APA Committee on
Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

Online Discussion

Ethical Relativism Discussion between
Boston University Academy and
the Edmund Burke School

Winter 1999

Welcome to an Internet philosophy discussion experiment for High School Students. The goal of this brief experiment is to begin examining how best to use the APA Web site as a forum for connecting High School philosophy students and teachers in productive discussions concerning philosophy and pedagogy.

The discussion relates to two articles on moral relativism: Ruth Benedict's "A Defense of Moral Relativism" and W. T. Stace's article from The Concept of Morals as found in James Gould's text under the title "Ethics are Not Relative".

Questions addressed are as follows:
1. What are Ruth Benedict's basic reasons for accepting normative moral relativism?
2. What are the best arguments offered by Stace to critique normative moral relativism?
3. What are some counter-arguments a relativist could offer in response to the best arguments offered by Stace?

High School students wishing to enter this discussion can reply by following the link below. Students from Boston University and Edmund Burke School would read any feedback and respond when appropriate. Teachers Jim Davis and Hugh Taft-Morales will oversee the discussion, offering suggestions and minor editorial corrections. This conversation will continue weekly until the end of February, with one school responding each week. Thanks to the American Philosophical Association, and to Christopher Clement, Information Technologies Coordinator for the APA, for facilitating this experiment.

(a) First Response to the questions above

(b) Second Response to the questions above

(c) Responses to (b)

(d) Second Response of Boston University Academy

(e) Response to comments (d)

(f) Response to (e)

First responses to the opening questions, written by Patrice Delva and George Simpson from Edmund Burke School (January 13, 1999):

1. What are Ruth Benedict's basic reasons for accepting normative moral relativism?

Response # 1) Ruth Benedict’s basic reason for believing that ethics are relative is that in different tribes and cultures one finds that what is morally good is what is the accepted norm. She studied many different cultures and found that there was not a distinct idea about right or wrong. Right or wrong depended on where you were at a given time in history. In some places murder was the norm, while in others it was perfectly okay to let a neighbor starve to death. To her, ethics is a matter of societal pressure and socially acceptable norms of behavior. An act is an ethical act if it is right in your culture. She could not accept absolutism because there was not one single idea accepted by all cultures.

2. What are the best arguments offered by Stace to critique normative moral relativism?

#2) The first thing Stace attacks is the proof of moral relativism. The proof is the varied moral standards of cultures. Basically, if everyone has a different i dea of "right", who is to say what is right? But Stace argues that just because moral standards differ, it does not mean that there is not one "standard". The reason is that different cultures haven’t found the true moral standard, whatever it may be. By this he means that an absolutist can have any kind of morality, no matter how liberal or conservative, as long as he or she believes that there is only on true correct moral code.

His second argument is that if you accept moral relativity, then you cannot judge any culture or any time because whatever they did, it was what was right at that place and time. In fact, one cannot say that there is a given moral standard within a given culture. Therefore, only the individual is a judge of what is right.

3. What are some counter-arguments a relativist could offer in response to the best arguments offered by Stace?

#3 A relativist might first argue that if there is a universal moral standard, then what is it, and who instituted it. In light of the modern day skeptism about the existence of a higher power, how would a set of absolute laws come to into existence. Laws imply an intelligence that creates the law. But the only true intelligence that we can verify is ourselves. Without relying on god, is there a secular explanation for absolute morality? No, there is no other explanation. How would one come to understand these absolute laws and follow them? Morality, a relavitist would say, is a sort of consensus among a given group of people.

Here is the second response in the moral relativism debate. This essay was written by the Boston University Academy High School Philosophy Course, consisting of Shannon Frederick, Anthony Gross, Daniel Gross, Michael Leen, and Yalun Tu.

In your set of responses, you claim that the best arguments offered by Stace to critique Normative Ethical Relativism are (a) the fact that cultures have different moral standards does not preclude an absolute moral standard and (b) cultural standards differ and so comparisons are impossible. Stace's most compelling argument, however, involves how to justify the moral standards for the culture. He states that moral standards must be determined by either the majority or minority. If determined by the majority, the results would be disastrous because "[w]herever there is found among a people a small band of select spirits, or perhaps one man, working for the establishment of higher and nobler ideals than those commonly accepted by the group, we shall be compelled to hold that, for that people at that time, the majority are right, and that the reformers are wrong and are preaching what is immoral" (p. 179). For example, Jesus would be considered immoral for attempting to preach a contrary moral standard to the community. If moral standards are determined by the minority, one must decide which minority sets the standard. Presumably, the most enlightened minority should set the standard; however, by which criterion should enlightenment by judged? For example, there would be no "...logical right to resist the claim of the gangsters of Chicago -- if such a claim were made -- that their practices represent the highest standards of American morality" (p. 179). Eventually the minority would collapse into the individual and, as your response rightly states, each individual would determine his or her own standard.

In your response to Stace, you argue that there is no secular basis for an absolute moral standard, i.e. who would create an absolute moral standard if not God? "Laws imply an intelligence that creates the law." Therefore, morality is a sort of consensus among a given group of people.

We respond that your argument is an argument from ignorance since just because we cannot determine what a secular foundation for morality would be doesn't necessarily eliminate the possibilities of one. If we define "secular" as something based on nature, then there are laws that have a secular basis independent of any intelligence; such laws are discovered rather than invented. The laws of physics, for example, existed before any intelligent life knew of them. Moral laws could be as natural as the laws of physics. Hence, the absence of a divine sanction does not rule out an absolute moral law. Since there could be a "secular basis", the consensus of the group need not be the ultimate determinant of morality.

There may however be other objections to Stace's moral absolutism than appealing to a lack of a secular basis. Stace says that it would be impossible for an individual to work for higher moral ideals under Normative Ethical Relativism (p. 179). This statement begs the question and is irrelevant because, under Normative Ethical Relativism, there is no concept of "higher and nobler ideals" than any other. They are simply different. A minority attempting to introduce new ideals is not necessarily immoral. They may be acting immorally at first from the point of view of the majority, but their actions, if successful, justify themselves. After they have transferred their ideals to the majority, then this newly reformed group will look upon the reformers past actions as moral.

Another argument against Stace is that it does not matter if a culture can not be judged. Stace claims that if one tries to determine the standards of a given group, the only standards he will eventually find will be those of each individual. This argument is irrelevant because we are not choosing the more practical view, but the correct view. Choosing the practical over the correct is like looking for a lost valuable not on the street where it was lost, but on one that is lighted.

(C) Response to comments (B), written by Patrice Delva and George Simpson from Edmund Burke School (February 2, 1999):

In your response to us, you claim that Stace's most compelling argument involves how to justify the moral standards -- whether the majority or minority sets the moral standards of the culture. But we feel this is one of Stace's flawed arguments, because in any culture the majority set the moral standards. Take your example of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, at the time that he was preaching, was considered to be morally corrupt. It was only after his death that his morality became widely accepted. But a majority always has the moral power. It is only when the minority enlists a part of the majority does the morality of a given culture change. For a minority to have the correct moral ground, it always requires persuading and/or control of a segment of the majority. The majority always justifies itself in its moral codes. One can create a new moral code, but it is not justified until a majority of people except it. Otherwise it is just one loon spouting off at the mouth.

Here's a question for you: How can there exist an absolute moral code without the existence of some higher conscious power or a code that applies to all people places and times? Cannot two rational people come to two different yet valid moral codes? For example, a man living in a desert might view stealing water as a capital crime. To him water means life. But to another man living by a river stealing water is a minor crime probably not even noticeable. Both are valid and rational claims.

(D) Second Response of Boston University Academy, written by Shannon Frederick, Anthony Gross, Daniel Gross, Michael Leen, and Yalun Tu.

In your rebuttal to Stace's arguments involving the determination of moral standards, you say that when a minority gets the majority to accept their moral code as correct, then that standard becomes correct. While this position is coherent, it raises some interesting issues. Under this system, a minority holds immoral views until the instant when their views become generally accepted. When this occurs, it is not simply that their views have been "justified", but that their rules have abruptly ceased to be immoral and become moral. They were not always moral, and simply waiting to be brought to light; they were immoral one moment and moral the next. Thus if the "one loon spouting off at the mouth" succeeds in convincing others of his point of view, he at that instant changes from a loon to a paragon of righteousness. Morality becomes nearly meaningless, as today's virtue is tomorrow's vice, all resting upon the whim of the masses.

You ask how an absolute moral code could exist without some higher consciousness sanctioning the rules. One answer to this is presented by John Stuart Mill, in his ethical system Utilitarianism. He holds that moral actions are those which produce the most happiness for the most people, calling this the "Greatest Happiness Principle". Mill rebuts the popular criticism of Utilitarianism, namely that it reduces humans to the level of animals, by saying that the pleasures which humans should seek is that which requires the use of their higher faculties, which animals do not possess. He therefore accepts the "fact that some kinds of pleasures are more desirable than others." The superior types of pleasures are those which are of an intellectual nature rather than of a physical, sensational nature or the kind attributed to swine and other animals.

Morality, for Mill, can be considered something which is good and good is something that makes people happy. Therefore, morality is something which makes people happy. Unlike the Epicureans who focus on the individual's pleasure, Mill's utilitarianism is a social hedonism since it deals with creating the most happiness for the most people. Of course, one could try to find holes in this, such as what if stealing from someone makes somebody else happy? This, however, makes that "someone" unhappy. In addition, the "somebody" who steals is happy only for a limited time, as he might eventually be caught and thus worries about who might know his misdeed; therefore, the pleasure attained by the thief is a low pleasure, as it has little permanency and has the potential to cause him pain. So the basic principle of morality being based on making people happy works out quite well.

Furthermore, utilitarian ethics are moral, but do not contain immutable or absolute moral laws. Instead they are based upon one broad principle, the Greatest Happiness Principle. Mill argues that an action is moral if it tends to promote the greatest possible number of people, and an action is immoral if it tends to promote pain and unhappiness to a large number of people. Even if you do not accept this view, it is an example of a moral code which is neither relative nor divinely imposed. Another example of such a moral code is Kant's ethics. Kant holds a deontological view. In other words, he believes that morality is founded on reason. To be immoral is, therefore, to be irrational. Moral "oughts" are "binding on rational agents simply because they are rational." Kant believes that all such "oughts" can be derived from a principle that every rational person should accept -- the categorical imperative, "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This rule applies to all actions that one may do. If one is going to do an action, one must ask himself if he would want the action to be followed by all people all the time. If the person would not be willing that everyone follow the rule, then the act is morally base. The categorical imperative may be restated as treat people as ends and not as mere means. One should never make an exception of oneself, and the moral rule should bind all. Moral principles are, therefore, universal and absolute.

Kant's answer to your question about whether a moral code can exist without a higher conscious power is, simply, yes. Kant would claim that one may base one's moral code on reason, and reason does not need a higher power to be applicable to all people, places, and times. One might object: "Cannot two rational people come to two different yet valid moral codes?" For example, a man living in a desert might view stealing water as a capital crime. To him water means life. But to another man living by a river stealing water is a minor crime, probably not even noticeable. Both are valid and rational claims. Kant would put these laws to the categorical imperative. He would collapse the two views into a maxim that stated, "it is never right to steal." For if everyone stole, then the world would erupt into chaos. It could not therefore be consistently willed universally.

(E) Response to comments (D), written by Patrice Delva and George Simpson from Edmund Burke School (February 28, 1999):

In your response to us, you claim that Mill and Kant both present absolute moral codes that do not depend on a higher consciousness or God. First, Mill offers his Utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and Kant offers the principal of universality. We deny that either system is a legitimate moral code.

You say that Mill’s Utilitarianism is an example of an absolute moral code because he claims that what is morally good is what causes the greatest happiness for the greatest number. But a Utilitarian would have you believe that what makes 11 people happy, as opposed to making 10 people happy, is the right thing to do. That lacks credibility because it reduces morality to a game of numbers. There are times that we do things that don’t add because we think they are right. For instance a man is wounded in battle and his comrades halt their retreat to help him, thereby by put many at risk for one. Would we claim that as a moral wrong? Utilitarianism as an absolute moral code is flawed because the greatest happiness to the most people does not always equate to what the greatest moral good. If killing off a minority group because it's members were considered lazy would bring the greatest happiness to the majority, Utilitarianism would justify it. But we believe that most people would disagree that such actions are morally right.

In the case of Kant’s universality, your claim is flawed. It is true that Kant would say that stealing is wrong, but he would not give the reason "because if everyone stole, the world would erupt in Chaos". While it may be hard to imagine a world where stealing is not considered to be morally wrong, it is possible for one to exist, without it being a self-destructive world. Sure, it may be a bit less friendly and a more dangerous but it can exist. So that means that stealing in not a universal wrong, because a world can exist if it were considered a moral right. The same goes for many other actions that we as humans consider to be moral wrongs. Kant’s idea of universality depicts moral right not by consequence but by the fact that it is universally right. So a world of chaos depicts a world that has been ravaged by the consequences of its own actions. This is not how morality works with Kant’s universality, for he rejects consequentialism.

In order for there to be a code of absolute moral rights, there must be some organizing conscience force behind it. If not, then any moral code could exist anywhere, but it would not truly matter because there is nothing that can claim that it is wrong. In conclusion, it is not possible to have an absolute moral code because an absolute moral code demands a consciousness that creates and holds them that precedes and exceeds human existence

(F) Response to (E) written by Shannon Frederick, Anthony Gross, Daniel Gross, Michael Leen, and Yalun Tu from Boston University Academy High School.

You claim that both Mill's and Kant's philosophies are incorrect. However, your refutations for Mill, for instance, do not weaken his argument at all. You ask whether Mill would judge it morally right for soldiers to halt a retreat and help a wounded friend, putting themselves at risk in the process. The risk of the soldiers are taken into account in the Utilitarian philosophy. Mill writes that "if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it." It is morally right for the soldiers to save their friend; however, it would be morally wrong according to Mill if the risk outweighed the possible gain, and the soldiers wouldn't be brave, but foolhardy and rash.

Your other example about killing off a minority group because its members are lazy is faulty because it seems like the majority would be in the wrong according to Mill, too. How could killing off a minority group because it is lazy benefit anybody at all? Almost all cases that are right according to Mill will seem right to us, except for a few discrepancies that occur because we do not know the exact values of peoples happiness. Communal hedonism actually is closer to our conception of morality than any other philosophy. According to Ethical Relativism, Hitler was moral, and, according to Kant, one should tell a potential murderer the location of his potential victim.

Even if you reject Mill's basis for morality, there are still other systems which also plausibly claim that there are moral values even if there is no divine consciousness. Consider three other alternatives: Kantianism, Aristotelianism, and Egoism.

The fundamental basis of moral values is reason. For one to act immorally is for one to act irrationally. Kant, by using his categorical imperative, shows one how to act morally. The desires of a person are completely irrelevant, for he or she should follow the categorical imperative simply because it is rational. Kant bases his moral system on reason, and he defends it as a principle that every rational person should accept. One could further argue that reason is the device that sets apart humans from other animals, for it is the embodiment of humanity's application of its higher faculties. Without reason, humans would act exactly as animals would, and feed their base desires. Kant's deontology provides a basis on how one should act so he or she is able to remain in the realm of humanity, and not slip into pure wanton desires.

In addition, proposing reason as a basis for morality means it is not tied to God. This basis of morality works because it does not depend on any belief in a divine power and is consistent and thus does not allow exceptions for specific people. Kant does not provide a list of dos and don'ts for his morality; instead, he provides a method of testing the morality of certain act. One must try to apply the act universally and determine whether or not this creates a contradiction. If it does, the act is immoral; if it does not, the act is moral. Thus, if an act is not one of a rational being, it cannot be made into a universal law. Your position that morality must be relative in the absence of a divine consciousness is struck down by Kantian ethics. These do not rely on any transcendent omnipotent and omniscient and benevolent powers, and neither do they lie in any vague inherent qualities of certain morals; these morals are derived a priori. Because of this, not only is there not one supreme being who decides which acts are moral, but each rational being determines morality.

Another alternative is Aristotelian virtue ethics. Glaucon, in Plato's Republic, claims that "Every man believes that wrongdoing pays him personally much better." If this is true, what compels a person to act morally at all? Under Aristotles moral system, the answer is simple. It is not vice which is most pleasurable, but virtue, because only virtue truly leads to happiness, or eudaimonia. Aristotle says that the basis of morality and happiness is to act in accordance with one's purpose. He then goes on to determine what a human's purpose must be. He concludes that it must involve exercising our faculty for reasoning, for it is reasoning which sets humans apart from horses, cows, and the brute creation as a whole.

Although the basis of this system is technically for a person to fulfill his purpose, this idea is not nearly so important as the idea of the mean. Aristotle asserts that in an artistic creation, too much and too little alike destroy perfection, while the mean preserves it. Because the goodness of art is but an imitation of the goodness of nature, then what is good in nature must also be governed by the mean. Thus, for a man to behave with excellence, and reach happiness, or eudaimonia, he must have neither an excess nor deficiency of any moral quality. Aristotle does not argue, as Kant does, that certain actions are always either right or wrong, but rather that it depends on whether we perform the action "at the right times on the right occasions towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way." Only in such circumstances is a person truly behaving in accordance with the mean. While Kant simply says that lying is always wrong, Aristotle would say that a person must be neither too deceitful nor too honest. This eliminates such problems in Kant's moral system as the Inquiring Murderer, where the actions Kant calls moral seem immoral and callous.

Aristotles moral system is an excellent example of a moral code without a divine consciousness which is not relative. Although it does rely on the somewhat questionable idea of the purpose of a "man as such", this is a very different thing from a divine consciousness. It could be argued that Man cannot have a purpose without something imposing it upon him, but this can be easily countered by saying that although it is a plants purpose to grow and reproduce, nothing is imbuing it with that purpose. Thus, purpose does not imply a divine consciousness.

One last alternative to moral values without God is egoism. Perhaps the ultimate basis for moral values is ones personal pleasures and desires. After all, humans are always selfish. No matter what the action may be, there is always a selfish undertone. For example, if one were to do something which would in our society be considered selfless, such as saving a dying friend, one might argue that the rescuer was only satisfying his desire to help a friend. If the person had helped this friend, he knows that he would meet a disconcerting guilt which would plague him for life. That person would suffer for the rest of his life and would thus never reach a comforting state of mind.

Egoism does not support your contention that morality must be relative in the absence of a divine consciousness. If no God were to exist, there would still be human nature. According to Glaucon, human nature is always to be selfish. Thus, morality as creating the greatest happiness for oneself would still exist. The presence or non-presence of God would have absolutely no bearing on morality. There is no connection between the two.

Finally, one might argue that if there were no God, there would not be any morality whatsoever. Reconsider Gaucons story of the ring of Gyges. Glaucon claims that if a just and unjust person were to each get a ring that makes one invisible, both would use it for their own ends. He argues that using the ring for evil purposes pays better than using the ring justly. Let us see who benefits more if the just man uses the ring for good purposes. The unjust obviously benefits in terms of wealth and power. If he plays his cards right and masks his crimes, he can even get a better reputation than the just man. The just man will not gain any of these benefits. However, he will have been ethical. But how do ethics matter? Does the just man gain more than the unjust man at all during his life? It seems that he does not. If a benevolent God doesnt exist, then there is no afterlife, or at least being ethical does not affect it, and it doesnt matter whether one was good or evil, ethical or unethical. Thus, the unjust man obviously benefits more from his actions. If there are no ethics, therefore, ethical relativism has no hold.

Comments or Replies can be directed to Hugh Taft-Morales

APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

Online Discussion

APA Committee on
Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy