate with a benignity never expected of the marketplace or the sphere of politics.¹²

Promoting women's human rights, even their basic rights to personal freedom and physical security, thus clearly involves making changes within areas of life usually considered to be private, and "calling for government accountability in these areas requires a considerable reorientation of human rights law." (Friedman, 20) Charlotte Bunch, noting that the violation of men's civil and political rights in the public sphere "has been privileged in human rights work," aptly notes that men "did not fear violations in the private sphere of the home because they were the masters of that territory." (Bunch, 13) Of course, how benefits and burdens are allocated in the private sphere of the household, how power is distributed and how decisions are made in that sphere, has a strong impact on who can participate fully and effectively in the public spheres of politics, civil society, and markets.

As I have suggested, the difficulties involved in getting women's human rights fully recognized are not helped by the fact that "respecting cultural differences" has increasingly been used as a justification for restricting or denying women's rights. As feminist activist-scholars have been making clear, the relevance, even the sanctity, of "cultural practices" is most often claimed when issues having to do with sexuality, marriage and divorce, reproduction, inheritance, and power over children are concerned-issues that play a much larger part in most women's lives than they do in most men's. It is crucial that attention be paid to the power of convention, custom, tradition, culture and religion in people's (especially women's) lives. Religion and other aspects of culture have powerful effects on people's perceptions of themselves, their primary attachments, their needs and desires and, therefore, their beliefs about what they have a right to-in short, on their identities. This problem is accentuated when religious doctrine or the customs of a culture are codified into actual law, which is far more often the case with respect to family or "personal" law than other areas of law.

That laws relating to family life are not only of extreme importance to women seeking equal rights but also of particular importance to religious or cultural leaders has accentuated the clash between religious or cultural claims and claims for women's rights.¹³ On the one hand, women's human rights activists and theorists try to be sensitive to cultural and ethnic as well as to other circumstances of women. On the other hand, they are aware that the beliefs and practices of many cultures and religions militate strongly against the equality of women, especially in matters relating to sexuality and reproduction, marriage and family relations. As two advocates of women's human rights have recently written:

The long, culturally diverse list of practices that effectively treat women as objects or property cannot be adequately addressed by...a vague invocation to equal treatment. Many of these practices are considered so 'normal,' 'natural,' and 'inevitable' that only clear rejection of the specific practice will help real women and their daughters. (Kaufmann & Lindquist, 122-23)

Thus, while in some circles "respecting cultural differences" has increasingly become a euphemism for restricting or denying women's human rights, in others the need to interrogate cultural claims as specifically as possible in order to promote women's equal rights is clearly recognized.

Not surprisingly, then, the recognition of women's claim to equality, with particular attention to family life, has begun to change the perceptions of religion and other aspects of culture put forth in human rights documents that specifically address women's human rights. Earlier human rights documents not only proclaimed the human rights to freedom of religion and to one's culture; they contained nothing but positive depictions of religions and cultures. More recently, in the context of women's human rights, although the positive role of religion in people's lives is still recognized, a certain wariness is clearly evident: Both the CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action include, in their discussions of religion, statements to the effect that "any form of extremism may have a negative impact on women and can lead to violence and discrimination."¹⁴ And, while the CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action respectively mention "cultural ...rights" and "respect...for cultural, religious, and other diversity," they also evince the understanding that "full equality between the sexes is likely to require cultural change."¹⁵ Thus the CEDAW calls for states parties "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." (CEDAW, Article 5a) Similarly, The Beijing Platform states that "cultural prejudice" can adversely affect women, and that "[a]ny harmful aspect of certain traditional, customary, or modern practices that violates the rights of women should be prohibited and eliminated." (Covenant, 112)

Recently, religious fundamentalism and orthodoxy have been growing in many parts of the world, partly in reaction to the legacy of colonialism and the pressure of Western or "white" values and ideas. Women's freedom and equality are often understood as clear symbols of such values and the control of women becomes a pivotal issue.¹⁶ Thus claims from religious or cultural conservatives often run directly into conflict with the recognition of women's equal rights.

We are now at a very significant turning point. The challenge faced by women's human rights activists who aim to implement these rights includes translating them into culturally or religiously acceptable language, or aiming to reform certain aspects of the cultures that are harmful to women, without threatening the culture as a whole. In taking up this challenge, a crucial role can be played by critics who have both the detailed knowledge acquired from having lived within a given culture and the perspective gained from going outside of it. For such critics are well placed both to know intimately the details of the culture and to have the perspective that can be gained by a certain amount of distance. They are also uniquely well placed to question the right and the authority of those (most often, male elites) who claim to speak for their cultures or religions on the world stage.

While many women around the world are fully cognizant of and are fighting for their rights, others are so enculturated or indoctrinated as not to think of themselves as having certain basic rights, much less the right to be treated as men's equals. As Mahnaz Afkhami, scholar-activist for Muslim women's rights, says: "unless a substantial number of women in a community come to believe that they have rights and demand to exercise them, right remains an abstraction." (Afkhami, 5) Like regimes, however, religions and cultures can change, whether dramatically or more gradually. The opportunities for change in the contemporary world, with its vast population shifts and remarkable communications technologies, are unprecedented. Activists for women's human rights share the aim of reconciling women's full equality with men, as proclaimed by international human rights law, while recognizing the centrality of religion or culture in defining most women's identities and deeply held values. They hope to increase women's senses of entitlement to treatment as full human beings without undermining their most fundamental senses of who they are. And those activists who combine the deep understanding of an insider with the critical distance of an outsider can play a

crucial part in this continuing struggle for women's equality.

Notes

1. Natalie Hevener Kaufman and Stefanie A. Lindquist, "Critiquing Gender-Neutral Treaty Language: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women," in Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper (eds), Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (New York: Routledge. 1995), 121-22.

2. For a brief account of these developments, see Elisabeth Friedman, "Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement," in Peters and Wolper, ibid., 18-35. Women's human rights activists have made real inroads into mainstream organizations like Amnesty International, and the Women's Rights Project was started up within Human Rights Watch.

3. Friedman, ibid., 30-31. As she reports, human rights activist Dorothy Thomas says that three key issues remain: moving beyond mere visibility for women's human rights to actual accountability for abuse; avoiding falling into "the trap of establishing some kind of parallel universe for women in the human rights area" (rather, having women's issues considered at every level and in every forum of the UN); finally, continuing to organize cross-culturally, remaining sensitive to the needs and desires of women from every region of the world.

4. The following three paragraphs draw substantially from my "Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and Cultural Differences," forthcoming in Hypatia (1998).

5. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill, 1950 {first published 1689}), 28-29.

6. Charlotte Bunch, "Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective," in Peters and Wolper, note 1 supra, 11-17; Susan Moller Okin, "Humanist Liberalism," in Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.) Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 39-53; Carole Pateman, "The Rights of Man and Early Feminism," in Frauen und Politik, Swiss Yearbook of Political Science (1994), 19-31.

7. See for example Bunch, ibid. and Hilary Charlesworth, "What are 'Women's International Human Rights'?" in Rebecca J. Cook (ed.) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 58-84.

8. Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, "Introduction" to Women's Rights, Human Rights, note 1 supra, 2.

9. Some such customs, such as bride price, are explained as intending to honor the woman and her family, but their practical effect is to oppress women and serve men. Kaufman and Lindquist, note 1 supra, 123, citing D. Russell, Lives of Courage: Women for a New South Africa (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books 1989), 131.

10. For example, as Hilary Charlesworth points out: "A central feature of the international legal definition of torture is that it takes place in the public realm: it must be 'inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity'." Charlesworth, note 7 supra, 72, and 83, n.103, quoting from the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 11. On the arbitrariness of the public/private distinction where women's right to be free from violence is concerned, see Charlesworth, "What are 'Women's International Human Rights'?" esp. pp.72-74.

12. See Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 117-33; and Carole Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy," in The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 118-40.

13. See for example Farida Shaheed, "Controlled or Autonomous: Identity and the Experience of the Network, Women Living under Muslim Laws," SIGNS: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19, 4 (1994) 997-1019 and Ann Elizabeth Meyer, "Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?" Michigan Journal of International Law 15, 2 (1994), 307-404.

14. The wording in the CEDAW is somewhat more convoluted. It calls for "the eradication of any conflicts which may arise between the rights of women and the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary practices, cultural prejudices and religious extremism."

15. CEDAW, Preamble; Covenant for a New Millennium: The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Santa Rosa CA: Free Hand Books, 1996), p.38.

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