The following appeared in Volume 98, Number 1 (Fall, 1998) of the APA Newsletters

There are communication problems within philosophy. No matter what we may disagree on, we can all agree on this. What, however, is the source of the communication problems? In attempting to answer this question it is instructive to look outside of our own discipline to communication problems in general. In Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know¹ E.D. Hirsch, Jr. argues that: comprehension depends on background knowledge to a great extent; it is surprising what many of us do not know; poor communication is frequently the product of poor comprehension; and there are things that the culturally literate American needs to know.² I propose that just as there is a basic cultural literacy we need in order to operate effectively in society at large, so too there is a basic philosophical literacy we need in order to operate effectively within the discipline of philosophy. In what follows I shall briefly sketch how philosophical literacy applies to the profession, graduate training, the major, and the introductory philosophy course.

The poor communication within philosophy is largely, though not exclusively, the result of a lack of shared information. The two most important and obvious causes of our lack of shared information are the analytic/continental split and overspecialization. Many in the profession lack the basic information needed to effectively comprehend the work of others. Analytic philosophers by and large, but with significant exceptions, have not made the effort to learn the concerns, methodology, and terminology of continental philosophers. The same is true, of course, of the efforts of continental philosophers to learn the ways of analytic philosophers. Unfortunately, this is, in a way, a worst case scenario. Not only do we have two groups, each lacking the basic information needed to understand one another, but all too often members of each group do not even consider the other worth knowing. Mutual contempt and disagreement as to what the basic issues of philosophy are, in part due to a lack of shared information, furthers the poor communication.³

In Philosophy and Its History⁴ Jorge J.E. Gracia has argued that our shared interest in the history of philosophy can help bridge the analytic/continental divide. The history of philosophy, in the sense that Gracia conceives of it, is part of what we may call philosophical literacy—it is one of those things every philosopher needs to know. There are many benefits to studying the history of philosophy⁵, not the least of which is that of providing a basis of shared information among philosophers.

In addition to the communication problems caused by the notorious analytic/continental rift, there are communication problems on each side of the divide. Overspecialization is partly responsible. Areas of specialization have indeed become so narrow that journal editors sometimes have difficulty in finding a suitable referee for a particular paper. Attending colloquium papers at an APA meeting can also give some indication of the problem. Unless a paper is in one’s own narrowly defined area of specialization, the chances of achieving satisfactory comprehension are not good.⁶ I am not suggesting that we abandon specialization altogether but that perhaps it has gone too far. We, as philosophers, should be broad in our scope of knowledge and communicate that knowledge in a way that is accessible to our peers. We should not hem ourselves in and in doing so exclude others; we should not become the philosophical equivalents of assembly line workers, each knowing his own task and ignorant of that of others. Perhaps the days of the great all-encompassing philosophies of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Hegel are gone, but we can each afford to broaden our scope and accessibility.

If there are problems with communication resulting from philosophical illiteracy within the profession, we would be well-advised to examine the training ground for the profession. Graduate work in philosophy is far from uniform in this country. In a way this is a virtue; one chooses what one will study by choosing where one will study it. Unfortunately, little is being done in our graduate schools to solve the communication problems and foster philosophical literacy. Students quickly learn, if they have not chosen on that very basis, whether they are in an "analytic" or a "continental" department. Many students who come to graduate school with a love of philosophy, plain and simple, learn that they must choose sides.

We also get the beginnings of overspecialization in graduate school. A dissertation, after all, is not a test or demonstration of general philosophical knowledge—nor should it be. Rather, it is normally a sustained attempt to produce an original piece of scholarship. As difficulty in publishing may lead to overspecialization, so too may the pressure to find a truly original dissertation topic. I am not suggesting that the dissertation become some demonstration of philosophical breadth, but only that something must be done.

Comprehensive and preliminary examinations might seem to be ample insurance against philosophical illiteracy, but unfortunately, at present they are not—at least not always. There is no substantial unity among programs in what they test, and some programs have eliminated comprehensive examinations altogether. At best, a comprehensive examination tests what a given department thinks its graduates should know, and there is no necessity or even likelihood that other departments would agree with the standards and bodies of knowledge established. Some broad but substantial agreement among programs, perhaps the product of an ecumenical council of sorts, would be an important step in the right direction.

It is in the undergraduate philosophy major that we see the first signs of philosophical illiteracy. Can all philosophy majors give a good clear definition of metaphysics or ontology? Do all truly know what phenomenology and pragmatism are? These are things we would expect a philosophy major to know quite clearly and accurately. We should teach our students rigorous argumentation and clarity of thought, but without a basic storehouse of knowledge these students will not be able to argue and communicate effectively within the philosophical community. ⁷

The fault may lie with the teachers and administrators who have allowed the curriculum to become fragmented, a ‘pick-and-choose’ cafeteria-style affair with no universal agreement among philosophy departments regarding the basic information majors should possess. Given the autonomy and various orientations of philosophy departments throughout this country, this is not surprising. Many departments do have basic requirements for courses in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the history of philosophy. What a given philosophy major en route to graduate school knows, however, is variable, unpredictable, and frequently inadequate for true philosophical literacy. ⁸

Some effort should be made among and within departments to insure that majors acquire a basic and standard core of knowledge. Departments should implement assessment plans, to check the progress of their majors in acquiring both the skills and the information they need. Such assessment plans could include not only demonstration of skill in oral and written reports, but basic competency in the various branches of philosophy as well as the history of philosophy.

The basic information which constitutes philosophical literacy can and should begin to be taught and learned in the introductory philosophy course. Philosophy majors would, then, be better prepared for and get more out of their upper-level philosophy courses, in turn better preparing them for graduate school. The ultimate goal and outcome would be a more philosophically literate community of philosophers—a community in which most members could be understood by most other members.

Let us turn to the questions so far not addressed: Just what exactly are the elements of philosophical literacy? What is it that we should teach in introductory philosophy courses? What are the things that every philosopher needs to know? It would be quite presumptuous of me to claim to have the definitive answers to these questions. Still, I would suggest that a clear understanding of the major branches of philosophy and a strong sense of the major historical periods would be a good starting point. This information can begin to be conveyed, at least on some elementary level, in the introductory philosophy course with the detail and sophistication with which we should be expected to know these things increasing as we move up the ladder from philosophy major to Ph.D. candidate to member of the profession.

Analogous to Hirsch’s enlistment of the aid of the historian Joseph Kett and the scientist James Trefil in assembling his preliminary list of what constitutes cultural literacy, we might have a meeting of those interested in assembling a model introductory philosophy course along philosophically eclectic lines.⁹ The number of potential elements for the list of full philosophical literacy would likely be too great for an introductory philosophy course. Perhaps, however, there could be some general agreement as to the core basic elements. Longer, more detailed lists and core areas of knowledge might be assembled for other stages such as the major, the masters candidate, and the Ph.D. candidate.¹⁰

1. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987).

2. This is a simplified summary of Hirsch’s position. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present Hirsch’s position and arguments in greater detail, or to argue in defense of them.

3. One might suggest that the bad communication and contempt actually produce fruitful rivalry and debate. One of the most noteworthy such clashes in recent times has been that between Searle and Derrida. The value of their exchange is questionable, however, and certainly does not seem to be sufficient justification for the contempt and misunderstanding that pervades the profession.

4. Jorge J.E. Gracia, Philosophy and Its History: Issues in Philosophical Historiography, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 1-34.

5. For an excellent discussion of the benefits see Gracia, op. cit., ch.3, "Doing Philosophy Historically: The Justification and Value of the History of Philosophy," pp. 133-173.

6. Of course some writers and presenters have a lucid and elegant style which makes even difficult and unfamiliar material quite accessible, but most do not. The clarity of writing within the profession has not helped matters, but the root of the problem is, more likely, a lack of shared information. Admittedly, even under the best of circumstances and the greatest shared treasure of philosophical literacy, comprehension of certain issues, problems, and solutions will not be easy.

7. My conception of philosophical literacy is, along Hirschian lines, learning concepts, ideas, and terminology. Hirsch does not mean to diminish the importance of the basic skills of decoding involved in reading. By the same token, I do not mean to diminish the importance of the basic skills needed in order to do philosophy. As Hirsch says, "Facts and skills are inseparable." (p. 133). For an excellent article dealing primarily with the skills side of philosophical literacy see, Thomas G. Miller, "Developing Philosophical Literacy: The Student as Apprentice," Teaching Philosophy 18 (1995), pp. 39-57. Miller argues that students learn the basic skills of philosophy—thinking, reading, writing, listening, and speaking—most effectively from teachers who teach philosophically, that is, from a public model of philosophy à la Socrates.

8. There has not been a GRE subject test in philosophy for quite some time, and given the differences in what students learn in their major programs such a test would be inappropriate at this point in time.

9. I have recently begun dialogue with members of my own department to assemble a list that will ensure some uniformity in our introductory philosophy course.