The following appeared in Volume 98, Number 1 (Fall, 1998) of the APA Newsletters

The review of my Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, Inc., 1996) which appeared in the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy in the fall of 1997, came to my attention in March, 1998, at which time I called one of the editors of the Newsletter, Prof. Tziporah Kasachkoff, who graciously invited me to reply in the next available space, which is now before you, in the fall, 1998 issue. I thank her for accepting my request.

The book has been so well-received, its first edition going through 12 printings, gaining the designation of Outstanding Reference Work of 1980 by the American Library Association, selection by the Quality Paper Back Book Club of the Month for several years running, as well as the Science Book Club, and strong reviews in a succession of journals that the review of the book’s second edition in the fall of 1997, carried by the A.P.A. Newsletter, came as a surprise to everyone connected with the project.

The reviewer centers on Judaica and analytic philosophy, two of the areas with which he is "quite familiar," and two among hundreds of movements treated in the Dictionary which spans the entire history of philosophy, from ancient to modern times, East as well as West, including a considerable overlap between philosophy and religion. Since the volume brings together thousands of philosophers and religious figures, concepts, and the movements energized by these individuals and ideas, it was necessary to find a means of holding them together, and allowing easy movement from one to another. The means employed is a system of cross-references, q.v.’s of various types, many of them designed merely to locate, or locate and name where a figure, concept, or movement is discussed, thus avoiding repetition and allowing the material to be presented in a single volume. There is evidence that the reviewer does not understand, or at least does not appreciate, this feature which has allowed the book a role in numerous programs of self-study and as a reference tool in undergraduate classes. The system of cross-references led naturally to extensive composite reference entries on the basic issues treated, e.g., in the problems courses of introduction to philosophy. The entry on Freedom, for example, consists of 31 sub-entries, divided into four parts, each part dealing with one of the four definitions of freedom. The material allows the student to engage in a personal search for the definition of, and position on, freedom which he, or she, finds most valid and most convincing. Other entries of this type explore self or soul, value, truth, beauty, right and wrong, social philosophy, and God and immortality. The God entry brings together 75 sub-entries, divided into chronological listings of treatments of the nature of God, arguments for God, and a section on God as a projection of human awareness.

The reviewer’s concern is not pedagogy, of course; he says that it is accuracy: one "...has an obligation to the reader to make every effort that the work be as accurate and as representative of the subject as is humanly possible." I agree, adding only that reviews might well be held to the same high standard. This concern with accuracy should be kept in mind, as we turn to the reviewer’s objections, treating the material in 9 divisions: A. Instances where the reviewer is in factual error; B. Instances where his locutions distort or misinterpret our intended meanings; C. Instances where credible interpretations differ; D. Instances where he misinterprets the function of simple q.v. references; E. Instances in which he misinterprets naming q.v. references; F. Instances in which he misinterprets the function of composite q.v. reference entries; G. Instances of perplexities or curiosities; H. Typos and inadvertencies; I. Work in progress. The normal pattern of response in what follows will be: First paragraph, presentation of the Dictionary material to which the reviewer is objecting; Second paragraph, the reviewer’s objection; Third paragraph et seq., our reply. That approximately one-third of this response concerns Judaica is proportionate to the review and not, of course, to the Dictionary.

A. Instances in which the position taken by the reviewer is in factual error.

(1) P. 1. ABARBANEL. Q.v. Leon Hebreo.

Objection: "We are given, on page 1, an entry that reads simply, ‘Abarbanel.’ The name is ‘Isaac Abarbanel’."

Reply: The reviewer is in error on two grounds: (1) He mistakes a q.v. reference for an entry. "Abarbanel" is a q.v. reference taking one to the "Leon Hebreo" entry on pp. 405-6 (see sections D., E., and F. below where this confusion leads to serious misrepresentations); (2) The given name of the Abarbanel, known as "Leon Hebreo" (Leone Ebreo), is not "Isaac," but "Judah." "Isaac ben Judah" was his son. Judah was the great, great grandson of the original Judah Abarbanel. I avoid these complications by following the standard practice of citing only the illustrious family name of the philosopher, "Abarbanel," in one of its alternative spellings. [Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Ltd., 1971), vol. 2, pp. 102-4, 109; note especially the genealogical chart for the Abarbanels on pp. 103-104.] Also, treating all the Abarbanels in one "Abravanel" entry, The Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (N.Y.: KTAV Publishing House, 1964), pp. 126-8; treating the family under "Abravanel Family," The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 6-8.

One aware of the family name would be directed to the member of the family we feature by the reference as it stands.

(2) P. 109. CATECHISM. Lines 4-9.

Although common to many religions, in Western usage the term refers to practices of Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant religious instruction.

Objection: "On p. 109, we are told that ‘Catechism’ refers to essential religious instruction in question and answer form, as in Jewish and other religious instruction. There is no Jewish catechism."

Reply: The 20 vol. Jewish Encyclopedia (op. cit.) reports in vol. 3, p. 621; "The name as well as the form of Jewish catechism has been adopted from the Christian Church...in connection with a more systematized religious instruction." "...probably in use among the Greek-speaking Jews in pre-Christian times (see, for instance, Acts XVIII. 25." "...the manual called ‘Didache’ Torah.") (Catechesis= "instruction") (Didache= "teaching").

(3) P. 127. CLIFFORD, W.K. (1).

The ethics of belief compels one to withhold acceptance of a statement unless all the evidence points to its truth.

Objection: "On page 127, it says that W.K. Clifford maintained that one was not to believe something unless ‘all the evidence points to its truth.’ This is false. Clifford requires adequate evidence, which is compatible with there being some counter-evidence."

Reply: The term Clifford uses is not "adequate," but "sufficient," as in "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." [W.K. Clifford, "Ethics of Belief," Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan & Co., 1879, vol. II, p. 186).] It is clear that my locution, having all the evidence, is "sufficient" for belief. Will the reviewer’s evidence mixed with "some counter-evidence" do as well?

When the result of one’s investigation is evidence mixed with "some counter-evidence," the inquiry is incomplete. Clifford says: "It is never lawful to stifle a doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not complete" (Ibid., p. 187). When inquiry is not complete there are still questions to be answered. Belief "...is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements..." (Ibid., p. 183). "...whoso shall...offend in one point...is guilty of all" (Ibid. p. 186). When one does not know all about a thing, one’s "...belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence..." (Ibid., p. 184).

In such cases one’s conclusion is merely probable. To be sure "...there are many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the evidence is not such as to justify present belief; because it is precisely by such action, and by observation of its fruits, that evidence is got which may justify future belief," (Ibid., p. 189). Therefore, we must act on probabilities without believing them.

Therefore, my locution follows Clifford, and that of the reviewer does not.

(4) p. 285. HASIDISM. Lines 1-3.

A movement of Jewish mysticism, originating in Poland in the 18th century.

Objection: "On page 285 the reader learns that Hasidism began in Poland. It didn’t. It began in Ukraine."

Reply: The Jewish Encyclopedia (op. cit.), vol. 6, p. 25: "A movement which arose among Polish Jews in the 18th century." The reviewer’s factual error in this case is in failure to recognize the manner in which national boundaries shift over unshifting regions.

Buber states (The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism, Horizon, 1960, p. 36): "It is no accident that the Hasidic movement arose in Podolia." Podolia is in W. Ukraine, and at the same time "...in the Medieval Kingdom of Poland" (Webster Unabridged, Gazeteer, 1954).

"The name [Podolia] appeared in the 14th century when the Poles began to colonize the area. It was under Polish rule until 1772, when the part west of the Abruch River became Austrian; the rest became the Podolian gubernia (province) in Russia in 1793." (Micropedia VIII, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., p. 60.)

The Ba’al Shem Tov (1700-60), founder of Hasidism (q.v. Cabala 3f), thus lived his entire life in the Podolia region of Poland. The complexity of the historical situation allows one’s appreciation to grow for the sources which finesse the problem with "Jews of Eastern Europe."

(5) P. 300. HILLEL (THE ELDER). Line 14.

Principal writings: Maxims.

Objection: "Despite what is written on p. 300, Hillel did not write a work entitled "Maxims."

Reply: Writing of Hillel (The Elder) William Bacher, Prof. of Biblical Studies, Rabbinical Seminary, states: "In his Maxims (Aboth, i.12) he recommends the love of peace and the love of mankind beyond all else...." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, pp. 467-8. Bacher is also cited in the 15th ed., Hillel entry, as having the most useful presentation of Hillel, containing all the sources.)

(6) P. 367. JUDAISM (19).

The 18th- and 19th-century mystical movement of Hasidism (q.v.) influenced many aspects of Jewish culture, especially in the humanities. The 20th-century mystical philosopher, Martin Buber (q.v.), is a product of this movement.

Objection: "We are also told that Buber was a ‘product’ of Hasidism. This is historically untrue."

Reply: Judaism (19) is a q.v. reference entry to be considered in relation to the Buber entry, where the more complete characterization reads: "Influenced by the teachings of the Hasidim, and by the work of Kierkegaard. While appropriating the mysticism of the Hasidim he has also given world-wide currency to that movement of Jewish mysticism (q.v. Hasidism)."

In Buber’s Hasidism and Modern Man, ed. Maurice Friedman (N.Y.: Horizon Press, 1958), book II is titled "My way to Hasidism." He reports that because of his grandfather he was close to Hasidism as a child. When he left Hasidism as a young man he also left Judaism. When he returned to Judaism after a period as a Zionist, he also returned to Hasidism. With respect to specific experiences he reported: "On this way I came to Hasidism." "It was then that, overpowered in an instant, I experienced the Hasidic soul. The primally Jewish opened to me...." "I realized my inborn binding with Hasidic truth...." (Pp. 59, 62).

In The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism (N.Y.:Horizon Press, 1960), pp. 70-71, Buber says: "Only listen to a saying such as this which made me, over forty years ago, into a Hasid of the Baal-Shem-Tov: ‘He takes unto himself the quality of fervor. He arises from sleep with fervor, for he is hallowed and become another man and is worthy to create and is become like the Holy One, blessed be He, when He created His world.’" His age at this moment of self-definition was 26 or younger (op. cit., p. 59).

(7) P. 583. PLANTINGA, ALVIN (5).

Applying the system to certain religious questions he treats the problem of theodicy (q.v.): how is the presence of evil to be reconciled with divine omnipotence and the necessity that God choose the best of all possible worlds? His solution is to grant significant freedom to human beings, while supposing "transworld depravity" in some of them.

Objection: "On page 583 the author misinterprets Plantinga’s treatment of the problem of evil. It is not a theodicy."

Reply: On p. 10 of God, Freedom, and Evil (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1974) Plantinga writes: "When a theist answers the question ‘Whence evil?’ or ‘Why does God permit evil?’ he is giving a theodicy." On p. 112 he says "I believe in God." He is, therefore, a theist. On p. 59 he says "I therefore conclude that the Free Will Defense successfully rebuts the charge of inconsistency brought against the theist." On p. 63, "The existence of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence of evil." On p. 64, "The Free Will Defense...shows that the existence of God is compatible, both logically and probabilistically, with the existence of evil...." And on p. 112, after saying that the second version of the ontological argument is valid, he says: "The only question of interest, it seems to me, is whether its main premise—that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated—is true. I think it is true; hence I think this version of the ontological argument is sound." He concludes that the argument establishes the "rational acceptability" of theism. He is therefore presenting a theodicy, or something very like.

B. The second section contains examples where the reviewer rephrases my language, simplifying its complexity, losing my implications, and edging it toward meanings I did not intend and did not express.

(8) [No single entry or page cited.]

Objection: "There are entries for Buddha, Jesus, and Mohammed, but not for Abraham or Moses."

Reply: This sounds as though they are missing from the Dictionary. Not so. Abraham is discussed in Judaism A, and not Moses but Mosaic law, in Judaism A (2). Both are discussed in Islam (1). Figures with individual entries often begin in synthetic movement or concept entries, and gain individual entries when the integrity of the book demands it. To the point, however, there is virtual unanimity of opinion that the former individuals are real persons and considerable agreement that the latter are pre-history and therefore mythopoetic figures.

(9) Pp. 280; 366. HALEVI, JUDAH; JUDAISM (9).

Objection: "Two different dates appear for the birth of Judah Halevi, one on page 280 and the other on page 366."

Reply: the two dates given do not contradict. Both offer a range, prefaced by "c." or "around." Page 280, the date "c. 1070-1143," p. 366 "around 1085 to around 1143." Discrepant figures to be harmonized.

(10) P. 285. HASIDISM. Lines 7-10.

Through Ravel, Bloch, Singer, and Buber (q.v.) Hasidism helped to shape the music, literature and philosophy of the Jewish community.

Objection: "...we are told that through Ravel and Bloch, Hasidism helped shape the music of the Jewish community. Ravel and Bloch may have done many things, but here they are marginal, at best."

Reply: The reviewer misrepresents our statement, which is consistent with what he is saying.

(11) P. 328. IDENTITY THEORY (3). Lines 3-4; 8-9.

Objection: "On p. 328, we learn that R. Rorty did not require ‘an exact translation between the mental state and the brain state,’ where, of course, the translation is between sentences, not states."

Reply: The continuation of the Dictionary entry states "In both cases the former manner of speaking may well disappear into the second," showing that what we mean is that there cannot be an exact translation of sentences referring to brain states into sentences referring to mental states, which is of course what he says is required.

(12) P. 349. ISLAM (6). Lines 6-9.

In terms of influence the two most powerful schools are the Mutazilites or Separatists, and the Mutakillim or Orthodox.

Objection: "On page 349, mention is made of the ‘two most powerful’ groups of Islamic philosophy, the Mutazilites and the Mutakillim, but nowhere in the work are we told anything about the teachings of the latter."

Reply: He ignores the preceding points, Islam (1-4), where the orthodox view is detailed. The q.v. to the Mutazilites tells how they differed.

(13) P. 367. JUDAISM (16). Lines 1-4.

The opposition between Talmud and Cabala continued in the 17th century, spreading throughout the Jewish communities of Europe and Asia.

Objection: "On page 367 we are informed that the Kabbalists were opposed to the Talmud. This is false."

Reply: Here he ignores the preceding points in Judaism (11-15), where the opposition between "...mysticism in the form of the Cabala, and reason as personified by Maimonides...," Gersonides, Crescas (the spirit of reason in the Talmud), is detailed.

(14) P. 370. KADDISH. Lines 1-3.

An Aramaic term meaning "holy." A Jewish prayer with the same opening phrases as the Lord’s Prayer.

Objection: "On page 370 it says the Jewish Kaddish prayer has the same opening words as the Lord’s prayer. The Kaddish does not open with ‘Our Father who art in heaven.’"

Reply: The entry calls for a comparison of "opening phrases," where he writes the "same opening words." Notice the similarities in phrasing:

Lord’s Prayer: "Our father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name."

Kaddish combining last with first phrase: "...their Father who is in heaven," and "Magnified and sanctified be His Great Name..."

L.P.: "Thy Kingdom come."

K: "May He establish his Kingdom during your life..."

L.P.: "Thy will be done."

K: "...the world which He hath created according to His will."

The remainder of the Lord’s Prayer is missing from the Kaddish.

Kaddish: "Magnified and sanctified be His Great Name in the world which He hath created according to His will. May he establish His Kingdom during your life and during your days, and during the life of the whole household of Israel, even speedily and in a near time! So say ye Amen.

Response: Let His Great name be blessed forever and unto all eternity.

May the prayers and supplications of all Israel be accepted by their Father, who is in Heaven. So say ye ‘Amen.’"

(15) P. 385. KRIPKE, SAUL A. (4).

Kripke argued that what Wittgenstein (q.v. 8) objected to in the private language argument was a "private model" of rule following without reference to the community in which one functions.

Objection: "On page 385, the author informs us that Kripke’s contribution to Wittgenstein studies was in seeing that Wittgenstein held there could not be rule-following without a community. For this we did not need Kripke."

Reply: His rendition distorts the point. Further, something is added to both Kripke and Wittgenstein in knowing that Kripke agrees with Wittgenstein (8).

(16) P. 846. YAHWEH.

Objection: "On page 846, we are told that ‘Yahweh’ was originally written, "YHWH," without the vowels, as a sign of reverence. Uh-uh. Originally, all Hebrew was written without the vowels."

Reply: I had never doubted that; the entry was meant to convey the thought that even after vowels were introduced, the faithful continued with YHWH out of reverence. My Jewish students to this day write "God" as "G_d" in their papers. A slight emendation could block this misinterpretation.

C. This section is devoted to instances, whose credible interpretations differ.

(17) P. 257. THE GETTIER PROBLEM. Lines 5-10, 10-12.

Lines 5-10: ...when one says of a certain person S that at a certain time t one knows that a certain statement h is true, three things are involved: One believes that h is true; h is true; and it is evident to S that h is true.

Objection: "This is thoroughly confused."

Reply: Immediately preceding the counter-example introduced below, Chisholm says: "...a person S knows a statement h to be true provided that h is true, S believes h to be true, and h is evident for S."

Can the reviewer help me to detect a difference of meaning between the two accounts? If not, wherein is the confusion?

Lines 10-12: Gettier provides a counter-example in which S believes that there is a sheep in the field....

Objection: "This is not Gettier’s example, it is Chisholm’s"

Reply: To be sure, Chisholm provided the most attractive counter-example for the problem. And we are dealing with the problem, not Edmund L. Gettier. The joint nature of the problem can be sensed from the resemblance between Gettier’s necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing a proposition, and those cited from Chisholm’s Perceiving, in the initial lines of Gettier’s article, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" (Analysis, 1963). In Roth and Galis’ anthology Knowing (N.Y.: Random House, 1970), the Chisholm article follows so seamlessly on Gettier’s that Chisholm introduces the sheep example with the words "...Mr. Gettier notes the possibility of this type of situation. Suppose "I see a sheep in the field"..." (etc.). This led us to say "Gettier provides a counter-example...." Does not noting "the possibility of this type of situation" often include noting the situation itself? Perhaps he had done so in conversation. But I had no right to say as much. It should read: "In the often cited counter-example, in Chisholm’s article, ‘The Foundation of Empirical Statements’ (1965), Suppose "I see a sheep in the field"..." (etc.).

(18) ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

(a) P. 535. ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (2).

Descartes (q.v. 5) presented the same two versions of the argument.

Objection: "On page 535, we are told that Descartes presented the same two versions of the ontological argument as did Anselm. Not so."

Reply: I hold they are the same. Note that Ont. Arg. (2) is a q.v. reference, whose function is to guide the reader to Descartes (5); an objection to Ont. Arg. (2) must go through Descartes (5). The first version, as in Anselm, centers on divine perfection (Meditations 2 and Reply to Objections); the second centers on the modality of necessity (Meditations 5, and Reply to Objections). Q.v. Hartshorne (4).

(b) P. 318. HUME, DAVID (7). Lines 14-20.

Hume really anticipates Kant in his criticism of the arguments for the existence of God. The a priori (ontological) argument is invalid, since "necessary existent" has no consistent meaning. The cosmological argument can never get outside the world.

Objection: "On page 318 we are told that the a priori argument in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is the ontological argument. Not so. The argument described in that work as "a priori" is Demea’s cosmological argument."

Reply: In the taxonomy of arguments Demea’s cosmological argument is the second form of the ontological argument, turning on the idea of necessity. Demea calls this an a priori argument, but I think that a bit mislabeled. It begins with temporal causes, which point to nontemporality. Maybe, it’s an a posteriori/a priori argument. But when the argument moves to the level of "...a necessarily existent Being, who carries the reason of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction" (cf. p. 62, Tweyman below), one has moved beyond cosmology to ontology, from a cosmological argument to an ontological one. Note that Tweyman (ed. of the Routledge, 1991 edition of the Dialogues), p. 63 inserts, at this point in his discussion, Descartes’ second version of the ontological argument from Meditations 5 (angles of triangle, mountain/valley).

Perhaps after Kant, we should introduce "(q.v. 5)" and after "ontological" in the parens add "(q.v.), although viewed by the man of faith as cosmological (q.v)."

(19) P. 554. PASSOVER. Lines 1-4.

A Jewish observance beginning on the evening of the fourteenth day of the month Nisan (the first month of the Jewish religious calendar)....

Objection: "On page 554, we are told that the holiday of Passover begins on the fourteenth of the month of Nisan. It starts on the fifteenth."

Reply: Note above the contrast between the Dictionary’s "observance" and the reviewer’s "holiday." Lev. 23.5-6 states "In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, is the Lord’s Passover. And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the feast of unleavened bread..." (Revised Standard Version). Also, see The Jewish Encyclopedia (op. cit.), vol. 9, 1st col. p. 548, "Lev. XXIII...seems to distinguish between Passover, which is set for the fourteenth day of the month, and...the Festival of the Unleavened Bread...appointed for the fifteenth day." "...from sunset on the 14th day to sunset on the 21st day...."

Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, 1997, p. 526, "Pesah Sheni (second Passover) ...introduced for those who...were unable...to sacrifice the paschal lamb on the proper date, 14 Nisan (Nm.9.9-25)." Numbers 9.11 reads: "In the second month on the fourteenth day in the evening they shall keep it."

The reviewer and others regard sundown on the 14th as the start of the 15th for ceremonial purposes, while calendrically the evening before the 15th is the 14th and continues to be so until midnight.

I shall now present 3 sections of examples (D., E., F.) in which the reviewer mistakes q.v. references for entries.

D. Section D contains simple q.v. references whose function is not to explain but to refer to another place in the Dictionary where the explanation is to be found. In these instances references are confused with entries. The instances are:

(20) P. 3. ABORTION.

Q.v. Dworkin (4).

(21) P. 229. FEMINISM.

Q.v. Simone De Beauvoir; Mary Daly.

(22) P. 636. RATIONALITY.

Q.v. Rescher (8).

(23) P. 276. GRUE. Q.v. Nelson Goodman (4).

In (20-22) one finds evidence of confusion between reference and entry. In the first two cases he cites the q.v. reference, and comments "That’s it." In the third his comment is "That’s the extent to which the concept of rationality is covered in this dictionary." In each case he is quite mistaken. In (20) the q.v. reference guides the reader to Dworkin’s view on abortion. In an ever-expanding reference work of this sort the reader is directed to the material the Dictionary now has on the topic. Given a growing weight of such cross-references the q.v. reference might grow into a composite q.v. reference entry on abortion similar to many such entries (q.v. Freedom; God). At the moment we refer and are not committed to an extensive entry.

In (21) he again calls the q.v. reference an entry; and the entries (on pp. 68-9 and 154) to which the q.v. refers are dismissed with: "Elsewhere, each of these thinkers gets a quarter of a page...." But the q.v. specifically directs the reader to those quarter pages. That is its specific function. This reference has moved a step beyond the previous example (20) in the direction of a composite q.v. entry, but still without a commitment to a full entry. He comments that Samuel Pufendorf (q.v.) receives more space. That illustrates how the Dictionary grows. The integrity of the volume requires more space for Pufendorf. His relation to completely developed entries, such as Social Contract Theory and Natural Law, requires it.

(22) P. 636. RATIONALITY. Q.v. Rescher (8).

Objection: "That’s the extent to which the concept of rationality is covered in this dictionary."

Reply: Wrong! First, the q.v. is not an entry but a reference to Rescher (8) where Rescher’s distinctive concept of rationality is treated. That is on p. 650. Second, the Rationality q.v. on p. 636, to which the reviewer refers, is nested in a host of additional references and reference entries related to rationality. The q.v. he mentions is immediately preceded by a 5-item composite q.v. entry on Rationalism and immediately followed by 4 separate q.v. references to types of Rationality. Turning forward one page one finds a 15-item composite q.v. entry on Reason, followed by a q.v. reference to Reasons of the Heart. The point is that the material grows from simple q.v. reference, to composite q.v. reference entry to complete entry as demanded by the integrity of the volume itself.

In response to (23) the reviewer notes, "On page 276, there is an entry for grue! (There is none for bleen)." But, of course, this isn’t an entry, it is a q.v. reference to Nelson Goodman (4). The entry is on p. 268. His comment is puzzling in at least 3 ways. First the exclamation point after "grue" suggests he thinks the term not sufficiently important to include; yet "grue" is Goodman’s example of a predicate which is not well-entrenched. Second, his further comment, "(There is none for bleen)," suggests that "bleen" should also have been included. Since "grue" is the more famous example, I thought that would be sufficient. Third, if his noting the absence of "bleen" came from turning to Goodman (4), he is beginning to move from reference to referent. On the other hand, if he knew that Goodman also discussed "bleen," and turned back to the B’s finding no "bleen," then he is not yet making the moves necessary to the use of this Dictionary.

E. In this section I give examples of q.v. references with naming phrases attached. The naming phrases are necessary when there is more than one concept to be located.

(24) Pp. 219-220. EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFIER.

The notation used in Existential Generalization and Instantiation. Q.v. Quantification Theory (6).

(25) P. 795. UNIVERSAL QUANTIFIER.

The notation used in Universal Generalization and Universal Instantiation (q.v. Quantification Theory 4 and 3, respectively).

In both cases he comments "uninformative and inadequate." Once again, let me say: A q.v. reference is intended to refer. In the case of Existential Generalization and Instantiation (24 above) the explanation is in Quantification Theory (6), taking up a column and a half on pp. 626-27. Universal Generalization and Instantiation are treated in Quantification Theory (4) and (3), as noted above (in 25), occupying two columns of text on pp. 625-26.

F. I next offer two instances of composite q.v. reference entries. These are still further along the path to being complete entries. From these instances we can learn a bit more about how the q.v. references and entries of the Dictionary inter-relate.

(26) P. 76. BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

Objection: "The entry on biblical criticism on page 76 makes no mention of Wellhausen."

Reply: There are two points to be made here: (1) Composite q.v. reference entries collect in one place the references in the Dictionary on a given topic. Brief explanations are given. Wellhausen is not mentioned because he is not in the Dictionary. (2) Why is he not in the Dictionary? The Dictionary, where not strictly philosophy, engages the overlap between philosophy and religion. All of the biblical criticism mentioned—that of Spinoza, Jefferson, Strauss, Renan, Schweitzer, Bultmann—fits that overlap in very obvious ways. Wellhausen, while a fine biblical critic, as well as historian of the Near-East, does not fit the overlap.

(27) Pp. 337-338. INDUCTION (17).

Objection: "On pages 337-38, mathematical induction is given a grossly mistaken formulation."

Reply: Induction is an instance of a complete composite q.v. reference entry, of a type that is antiphonal to all of the complete entries to which it refers, and which it briefly describes. The entry is made up of 17 such references, plus descriptions.

In the case of Induction (17) the reviewer does not give the grounds for his objection. I presume it is because I did not there say that "0" is a number. The reason I did not is that in the referent entry Peano gives two formulations of the postulates of arithmetic. Both contain the principle of inheritance. Only the second says that "0" is a number. I decided to give just the principle of inheritance, and q.v. to Peano (2) for the rest. Even so, if "0" is a number, as all now agree, then the case of "0" is included in the principle of succession whereby the relation of n+1 to n is one of inheritance.

G. Curiosities, perplexities.

(28) P. 325. Lines 4-6. IBN EZRA, ABRAHAM BEN MEIR, 1089-1164.

He is the author of hundreds of poems, 150 of which found their way into the Jewish prayer book.

Objection: "On page 325 we read that 150 of the poems of Abraham Ibn Ezra ‘found their way into’ the Jewish prayer book. If that statement is at all true, all but a handful must have felt quite lost there, for they found their way out very quickly."

Reply: This rather jolly objection has the form of a modus tollendo tollens. He expects the reader to deny the consequent on the basis of a reductio ad absurdum expressed in the form of the lostness felt by Ibn Ezra’s poems in the Prayer book, and on this basis to deny the antecedent. Unable to locate the precise sources for this entry (written 20 years ago), at this time the most I can do is establish credibility. (a.) The reference in the The Jewish Encyclopedia (op. cit.), vol. 6, p. 521, refers to poems no. 203 and 205, in Ibn Ezra’s book of poetry titled Diwan, and later states that the Diwan contains 260 poems (Ibid. p. 524). The editor of the Diwan also appended a list naming close to 200 additional religious poems "and some secular." (b.) The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (U.J.E., Inc., 1941), vol. 5, p. 525, col. 1, after referring to his secular poems states: "He left also several hundred religious poems...." This brings us to 500 poems, several hundred being religious. (c.) But is it credible to believe that 150 of these poems became part of the liturgy (and this implies inclusion in some Jewish prayer book or other)? The New Standard Jewish Encyclopedia (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1977), p. 944, tells us "He wrote secular and sacred poems...much of his penitential poetry being incorporated in the liturgy." And the Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Ltd., 1971), vol. 8, p. 1,166, affirms: "Much of his poetry is liturgical and his poems of penitence and supplication, as well as many of his hymns, have been included in the liturgy...." The above establishes credibility that 150 of Ibn Ezra’s poems were in some version of the Jewish prayer book.

(d.) Given that the evidence supports this, why is it that but a handful can now be found? The reviewer explains this by their feeling "lost," thus providing an instance of the "pathetic fallacy." History provides a more reasonable explanation. Religious poems were called "piyyutim." Encyclopedia Judaica (Ibid.) goes on to say of Ibn Ezra, "He wrote many different types of piyyutim...in his sacred poetry." The piyyutim met a great need in the lives of worshipers and were "...popular among the masses in every land..." [Herman Kieval, The High Holy Days, bk. one (N.Y.: The Burning Bush Press, 1959), p. 34]. The area of popularity described by Kieval includes all of Europe and the Middle East, extending into the Orient. In this period of time, from 500 to 1500 C.E.: "The leader of the worship [had the power to] interpolate newly-composed sacred poems into the worship service" [at will] (Ibid., pp. 23-4), "...introducing new material into the classic Prayerbook for a thousand years (and in some Oriental communities down to the present day" (Ibid. p. 22). Karla Goldman calls attention to the fact that: "The siddur, containing the fixed, regular prayers for Jewish worship, has never been a static text." [S.R. Wachs, American Jewish Liturgies (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1997), p. 13]. Tracing Prayer book history in American Jewry alone between 1760 and 1925, S.R. Wachs lists 1,284 different published versions. Consider the multiple which would be needed to include all Jewish prayer books. Israel Davidson was able to collect "...over 35,000 titles of extant piyyutim by almost 3,000 poets" (The High Holy Days, op. cit., pp. 22-3). But although popular with the ordinary worshiper piyyutim were regarded by many scholars and authorities as "...unwarranted interruptions of the classic Rabbinic rite..." (Ibid., p. 34). Maimonides opposed the piyyutim. And we have the following statement concerning our current subject: "Even Abraham Ibn Ezra...opposed in principle the interruption of the obligatory prayers by optional piyyutim, [although he] wrote scores of sacred poems which fall within the Piyyut category" (Ibid., p. 30) [perhaps 8 score?]. The curious result is that Ibn Ezra opposed the presence of piyyutim in the Prayer book even as his own work was flowing into it. The movement of opposition included the Hasidic movement, the Mussar school of Lithuania, the Haskalah movement, the 19th century Reformists (Ibid., fn 53, p. 205). As a result, Ismar Elbogen wrote: "The modern era has...set aside the great mass of unintelligible and worthless piyyutim..." (Ibid., p. 34) preserving in the Mahzor (the Prayerbook for High Holy Days and other Festivals) only those of poetic value.

In light of these data I join the reviewer in endorsing his "pathetic fallacy," with the qualification that in my view the Ibn Ezra piyyutim which were deleted, did not feel lost while in the Prayer book. Where would a self-respecting Piyyut rather be? They felt at home there, but now feel sad that they did not make the cut.

(29) P. 658. RORTY, RICHARD (1). Lines 1-5.

Initially believing progress in philosophy to be possible, or at least that "philosophers think they have made progress," Rorty contributed to the ceremonies of analytic philosophy.

Objection: "On page 658, we are told that Richard Rorty contributed to the ‘ceremonies of analytic philosophy.’ I can’t understand why I have never been invited—I’m an analytic philosopher."

Reply: As an analytic philosopher, you are invited carte blanche.

(30) [No single entry or page.]

The final criticism is that I introduce entries as "terms," "movements," "doctrines," "theories" without consistency. Indeed, I do use all of these locutions, and more. In the most obvious sense my subject matter is words. "Names" and "terms" are also used. I often offer definitions which move one from words to ideas, thence to doctrines, and theories; and movements, of course, refer to doctrines or theories held by groups of individuals, and are changing through time. The word one uses is context sensitive. I am perplexed concerning his point. Would it not be tedious, even inappropriate, to begin every entry the same way?

H. Typos and inadvertencies.

(31) I thank the reviewer for calling my attention to the following 5 typos and 3 minor inadvertencies.

(a.) Typos: "ARL" for "ARI," pp. 100, 348; Talmuda for Talmud, p. 755; Turath for Torah, p. 776; an "x" instead of a "y" in Transitivity, pp. 780-81.

(b.) Inadvertencies: The misreading of the q.v. heading "Akiba, Ben Joseph" as "Ben Joseph Akiba" in the referent text (the convention is followed correctly in 11 other usages). The inadvertent omission of a q.v. from the Isaac Luria reference to the Luria, Isaac entry. The geographical misidentification of Safed, Israel.

I. Work in progress.

I have labeled the reviewer’s interventions as objections because of their prosecutorial tone. These objections are sustained, strictly speaking, only with respect to the typos and inadvertencies of section H. above. When his interventions are regarded as suggestions for improvement, as they would have been in a more gemütlich review, he scores more impressively. So taken, and my stance is that all genuine philosophy is co-operative, I can point to 7 instances of possible improvement: the clarifications suggested in my replies to (17) and (18b), the final paragraph in each case; in (4), (9), and (16) the possible clarifications whose general drift is indicated; more extensively, the augmentations described below in the final paragraph of (32), and in the Reply of (33).

(32) Pp. 205-6. EPISTEMOLOGY.

(a.) P. 205 (1, 2).

The basic contrast between theories of knowledge is the contrast between the methods of Rationalism (q.v.), stressed by...Parmenides...Plato...Descartes...Spinoza... Leibniz on the one hand...and...Empiricism (q.v.) stressed by Francis Bacon...Locke...Berkeley...Hume...on the other. Empiricism can, generally, be identified with a Correspondence Theory of truth, and Rationalism with a Coherence Theory of truth.

Objection: "On page 205 we are given the false statement that generally rationalism is identified with the coherence theory of truth."

(b.) Pp. 205-6 (2-6).

Objection: "The entry on epistemology, pages 205-6, ignores entirely the debate over internalism and externalism...."

Reply:

(a.) The first objection distorts the p. 205 entry by simplification, taking my statement out of context, and thus misrepresenting my position that, in the tradition I specify, "Empiricism can, generally, be identified with a Correspondence Theory of truth, and Rationalism with a Coherence Theory of truth," (not his: "...generally rationalism is identified with the coherence theory of truth").

(b.) The second objection is false through overstatement. The argument supporting my position on empiricism and rationalism rests on the internalism/externalism distinction (q.v. Epistemology 2, 3). The first part of the argument is that in the Correspondence Theory "...ideas are correlated with reality by means of the perceptions we receive from the world" (q.v. Epist. 2). Here the paradigm case is Aristotle (1). This is externalism. In the Coherence Theory, on the other hand (the second part of the argument), "...one can know only ideas [and] the most one can accomplish is the checking of one idea against another...." Therefore "...the Rationalist who holds the Coherence Theory" (individual philosophers specified) "stresses not correspondence, but logical criteria in evaluating a theory or explanation," (q.v. Epist. 3). The paradigm case is Plato for whom, in the realm of truth one begins, continues, and ends in ideas. This is internalism. It is inappropriate to reply to an argument, as the reviewer has, by extracting one half of a concluding statement and labeling it "false statement." And as the argument given in supporting the description of Correspondence and Coherence relies on the distinction between internalism and externalism, the only "false statement" is the reviewer’s claim that the debate over internalism and externalism is ignored entirely. In fact, the argument sketched above takes up 2 columns of text in Epistemology (1-6).

To represent the contemporary form of the argument, in addition to material already in the Dictionary (Carnap 2, 5; Putnam 3, on Twin Earth, as well as 5, 8; and Chisholm 5), one would bring in Goldman, and Bonjour, among others, which we intend to do. Q.v. reference entries will be added, beginning from (7-9) with Carnap, Putnam, Chisholm, and others.

(33) P. 816. VERSTEHEN.

Objection: "The entry on ‘Verstehen,’ on page 816, fails to mention the importance of that term for Hegel.

Reply: The entry treats the use of verstehen in Dilthey, Rickert, Weber, Heidegger. The reason for the omission of Hegel was that at publication time I lacked clarity on how Hegel intended us to inter-relate verstehen with Verstand and Vernunft. In fact, Hegel is not mentioned in the Verstehen entries of any of the prominent single volume Dictionaries of philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, and Cambridge); and there is no verstehen entry at all in the Routledge & Kegan Paul Dictionary (Lacey). I believed then, and still believe, that Hegel should introduce the entry. But my question is this: if Verstand is abstract clarity, tending toward contradiction by the finitude of its expression, and negative Vernunft is the process making these implicit contradictions explicit, and if positive reason (is this the same as positive Vernunft?) is the synthesis overcoming the problem, then is verstehen this whole process including Verstand? Or the latter stages of the process? Or what? I should be happy to hear from anyone with suggestions on this problem (e-mail address given below).

We have considered the Dictionary a work in progress from the start. In that spirit we welcome suggestions from readers, not only on the instances in this section, but on any other section of this review response, or for that matter on any part of the Dictionary. What we are trying to have is a Dictionary which can be updated between printings, and even an electronic version which can be on-line, taking advantage of suggestions from any provenance at any time.

E-mail address: wlr@cnsunix.albany.edu