Robert Desgabets is a little know Cartesian who deserves to be better known. I give a glimpse of Desgabets's system by discussing the surprising view of intentionality central to Desgabets's proof of the external world and to Desgabets's system in general. I note some interesting similarities and differences between Desgabets's position and the positions of Descartes and seventeenth century Cartesians Malebranche and Arnauld. Further, I bring out some ways in which Desgabets's position touches on issues of interest in recent metaphysics (specifically, disputes between actualists and possibilists and between eternalists and presentists). But mainly I clarify and give some needed structure to Desgabets's argument for his view of intentionality. This argument is interesting in itself as a sustained and masterful argument for a position whose initial plausibility is almost nil. And the argument needs interpretation, because it does not wear its structure on its sleeve.