The following appeared in Volume 98, Number 1 (Fall, 1998) of the APA Newsletters

I would like to give a brief description of the state of philosophy in Iran and at the same time comment on the state of philosophy and philosophers in the west (concerning only certain issues). I feel this is necessary since the point of this Newsletter is to allow a productive dialogue to take place.

To understand the Iranian philosophical scene, one needs to consider the political context shaped by the 1978 political revolution. Shah Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi, who had earlier been ousted was restored to power by a coup d’état the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arranged in 1953. From then until now, I would suggest that American policy was focussed on crushing any democratic arrangements in Iran and in the region. A stout defender of United States’ interests in the area, the Shah was expected to suppress any attempts to disrupt the flow of oil. Meanwhile, five-year plans that he introduced in the name of industrialization and "westernization" destroyed Iran’s agriculture, making its economy dependent on oil. Farmers were forced to abandon their lands, and they had to migrate to work in urban factories. In order to quell popular protest against the resultant very difficult economic situation, the infamous Security and Intelligence Agency, SasmAne Ammnyiiat va Ettelaate Keshvar (SAVAK), the CIA-trained secret police, did not hesitate to torture protesters. Nail-pulling, skull-drilling and the steel bed barbecue (an instrument of torture) became all too familiar to Iranians. In their eyes, the Shah, who was supported by the Western powers, represented everything they ascribe to the West: moral relativism, consumerism, secularism, decadence and imperialism. Further, for Iranians, the alliance of the regime with the West put Iran in effective alliance with America’s other major regional ally, Israel. Finally, in order to introduce import consumerism, to depoliticize the young, and to reduce any opposition to his puppet-master relationship with Western powers and their ally in the region —Israel— the Shah had to go against traditional religious values. And so it was to be expected that with the coming of the revolution the Shah and whatever he represented would be considered "bad," anti-religious and, hence, to be avoided.

This revolution and the subsequent quest for the perfect Islamic state so polarised Iranian life that even the universities were closed for a while so that the authorities could figure out what Islamic sciences might be. There were debates, the most pronounced of which concerned the "human sciences." It was understood, not so explicitly perhaps, that the human sciences are affected by social practices and world views. The basic position taken was that if a given practice is immoral (i.e., against social justice, family values, etc.), then the theory that informs it is questionable. Iranian life under the Shah was held by many to issue out of questionable Western social scientific theories. "Western" social sciences consequently appeared tainted by irreligiousness and untruth.

This position is well displayed in the confusion surrounding the "Heidegger Affair" after the publication of Victor Farias’s book on Martin Heidegger, in North America and Europe. The confusion is precisely about how Heidegger’s political position affected his thought—a question which has not yet been answered adequately. The authorities in Iran also saw this connection. Like the Chinese before them, they closed the universities for a few years to do their own "cultural revolution." At last, it was decided that it is better to study Western and Islamic human sciences on their own and let a slow and long dialogue take place between the traditional (religious) schools and the universities, whereby the nature of Western human sciences would become more apparent. Sociology and psychology were most affected, philosophy less so. Somehow philosophy was harder to classify as "Western" or Islamic. After all, the fathers of "Western" philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, are as influential in Islamic philosophy, and in fact they were, for the most part, introduced to the Western world through Islamic translations and commentaries. Indeed, "classical Greece" was as much a Middle Eastern as a European phenomenon. The politicization of everything forced various philosophers and intellectuals to ask about the political "cash value" of their thoughts for the new Iranian society. Considering the religious nature of the revolution, the following two general issues are among the most debated ones in this regard: –Is a religious state compatible with civil society? –How do democracy and religion come together?¹ In some universities these issues are discussed from the point of view of Critical Theory, particularly that of Jürgen Habermas. For instance, at the University of Tehran, Dr. Muhammad Bashirieh teaches Habermas in his graduate classes on political philosophy. These classes are well received by the students. Finally the very sensitive question of whether religion and politics are separated or not, is heatedly debated.² The situation is quite complex.

On one hand, in order to win people’s support and stay in power the authorities have to take, or at least say that they take, an anti-imperialist foreign policy stance. They have to do this mostly because their legitimation rests on their being heirs to Ayatollah Khomeini and the early years of the revolution when the state was truly anti-imperialistic and popular. But now that they are in power and want to stay in power, they have to justify themselves. Hence they have to say that religion and politics are the same. Of course it is important to understand what they mean by this: by religion, they mean the representatives of religion, namely themselves, the clergy; and by politics, they mean political power and government.

On the other hand, the advocates of separation between religion and politics, however, are not so clear about what they say. What they really mean is that clergy and government should be separated. However, the most outspoken representative of this camp is Abdol Karim Soroush who, with his many books and articles on this matter, does in fact promote the separation of religious and political matters. He takes religion to be a private affair which should not be mixed with politics.³ In the name of democracy, ironically, a public sphere of life and religion is depoliticized. Separating the private sphere from the public one is a cause for a common kind of social schizophrenia: one would go to church on Sundays, and to Wall Street on Mondays. To achieve consistency, I argue, private and public spheres must interact. Hypocrisy is not a virtue in anybody’s book. Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Heidegger, to mention a few, all point out the inseparability of knowledge (reason, thinking) and interest (value judgement, faith). Heidegger goes so far as to say: "This originary believing is not at all a matter of accepting that which offers immediate support and makes courage superfluous. This believing is rather a persisting in the uttermost decision" [Ausharren in der aussersten Entscheidung] (GA 65, 237), whereby believing is identified with the ground of thinking. One could see that if these two spheres are allowed to interact, then both will be open to change. Religion becomes more serious when it has to deal with the realities of its believers’ lives. The pragmatism of the Iranian government is also partly the pragmatism of their Islam. They have to deal with questions that they did not have to consider concretely when religion and politics were separated under the Shah: Do we make a pact with Europeans who are as "bad" as the United States government, since they too have imperialistic intentions? Do we make a pact with Syria knowing that it is as Machiavellian as Britain? Is crossing the red light a traffic violation or a religious one? Sacred texts and traditions are being debated and interpreted in the parliament, in the newspapers and among the ordinary people. This is what breaks open "religious" rigidity.

Why advocate the separation of religion and politics? Some think that "religious" people want to impose their way of life on others, disregarding consensus; this charge has been hurled at Zionists, Stalinists, and Nazis alike. Of course, there is more to viable democracy than just imposing the consensus of the majority on the minority. Minorities must be afforded the chance to become majorities. The problem seems to have nothing to do with religion or theologies, but everything to do with the process of interpretation and the political consequences of a way of thinking. By mentioning this I want to point out that those who advocate, particularly in the West, the separation of religion from politics in relation to Iran and Islam, either have ulterior motives which are not totally based on their desire for democracy and justice, or are ignorant. I am also trying to answer a question, namely: why do these intellectuals and the so-called philosophers have these positions? For instance, what is wielded around in the international arena as "fundamentalism" has its roots in the CIA campaign to vilify Islam in general and Iran after the 1978 revolution in particular. Iranians are Shiieh who believe in the hermeneutical interpretation of Qur’an and Hadith. The real fundamentalists are ostensibly the Saudi Arabians who do not believe in hermeneutics. But then why isn’t Saudi Arabia mentioned in this regard? Because the Saudis along with the Israelis (who have their own fundamentalists), are the current regional representatives of United States interests in the Middle East.

Philosophy has more of a chance to become effectively consequential in Iran because religion and politics are not separated there. Separated from politics, philosophers are not taken seriously. Philosophy becomes an extension of the political system, justifying instead of genuinely questioning (Medical Ethics!, Business Ethics!!, Dental Ethics!!!). Instead of radically exploring, say, the nature of profit, money, and work, professional philosophers ask if dentists should admit to having AIDS or if cameras and microphones should be installed in employees’ locker rooms. It is not that philosophy has stooped to the trivial but that it has assumed too much, leaving many fundamental things unquestioned.⁴ Why? One can refer to "capitalism as the spirit of the age," or "technology (control) as the name of Being of our epoch," with the resultant field and habitus (Bourdieu) for the Homo Academicus, which would make sense. Self-interest and the will-to-control are two primary drives of the contemporary western man.⁵ But this would be an analysis at the in-itself level so to speak. We should do an analysis at the for-itself level. We need to question philosophers too, and by this I mean people who claim to be philosophers. If inherent to philosophy is the claim to truth, truthfulness and the good, and if according to Plato these are the same, then philosophers in particular should be consistent in their claims and acts. They cannot just say that they are the employees of the empire and are just doing their jobs (remember Eichmann in Jerusalem).

It would be revealing to see how these philosophers try to justify themselves: they would engage with issues that have little or no consequence for justice. The Heidegger affair is a good case in point. It is very easy to become morally judgmental about the racism and violence of the Nazis, something that happened in the past, but very difficult to protest the racism and violence that is happening right now: Bosnia, Palestine, Algeria, Guatemala, America’s inner cities and prison system, and so on.⁶ This is why Heidegger becomes an easy target but Emmanuel Levinas who is far more hypocritical than Heidegger, is not mentioned by these loud critics and champions of morality.⁷ One can do a construction, as Heidegger says, and consider the effects of this hypocrisy and weakness of spirit on the philosophy that is produced. The corpus of what is known as Continental Philosophy is a good indication of this infirmity. The prevalent style of this corpus is unnecessary vagueness, repetitiveness, loose philosophizing, all pretentious and provocative for the sake of marketing. I actually know of a few philosophers in this field who invite speakers from other countries or cities, whose talk contribute nothing or very little, far below the level that justifies spending the department’s budget, but in return that speaker invites his host to give a talk. The net effect: the money that should be spent on furthering philosophy is used for sight seeing and becoming famous.

One can do a Foucauldian analysis and show how philosophers, by avoiding the real issues, become accomplices to the general violence. It can be shown how the empire requires this and how they rearrange their language, practices and concerns to fit this demand. They mutually form each other. And the so called Analytic Philosophy? The prevalent trend in this field is to become an extension of psychology departments.⁸ Imperialism does not want to have a conscience. (I am trying to show that the position of the western intellectuals and philosophers toward Iran and Islam is a symptom of their forgetfulness of the fundamental demands of philosophy).

Now I would like to mention some of the more concrete issues internal to Iran that raise philosophical questions for Iranian intellectuals. Considering that Iran now has to concentrate on building itself, "development" and specifically "technology" are among the main topics that attract the attention of Iranian intellectuals. In this vein, some of the questions raised are:

Some people, including Soroush, argue that technology is culturally neutral.¹⁰ It can be imported without affecting anyone’s value system and world view. Others, notably the followers of the late Professor Ahmad Fardid, an avowed Heideggerian, argue that technology itself is the problem. The authorities here are quite pragmatic: they need technology to stay in power and to run the country. The other group of issues debated, but with less heat, is about the relation of Heidegger’s thought to Islamic mysticism (Erfan). It was Henry Corbin who first ignited interest in such comparisons.¹¹ Then the late Professor Fardid’s lectures introduced Heidegger’s later thought in Iran. Unfortunately, because of his own eccentric understanding of Heidegger, he mystified what many already find mystifying. We have yet to see the publication of his "thousands of pages" of notes on Heidegger promised by his followers.

Another set of issues debated in the last few years concerns the nature of poststructuralism. As in America, so too in Iran, these debates started with the discussion of "postmodernism" in architecture and soon moved to other fields. Just as in the United States, the debate is conducted with a lot of misunderstandings. For instance, it is mostly thought that postmodernism implies relativism, that there are no final truths, and that, therefore, there are no cultural or religious principles that are rational. But when the post-structuralist position is presented carefully, and when its main proponents such as Heidegger, Jacques Derrida or Michel Foucault are discussed in detail, the charge of relativism fades away quickly. Among the important modern philosophers whose works are often translated and discussed is Kant. His views on ethics and politics are commented on and frequently compared to Islamic philosophers such as Mulla Sadra’s or the late Allameh Tabataba’s.¹²

Among the organizations that teach or do research in philosophy are all the universities, since introductory Islamic philosophy is taught to all undergraduates. Most universities offer philosophy as a major at the undergraduate and graduate levels. The traditional theological schools such as Imam Khomeini Research Center and the Islamic Center for Research, both in Qum, study Christian theology and, recently, contemporary Western philosophy. The Society for Wisdom and Philosophy,¹³ an affiliate of the Ministry of Education, has research groups on the philosophy of science, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of logic. Foreign philosophers are often invited to present papers or direct seminars. In 1995, Paul Ricoeur was invited. Finally, the Institute for Theoretical Physics and Mathematics¹⁴ has research groups on mathematical logic, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence.

1. Cf. the series of articles written in Keyan [Flag] and Iran-e Farda [Tomorrow’s Iran] both monthly magazines published in Tehran, and to books and articles by Abdol Karim Soroush.

2. This is the issue of "Church and State" phrased differently.

3. See his interview with Los Angeles Times, Robin Wright, "Islamist’s Theory of Relativity," Los Angeles Times, A, 1:1, Jan. 27, 1995. Some of his works include the following: Knowledge and Value, Tehran: Sarat Publishers. Hekmat va Ma’yshat (Tehran: Sarat Publishers, 1994); Farbeh Tar Az ydeology [Fatter than Idelogy] (Tehran: Sarat Publishers, 1994); Nahade Na-arame Jahan [The Restless Nature of the World] (Tehran: Sarat Publishers); Tafarroje Son’e (Tehran: Sarat Publishers).

4. A scientist after constructing a neural network that recognizes few shapes, is reported to have developed the "first thinking machine"! Reuters news release, December 18, 1996.

5. This raises the question of the priority of these two tendencies: What names our time, en-framing (as Heidegger says) or en-pricing (to coin an ugly name for an ugly concept)? What drives "progress" more, the urge to control or self-interest? Imperialism caters to both.

6. One can object: how can one lump the other(s) (the North Africans in France, the Indians in Central America, the Gypsies in Europe, the Kurds, the children in labor camps of Central America that provide cheap sugar for the United States, ...) under a nameless "etcetera"? Well, this article itself seems to belong to an etc, with very little or no effect.

7. Heidegger at least did not overtly claim to be doing Ethics or base his philosophy on resentment (or should I say ressentiment) toward another people.

8. A Wired magazine interviewer calls Paul Churchland, "Neurophilosopher," and a "scientific philosopher... of mind," (emphasis mine), and he seems to fancy himself as such. See his The Engine of Reason: The Seat of the Soul.

9. Cf. Farhang va Touse’eh [Culture and Development], a monthly magazine published in Tehran with some articles in English.

10. See his articles in Keyan.

11. See Henry Corbin’s several studies on Islamic philosophy, for instance Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shee’h Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

12. See Motahhari, Morteza, Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism (Tehran: Sadra Publishing Co.), and, Ebrahimi Dinani, Hossein, The Story of Philosophical Thinking in the Islamic World (Tehran: Enteshar Publishing Co., 1998).

13. This center Anjoman-e Hekmat va Falsafe is located at Nofel Le Chatoue Street, Tehran.