APA Newsletters

Volume 02, Number 2 Spring 2003
NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE FROM THE EDITORS, ROSAMOND RHODES & MARK SHELDON FROM THE CHAIR, KENNETH KIPNIS
ARTICLES KENNETH KIPNIS "Pediatric Ethics and Responsibility for Children: Clearing the Ground" LAINIE FRIEDMAN ROSS "Adolescent Autonomy in Health Care?" JOEL E. FRADER "Commnetary: Parental Authority and Health Care Decisions" F. M. KAMM "Embryonic Stem Cell Research" ARTHUR CAPLAN "Revulsion Is Simply Not Enough: The Impending Culture War over Advances in Genetics" THOMAS MAY, ROSS D. SILVERMAN, & MARK P. AULISIO "Do HEalthcare Professionals Have an Obligation to be Vaccinated Against Smallpox?" MICHAEL DAVIS "Some Problems of Method in Punishment Theory: A Critique of Michael Ridge’s ‘Unfair Advantage, Auctions, and Proportionality’"
BOOK REVIEWS David Kuhl: What Dying People Want: Practical Wisdom for the End of Life and Timothy Quill: Caring for Patients at the End of Life: Facing an Uncertain Future Together REVIEWED BY MARY DEVEREAUX Peter Korn: Lovejoy: A Year in the Life of an Abortion Clinic REVIEWED BY VIRGINIA J. NIMICK

 

© 2002 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN: 1067-9464

APA NEWSLETTER ON
Philosophy and Medicine Rosamond Rhodes & Mark Sheldon, Co-Editors Spring 2003 Volume 02, Number 2
FROM THE EDITORS
Rosamond Rhodes & Mark Sheldon "Richness" and "variety" describe this issue of the Newsletter. Its contents illustrate how interesting topics in applied ethics can be and how philosophically challenging medical ethics issues are. The contributions span the field from discussions of parental authority over health care decisions to stem cell research, from an examination of smallpox vaccination policy to an assessment of a theory of punishment. At the March 2002 meeting of the Central Division, the Committee on Philosophy and Medicine invited four individuals to focus on the issue of how to resolve the tension between parental rights, children’s interests, and physicians’ responsibilities. The four were philosophers Jeffrey Blustein and Kenneth Kipnis, philosopher and pediatrician Lainie Friedman Ross, and pediatrician Joel Frader. The specific issue that the four addressed was the age at which children should be allowed to make health care decisions for themselves. Jeffrey Blustein’s paper, "Parental Authority, Children’s Rights, and Health Care," appeared in Volume 02, Number 1, Fall 2002 of this Newsletter. In this issue, the discussion continues as Kenneth Kipnis, in "Pediatric Ethics and Responsibility for Children: Clearing the Ground," sketches a broad outline concerning criminal and family law, medical social work, and clinical ethics. He discusses whether the criminal and family law frameworks provide precedents and a model for when physicians should override parental wishes. Lainie Friedman Ross, in "Adolescent Autonomy in Health Care?" seeks to counter what she perceives as a growing trend to grant to adolescents autonomy to make health care decisions. She particularly questions the effort by the American Academy of Pediatrics to recognize a greater role for children and adolescents in making health care decisions for themselves and the basis for their ascribing an adequate level of maturity when there is no test for maturity. Ross sees no basis for allowing physicians to overrule parental decisions and argues, instead, for the importance of keeping the family at the center of medical decision-making and allowing parents to set family priorities. In "Parental Authority and Health Care Decisions," Joel Frader (who Chaired the Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics when it formulated the report criticized by Ross) stresses the practical challenges posed by the real and complicated world in which clinical pediatrics plays itself out. While he acknowledges the usefulness of criminal law for dealing with some pediatric cases, he does not see it in others. Frader questions the appeal to a standard of "rationality" premised on the notion of a "well-reflected" or "well-conceived life plan" that we don’t even apply to adults. Frader also criticizes Ross for failing to appreciate that clinicians sometimes encounter adequately mature adolescent patients, and he maintains that it would be appropriate to let such patients make decisions. In addition, he challenges Ross’s claim that there is no test to determine levels of maturity by pointing to the behavioral scientists who would disagree. The next two papers, "Embryonic Stem Cell Research" by F.M. Kamm and "Revulsion is Simply Not Enough: The Impending Culture War Over Advances in Genetics" by Arthur Caplan, focus on the current controversy concer ning therapeutic cloning. Kamm develops a tight and rich analysis of the moral importance of human embryos. Caplan expresses concern about the political and social forces that make the new genetic science and therapeutic cloning into a symbol for their broader agendas and the newest battlefield of the "culture war" to block further advances in the new science. Taking issue with Kass and others who experience revulsion at the thought of creating a cloned human embryo, and criticizing Fukuyama’s argument from the inviolable status of human nature, Caplan argues that turning away from the possibilities afforded by biotechnology amounts to paranoid conservatism. The clear and present danger of these vocal critics is that they would deny the sick or disabled the possible benefits of developments on the horizon of science. Turning to yet another topic is the timely paper by Thomas May, Ross Silverman, and Mark Aulisio. Focusing on President Bush’s December 2002 announcement of plans to vaccinate up to 500,000 healthcare professionals, they ask whether healthcare professionals have an ethical obligation to submit to vaccination. They examine the issue in light of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act developed shortly after September 11, 200l, in light of membership in a health profession, and in light of healthcare professionals’ obligation to serve national security interests. Ultimately, the authors conclude that there is no professional obligation for healthcare professionals to be vaccinated against smallpox prior to a terrorist attack. In the final paper of this issue, "Some Problems of Method in Punishment Theory: A Critique of Michael Ridge’s ‘Unfair Advantage, Auctions, and Proportionality,’" Michael Davis responds to Ridge’s criticism of Davis’s own "fairness theory" of punishment. The appearance of this paper in these pages may surprise some readers. Yet Davis’s comments are far more relevant than his title suggests. Punishment, whether it is seen as a part of ordinary morality and integrally related to our assignment of praise and blame, or seen as a piece of a legal system, raises an important topic in medical ethics. It is relevant to our judgments and responses to medical errors and to our stand on the issue of the medical profession policing itself. Davis also offers interesting comments on the use of intuitions and models in applied ethics. This part of his discussion is apropos because a good deal of the work in medical ethics makes use of intuition as a starting point (for instance, Frances Kamm’s paper in this section). Davis provides a clear account of how intuitions can be misleading. Unless they are clear, shared, and relevant, and unless the inference is appropriate, intuitions are not a useful starting point for ethical analysis. Furthermore, Davis’s discussion of how to use and criticize a theoretical model raises appropriate considerations for addressing the models we find in medical ethics discussion (for example, Kennith Kipnis’s reference to the dominion model in family law). This issue of the Newsletter concludes with reviews of three books, each one worthy of library space according to the assessment of our reviewers. In "Patient Perspectives on Dying: A Review of Recent Literature," Mar y Devereaux considers two books, What Dying People Want: Practical Wisdom for the End of Life and also Caring for Patients at the End of Life: Facing An Uncertain Future Together. Virginia Nimick reviews Lovejoy: A Year in the Life of an Abortion Clinic. As always, please send announcements, letters, papers, poetry, stories, book and film reviews. Contributions and queries should be sent to Rosamond or Mark at the addresses below. For ease of communication, please include your phone and fax numbers and your email address. ROSAMOND RHODES & MARK SHELDON, Co-Editors Address mail to: Rosamond Rhodes Box 1108 Mount Sinai School of Medicine One Gustave Levy Place New York, NY 10029 Phone: (212) 241-3757 Fax: (212) 241-5028 Email: rosamond.Rhodes@mssm.edu Mark Sheldon Department of Philosophy and Medical Ethics and Humanities Program Northwestern University Evanston, IL 60208 Phone: (847) 328-2739 Email: sheldon@northwestern.edu
FROM THE CHAIR
Kenneth Kipnis University of Hawaii, Manoa
The Business Models of Philosophy For reasons that are not easy to understand, we philosophers don’t often think about how we earn our livelihoods. Perhaps we are too much the heirs of Socrates, who didn’t seem to have taken the problem seriously enough. Aside from the poverty, Our Founder counted on the informal graciousness of wealthy and powerful friends, connections that may have served him badly toward the end. To his credit, Socrates had regular conversations with a variety of adults who, while neither philosophers nor intent on becoming philosophers, nonetheless pursued lively interests in philosophical questions. Those dialogues shifted when Socrates’ student, Plato, developed the Academic business model, perhaps his most important contribution to philosophy. In exchange for teaching the sons of the wealthy, philosophers could now subsist on regular tuition payments while continuing their creative professional work between classes. Conversations now occurred between teachers and students and among faculty. For about 800 years—a successful run by any commercial standard—the Athenian philosophy industry flourished, albeit in a non-Socratic, sequestered manifestation; coming to an end only when an ascendant Christianity shut down the schools as hotbeds of pagan corruption, an occupational hazard. Although Dark Ages ensued, new academic institutions eventually re-emerged to support philosophy and other disciplines. While our contemporary colleges and universities are not so different from Plato’s shop, we have come to take the Enlightenment legacy for granted, usually conceiving professional philosophers as academicians. But other business models have appeared. To be sure, Pierce and Spinoza did estimable work in their spare time. But Nietzsche, Russell, Hume and Copi sought livelihoods in the publishing industry. And still others took up work within non-academic settings: Plato and Aristotle in Syracuse and Macedonia; Aquinas and Confucius most spectacularly within the church and the Chinese courts; and, arguably, Lenin, Leibniz, Trotsky and Jefferson. It is a mistake to think that ‘academic philosophy’ is a redundancy. Many of us working in medical ethics are now venturing well beyond the walls of the academy and discerning what may be new career paths. But there are perils for professionals who seek work within alien organizations, risks that are well-known to in-house corporate attorneys, doctors in correctional health services and—notoriously—accountants who get too chummy with their clients. Journalists worry about colleagues who board political bandwagons and "drink the Kool-Aid." You can lose your professional bearings if you aren’t careful. Having worked as an organizational ethics consultant and as an expert witness in ethics-related legal cases, I have learned to keep my distance, staying away from victory parties, for example. I struggle to avoid referring to my client and myself as "we." I treasure my day job. I remind myself that I am merely an outsider, offering a judgment within my professional competence and decidedly not a participant in the client’s enterprise. None of these precautions were covered during my professional training, I have picked them up along the way. We may need a new business model for this work: something like an ethics consultation firm. The jobs are out there, but not the optimal organizational setting. Such an entity would have a Board with deep roots in professional values. It would have multiple clients with project managers who were primarily accountable to the Board rather than to clients. There would be information management practices that encouraged publication, so work could be judged openly by peers rather than concealed as proprietary. These arrangements and others could protect philosophical practitioners from being overawed by wealthy and powerful clients. Though more work needs to be done, the idea of a such an entity may hold out the prospect of new career paths for philosophy students. But it also points toward an alternative business model that could end the Academic isolation that has marked too much of our profession’s history since the death of Socrates.
ARTICLES
Pediatric Ethics and Responsibility for Children: Clearing the Ground
Kenneth Kipnis University of Hawaii at Manoa What exactly do pediatricians owe to their minor patients— early infancy to late adolescence? And what do they owe to the parents of those minors? While these questions usually lie dormant in everyday clinical practice, they arise as ethical problems in a broad array of cases: vaccinations, clinical research, teen abortions and birth control, circumcision (both male and female), venereal disease, parental refusals of indicated treatment on religious grounds (particularly Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists), deafness and cochlear implants, non-treatment decisions in newborn intensive care, child abuse reporting, and so on. Conscientious physicians can experience perplexing ethical conflicts involving duties to children and to parents. Even worse, ethical deliberation is often further complicated by the presence of legal standards and imperatives that add a third vector of obligation to the first two. The field of medical ethics is far from consensus on these problems. Rather than providing definitive answers to the questions here, my purpose will be to begin to sort them out, narrowing the areas of possible disagreement and sharpening the issues. I have suggested elsewhere [Kenneth Kipnis and Gailynn Williamson, "Nontreatment Decisions for Severely Compromised Newborns" in Ethics 1984, 95:90-111] that the root of our problem is our commitment to two different and incompatible ways of accounting for parental authority: accounts that I have termed dominion—with its roots in Roman Law—and custody—a more recent idea. Dominion conceives society as composed of families, not persons. Just as I do not have to account to others when I paint my car, so, on this view, parents do not have to justify the religious upbringings they provide to their children. Parenthood consists of a right that certain men and women have in certain children. It sets out a domain of privacy—the home as sovereign castle—that neither the state nor other persons can properly violate. Just as it is wrong to mess with Mr. Jones’s garden even though he neglects his flowers, so it is wrong to mess with Mr. Jones’s children even though they may benefit from our attention. Dominion in family law is most clearly seen in the legal system’s response to actions that would be criminal offenses but for the fact that the "perpetrator" is the "victim’s" parent. If I wreck your daughter’s bicycle, pierce her earlobes, and spank her for misbehaving, those would be very serious legal matters. But if I do the same with my own daughter, there will be no legal charge. Proponents of dominion can either (1) seek to establish that children are the personal possessions of their parents (strong dominion), or they can (2) concede that while parents don’t literally own their children, things will go better if we acted as if they did, supporting parents in their decisions (weak dominion). It is commonly alleged that parents have a special sensitivity to the child’s interests, while professionals and state officials are clumsily intrusive. In both its strong and weak forms, dominion creates a powerful presumption against interference with the family, providing few tools for child advocates and reformers. As late as 1874, laws prohibiting child abuse were unheard of in the United States. The first prosecution (the New York City case of 10-year-old Mary Ellen McCormack) was famously brought under an animal protection statute. Because dominion offers few internal resources for limiting parental authority (e.g., delinquency and abandonment), its derivative pediatric ethic will endorse strong deference to parents, much as veterinarians are obliged to animal owners. Beginning in 1874, the view that children are under the sovereignty of their parents has given way to the view we can call custody. The term suggests an entrusting of the child to the care of its parents. Custody acknowledges the truism that it takes three to make a marriage: a man, a woman, and a state. This idea is not new; Plato, in the Crito, has Socrates argue that the state, acting through its laws, is a third and preeminent parent. On this second account of parenthood, parental authority is a stewardship: a special permission the state bestows and can revoke if certain conditions are not met. Parental powers do not come free. Society often grants special permission: think of the privilege that ambulance drivers have to sound their sirens, break the speed limit, and oblige others to pull off the road. We expect ambulance drivers to use their special permission to perform an important task. And we will take away their privileges for reasons of abuse, neglect, or inability to meet responsibilities. Important matters of social concern should only be entrusted to persons who are willing and able to attend to them, and who do not abuse the special privileges they are accorded in the light of their responsibilities. Custody gives parents a revocable possession of the child until it reaches adulthood. Parental authority is both justified and limited by parents’ duties to meet their distinctive responsibilities. In pediatric ethics, the tasks are, first, to define the proper dimensions of the responsibility that the community imposes on parents for the care of their children and, second, to circumscribe the special responsibilities pediatricians have for the health care interests of those same children. To the extent that these boundaries and standards are murky and insecure, dominion may come to be a more accurate description than custody. Here medical ethics can play a role in the creation of socially valuable clarity. Discussion of the dimensions of pediatric responsibility are often confused by inattention to the context of discussion. There are at least four contexts within which inquiry can be carried out. We can be concerned about substantive criminal law, family law, medical social work, and—finally—clinical ethics. Criminal Law: Criminal law characteristically includes prohibitions on child abuse, involuntary manslaughter (or negligent manslaughter) and child neglect. Standardly, parents have a legal responsibility to provide appropriate care for their children, including health care. Since they are ordinarily not licensed to do this themselves, they must retain doctors to do this for them. If a parent refuses to seek out appropriate medical care for a child who is obviously and seriously ill, and the child dies, there can be a charge of involuntar y manslaughter. Parents do go to jail for this. Although it is not often discussed, there may be situations in which pediatricians serve as instruments of abuse. In one case I know of, the parents of a young child refused on religious grounds to permit the use of pain medications during debridement (the removal of debris and dead tissue following a severe burn). Even with medication, this is one of medicine’s most painful procedures. It seems that anyone inflicting a like amount of unnecessary suffering upon a child would plainly be guilty of abuse. I think health care professionals should have refused to do the debridement in that way. Comparable concerns also arise in connection with circumcision (both female and male), surgical assignments of sex, and when dying minors are "flogged" with burdensome treatments that cannot provide patient benefit. In this context, we might include the deliberate failure to relieve severe pain and the imposition of burdensome treatments—especially those that cause pain or irreversible loss of function—that are not expected to provide compensating benefits. It may be that the concept of abuse is broad enough to prohibit such treatments. Finally, physicians are routinely assigned enforcable legal duties to report evidence or reasonable suspicions of child abuse and neglect. These legal responsibilities can conflict with ethical obligations of confidentiality and—more importantly—with the duty to make medical services available. Child abusers will be discouraged from bringing injured children to doctors if they know they will face prosecution and punishment as a consequence. Instead of protecting children, reporting laws may substantially increase the danger to them. Family Law: From this point of view, the primary issues are whether and on what basis courts should suspend or terminate some or all parental rights where parents are unwilling or unable to provide appropriately for children. If we have common standards specifying what parents owe to children, and if it becomes clear that some parents are neither meeting those obligations nor delegating the appropriate authority to others who will, then it can fall to a court, acting as parens patriae, to relieve parents of responsibility and delegate it to another. There is not necessarily blame in these cases. Where a couple with mental retardation, lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make decisions, is unable to manage responsibilities associated with their child, a court may appoint a guardian for the child (or even for all three). Guardians are sometimes appointed in divorces when rancorous conflict renders parents incapable of reaching agreement on simple matters. In this context, the central concern is with the standards courts should use in deciding whether to suspend elements of the parents’ authority and appoint a substitute medical decision-maker—a guardian— for the child. Here the courts oversee parental responsibilities to provide appropriately for the safety and well-being of the children until adulthood. We will return to this issue. Medical Social Work: Instead of appointing a proxy decision-maker, it is often possible to mobilize and enhance the resources of the immediate family and community in the interest of ensuring that the minor patient receives indicated care. Almost all parents are, from time to time, unable to manage certain childrearing responsibilities by themselves. Public schools, hospitals, day care centers and pre-schools, foster homes, juvenile detention facilities, pharmacies, family courts, etc., are all social mechanisms intended to augment the resources of parents in the interests of the community and its children. This point of view inquires about special resources that might provide assurance that the child will be protected. For example, where Christian Scientist parents are conscientiously refusing medical care for a chronic condition like diabetes, one might ask whether a guardian can be appointed on a continuing basis to arrange for and consent to treatment. Can mechanisms be set up to ensure that appropriate parties are notified in the event that the child needs medical attention? Can neighbors, teachers, home visits by social workers, be parts of the solution? Much can be gained— especially for the child—if a formula for cooperation can be found. It was noted earlier that guardians are sometimes appointed—almost as a prosthesis—where parents who are mentally retarded are unable, by themselves, to manage the responsibilities associated with childrearing. In a comparable way, Christian Scientists sometimes cannot be counted upon to provide their children with medical interventions that are necessary in the senses defined above. While there may be no blame in these cases, it is unfair to the children of Christian Scientists for the larger community to undertake to protect all children against unnecessary suffering and untimely death from medical neglect, except for the children of Christian Scientists. The special legal privileges that parents have over their children make sense only in relation to the reciprocal responsibilities parents have to provide appropriate care. Where it becomes evident that parents, for whatever reason, cannot be expected to meet the standard, the larger community has a duty either to relieve the parents of responsibility—delegating all or part of it to another—or to augment the family’s resources to the point where the child’s well-being is reasonably assured. Clinical Ethics: A fourth context involves pediatric clinical ethics: specifically, the circumstances under which a physician should act to override a parental decision. We have already alluded to one case in which the parents demanded that a physician administer abusive treatments, treatments that imposed burdens without an expectation of compensating benefits. Here the Hippocratic duty "above all, to do no harm" should suffice. Physicians have a duty to reject such demands. But how physicians and hospitals should respond to refusals of medically indicated treatment by the children themselves or by their parents or guardians is a quite different issue. (A further complication occurs when a mature minor disagrees with a parental decision). Under what circumstances should physicians operating within a liberal society (a society committed to respecting substantial differences in orientation and values) either disregard such refusals, treating the minor directly or, if time permits, seek to have the refusal overturned in court? While the criteria the courts use in deciding to appoint guardians will be relevant to a medical decision to seek a court order, the medical profession, collectively, has an ethical duty to try to get the courts and legislature to adopt criteria that are consistent with medical ethics. Notwithstanding the central involvement of doctors, it is not the case that physicians have the legal authority to impose treatment against the will of the minor’s parents, except under rare, emergency circumstances. At the hospitals at which I have worked the standard procedure is to ask the administration to direct the hospital attorney to petition the family court for a hearing to appoint a guardian. In Honolulu, a family court judge carries a beeper for this purpose at all times. Emergency hearings can be convened in hours. If the motion is granted, the parents’ authority over the child will be partially suspended and delegated to another individual—the guardian—who will then have the authority to give or withhold consent to medical treatment in the interest of the child. Conceived as a problem in medical ethics, the bottom-line issue is when to seek in this way to suspend or terminate a parent’s legal authority to give or withhold consent to a minor’s treatment. While it is not possible to set out a rule here, there are three factors that should generally carry weight in medically honoring a refusal of medical treatment by or on behalf of a minor: the decisional capacity of the minor, the burden and risk of treatment, and the effectiveness of treatment. The Decisional Capacity of the Minor: The emerging trend, both in law and medical ethics, is to distinguish between mature (i.e., decisionally capacitated) minors and other minors. Minors often have the abilities to understand their diagnosis, the treatment options, and the risks and benefits attaching to each. Their personal values may be stable and well-reflected upon, and not the manifestations of either a developmental phase or a transient or treatable psychiatric condition. There may be grounded confidence that the child will still own the decision later on in life. It is now common for medical ethicists to maintain that a refusal to assent to treatment from such a "mature minor" should be given great weight in medical decision-making and several court cases support the right of mature Jehovah’s Witness minors to refuse blood. [See, for example, In re E.G, 549 N.D.2d 322 (IL, 1989) and In re W.M. (823 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827 (W.Va. 1992) involved a non-Jehovah’s Witness minor.] One very useful standard is the "rule of sevens." [See, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W. 2d 739 (TN, 1987).] Below the age of seven years the child is unrebuttably decisionally incapacitated; from seven to fourteen years there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity; and for fourteen years and above there is a rebuttable presumption of capacity. Accordingly, a Christian Scientist minor, perhaps even as young as seven years of age, could have a refusal of treatment honored, especially if that refusal made sense against a background of what appeared to be reasonably stable personal values. The case for deferring to parental authority (and the withheld assent of a child) would be much stronger if either or both of the next two conditions obtained. The Burden and Risk of the Treatment: Though medical treatments can be risky and burdensome, many doctors tend to focus on the best outcomes and not on the human costs of getting there. Where treatments carry high prices in this way, that factor can call into question whether treatment is, on balance, a clear benefit. The greater the burden and risk, the less clear it is that the physician is doing a favor for the child in treating and that the treatment is "medically indicated." The fact that a parent is withholding consent on religious grounds should carry no weight if the treatment being rejected is "elective" on the basis that it is burdensome or risky to the point that it could be plausibly refused on those grounds alone. It is worth noting that there are a number of effective and standard life-prolonging treatments—chemotherapy for cancer, dialysis for end-stage renal disease, and immunosuppressive therapies following transplants—that adults can reject as too burdensome or risky to endure. The Effectiveness of the Treatment: There is also a need to consider whether the treatment is likely to be effective in securing some significant and subjectively valuable benefit for the child. The strongest case for overriding parental authority will involve treatments that are demonstrably effective—not experimental or investigational—in securing or recovering some very significant benefit that is subjectively valuable to the child (e.g., saving the child’s life with good function). Antibiotic treatment for bacterial meningitis is a clear case. But where a treatment has less than a 50% chance of realizing such a benefit, and where it is burdensome and/or risky, then these two conditions can entail that it is more likely that the child will be harmed by the treatment instead of being helped by it. If, let us say, a certain drug has a side effect which harms everyone who takes it, but provides significant compensating benefits to 30%, then a patient has a 70% chance of ending up harmed by the treatment without any compensating benefit. It would be difficult to argue that parents should have a legal obligation to authorize treatments that were reasonably expected to harm the child without a compensating benefit. In making these calculations, it should not be overlooked that the psychosocial stresses of official intervention in the family and litigation, and the imposition of treatment against the expressed wishes of the parents, may themselves cause significant damage to the child and his or her social support system, and all of these at a time when, because of the illness, the integrity of the family is likely to be critically important to the child. But where the intervention is virtually without risk or burden, then even a small chance of a significant subjectively valuable benefit might conceivably carry great weight. A treatment’s effectiveness, together with its burdens and risks, are relevant in applying the Hippocratic principles that whatever the physician does shall be for the benefit of the patient and that, above all, the physician is to do no harm. Being a physician is not like repairing appliances. The doctor has an independent responsibility for the well-being of the minor: he or she is not a mere functionary, beholden to the whims of the parents. There are some things a physician should not do to a minor patient even if the parents ask, and there are other things a physician should do for a minor patient even if the parents object.
Adolescent Autonomy in Health Care?*
Lainie Friedman Ross University of Chicago
Introduction The physician-patient relationship is often described as fundamental to medicine and medical decision-making. The relationship is being stretched at both ends. The doctor is now represented by physician-extenders (e.g., nurse practitioners, physician’s assistants) or by a health care team. And the patient is no longer viewed in isolation because 1) changes in medicine, most obvious in such fields as genetics and transplantation, have blurred the individual line of who is the patient; and 2) a recent movement within the Bioethics community seeks to promote an increased role for the family in the decision-making process, even when the patient is a competent adult.1 These changes are challenging mainstream contemporary American Bioethics in which the principle of patient autonomy functions as the crux of ethical decision making. In pediatrics, the doctor-patient relationship traditionally has included three parties: the physician, the child, and his or her parents. Parents are not merely surrogate decision makers on the grounds of child incompetence, but rather, parents are believed to have both a right and a responsibility to partake in their child’s medical decisions.2 In contrast with the changes in the physician-patient relationship generally, the triadic nature of the doctor-patient relationship in pediatrics is being contracted. Many ethicists and policy makers are seeking to isolate the child and physician by excluding parents from many of their children’s health care decisions,3 and thereby promote the child’s self-determination. In part I, I examine the current position of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) as a leader in promoting this policy and I argue why it is misguided. In part II, I discuss two controversial issues and the implications of a policy that supports adolescent self-determination versus a policy that requires parental involvement.
Part I: Health Care Decision Making for Children
1. Recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics In 1995, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) published its recommendations for the role of children in health care decision-making.4 The AAP recommended that the child’s role should depend upon his or her decision-making capacity. The AAP concluded that children who have decision-making capacity should give informed consent for themselves. Although the AAP stated that there were no requirements to obtain parental permission, it tempered this conclusion by encouraging parental involvement "as appropriate."5 With respect to children with developing decision-making capacity, the AAP stated that there were certain situations in which their dissent should be binding (e.g., research) and that even in the therapeutic arena, the child’s decision should "carr y considerable weight when the proposed intervention is not essential to his or her welfare and/or can be deferred without substantial risk."6 For children who lacked decision-making capacity, the AAP deferred to parents unless they (or their decisions) were abusive or neglectful. The AAP also made specific recommendations about what should be done when parents and children disagree on health care decisions. According to the AAP, if there is parental-child disagreement and the child is judged to have decision-making authority, the child’s decision should be binding. If the child has developing capacity, consensus should be sought. The AAP supported third-party intervention for persistent disagreement between the parent and the child and offered various mechanisms including: . . .short term counseling or psychiatric consultation for patient and/or family, case management or similar multidisciplinary conference(s), and/or consultation with individuals trained in clinical ethics or a hospital based ethics committee. In rare cases of refractory disagreement, formal legal adjudication may be necessary.7 In part I of this paper, I challenge the AAP’s recommendations regarding 1) the proper role of children and parents in the decision making process; and 2) its suggestions for mediating child-parent disagreements.
2. Are Children Competent to Make Health Care Decisions?8 A major problem with the AAP’s recommendations regarding the proper role for children in the decision-making process is that it assumes that decision-making capacity can be defined and measured. In the medical and psychiatric literature, there exist no objective standards that can easily distinguish between a competent and an incompetent individual. Even if an objective test could be devised, individual tests of competency of every potential patient would exact a high price in terms of efficiency, privacy, and respect for autonomy. Rather, adults are presumed competent on the basis of age, and physicians are not allowed to perform any medical procedure without the patient’s "informed consent." In contrast, non-emancipated children are presumed incompetent and their parents have surrogate decision-making authority. To some extent, the age standard is arbitrary, as there are individuals older than the legal age of emancipation who are incompetent (lack decision-making capacity) and individuals younger than the legal age of emancipation who are competent (have decision-making capacity). But the statutes are not capricious; in general, individuals above the legal age are more likely to be competent than individuals below the legal age. The AAP offers no guidance as to how to define or test for decision-making capacity, but recommends individual assessment of decision-making capacity on a case-by-case determination. However, since there are no criteria on which to base maturity or decision-making capacity, the decision of whether or not a child has decision-making capacity is dependent upon the judgement of the particular pediatrician— a judgement for which he or she has no training. Are some children competent to make health care decisions? Although the data support the claim that adolescents and adults make equally competent decisions in medical vignettes designed by psychologists,9 this competency may not apply to real life. Despite their knowledge regarding automobile safety, adolescents account for a disproportionate number of fatal car accidents. And despite their ability to repeat the facts about the transmission of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, adolescents tend to overlook long-term consequences. If competency is understood as the ability both to choose and to act to promote one’s self-interest, then the claim that adolescents are competent is not persuasive. I will ignore the difficulties in determining whether a minor has decision-making capacity and assume that some minors are competent to make at least some health care decisions. If autonomy is based solely on competency, then competent children should have decision-making authority in the health care setting. My goals will be to argue 1) that even if children are competent, that there is a morally significant difference between competent minors and adults; and 2) that competency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition on which to base respect for a minor’s health care decision-making autonomy.
3. Competency and its relationship to autonomy If a child is competent, are there any advantages in treating her differently than an adult, particularly with regard to respect for her autonomy? One moral argument to limit the child’s short-term freedom is based on the parents and other authorities need to promote the child’s long-term autonomy. Given the value that is placed on self-determination, it makes sense to grant adults autonomy, provided they have some threshold level of competency. Respect is shown by respecting their present project pursuits.10 But respect for a threshold of competency in children places the emphasis on short-term autonomy rather than on a child’s life-time autonomy. Children need a protected period in which to develop "enabling virtues" (habits, including the habit of self-control), which advance their life-time autonomy and opportunities.11 Although many adults would also benefit from the development of their potential and the improvement of their skills and self-control, at some point (and it is reasonable to use the age of emancipation as the proper cut-off12), the advantages of self-determination outweigh the benefits of further guidance and its potential to improve long-term autonomy. A second moral argument to limit the child’s present-day autonomy is based on the child’s limited world experience such that her decisions are not part of a well-conceived life plan. Again, there are many adults with limited world experience, but children have a greater potential for improving their knowledge base and for improving their skills of critical reflection and self-control. As Willard Gaylin explains: Surely, part of what goes into our abridgement of the child’s autonomy is the recognition that although he may be [competent] … the limitations of his experience distorts his capacity for sound judgement.13 By protecting the child from his own impetuosity, his parents help him obtain the background knowledge and the capacities that will allow him to make decisions that better promote his life plans. His parents’ attempt to help him flourish may not be achieved, but that does not invalidate the attempt. A third argument why childhood competency should not entail respect for a child’s autonomy depends upon the significant role that intimate families play in our lives. Elsewhere, I have argued that when the family is intimate, parents should have wide discretion in pursuing family goals, even though these goals may compete and conflict with the goals of particular members.14 In general, family autonomy promotes the interests and goals of both the children and the parents. It serves the needs and interests of the child to have autonomous parents who will help her become an autonomous individual capable of devising and implementing her own life plan. It serves the adults’ interest in having and raising a family according to their own vision of the good life. These interests do not abruptly cease when the child becomes competent. If anything, parents then have the opportunity to inculcate their beliefs through rational discourse, instead of through example, bribery or force.15 While children are still dependent upon their parents for emotional, economic, and material support, parental interest in their children must be balanced against the competent children’s interest in acting autonomously. In contrast, the current movement gives unilateral responsibility to older children who can still benefit from adult guidance, and it denies enduring parental interest in educating and guiding their competent children according to their own values. If family intimacy is valuable both for what it does and for what it is, then family autonomy should not terminate the moment that a child attains some threshold level of competency. Rather, families can continue to pursue family goals which may compete with the individual goals of family members, even of its competent members. As the ultimate arbiters of intrafamilial conflicts, parents have the right and responsibility to choose these goals. This is not to suggest that parents should not give their child’s opinions serious consideration, particularly if the child is mature; only that parents should retain final decision-making authority until the age of emancipation.16 Although the child’s present-day autonomy is overridden, respect for family autonomy serves to promote the direction and development of the child’s lifetime autonomy. As such, respect for family autonomy respects the child’s developing personhood. A fourth moral argument against respecting the health care decisions of minors is based on placing the notion of health care rights in context. Most individuals who support health care decision making for children view it as an exception and do not seek to emancipate children in other spheres. But why should a child who is competent to make health care decisions not have a right to make other types of decisions? That is, if a fourteen-year-old is competent to make life-and-death decisions, then why can’t this fourteen-year-old buy and smoke cigarettes? Participate in interscholastic football without his parents’ consent? Or even drop out of school? Child liberation is a radical proposal with wide repercussions.17 It would mean that children could make binding contracts, and that child labor laws, mandatory education regulations, statutory rape laws, and child neglect statutes should be overturned. It would give children rights for which they are ill-prepared and deny them the protection they need from predatory adults. It would leave children even more vulnerable than they presently are. My objection to the child liberation position should in no way suggest that I do not place great value on autonomy. My objection is that respect for an individual’s autonomy means respecting her good and bad decisions. Child liberation requires that I respect a child’s present-day freedom regardless of its long-term impact on her developing personhood. Imagine, then, that a fourteen-year-old with new-onset diabetes refuses to take insulin because she fears needles (or because her boyfriend’s religious beliefs proscribe medical care) even though she understands that she will die without it. Who is willing to abandon her to her autonomy? Not many: the laws that give adolescents the right to consent to treatment often do not give them the right to refuse treatment.18 Child liberationists may object that adults also make bad decisions. Since physicians often challenge adults whom they perceive to be making bad decisions, they could do the same with adolescents. The difference is that the competent adult’s decision ultimately prevails. In contrast, most health care professionals for children would be unwilling to respect the treatment refusal of the fourteen-year-old with new-onset diabetes. More generally, we would be unwilling to respect a competent child’s present-day autonomy whenever she makes a bad decision. But if we are unwilling to respect her autonomy on the basis of content, then we are not respecting her autonomy. To only respect those decisions that a child makes with which we agree is not to show respect for the child’s autonomy, but to make a farce out of what is meant by respect for autonomy. Finally, there are also pragmatic reasons to justify overriding the present-day autonomy of competent children. First, although it may be desirable to obtain a determination of competency for unusually mature and competent children, no such test exists. Second, it may be best if parents recognize their children’s maturity and treated them accordingly, but deny that this justifies granting competent children legal emancipation. Many parents respect their mature child’s decisions voluntarily, and "[i]t is plausible to think that children’s maturity is not completely unrelated to parental good sense."19 Although child liberationists may object because a voluntary approach only encourages but does not legally enforce respect for the adolescent’s autonomy, such an approach does limit the state’s role in intrafamilial decisions, which is important for the family’s ability to flourish.20
4. The Family as the Locus of Decision-Making My second objection with the AAP’s recommendations is its willingness to involve third parties in the decision-making process. My concern is that these decisions undermine the family as an autonomous unit. Scant attention has been paid to the family and its children-members by moral theorists during the last quarter of the last centur y. Blustein hypothesized in 1982 that contemporary moral theorists ignore children and the family "because they tend to conceive of ethics as the study of those principles that determine how any two individuals are required to regard, and behave toward, one another."21 The history of the philosophy of the family shows that this has not always been the case. From Plato to Russell, all moral theorists discussed the family. Although some contemporary moral theorists have recommended empowering children with rights and allowing them to make decisions for themselves,22 classical liberal theorists did not.23 John Locke, for example, specifically stated that it is a failure of parents and society … … To turn him loose to an unrestrain’d Liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the priviledge of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a Man, as theirs. This is that which puts the Authority into Parents hands to govern the Minority of their Children.24 Locke was quite specific about when a child comes to be free from both his mother and his father: "when he comes to be of age."25 Locke did not deny the developmental process, but understood that a sharp line needed to be drawn between those who are and those who are not under parental authority. My concern is that unlike Locke, many of my physician and bioethicist colleagues forget where their professional responsibilities end. Physicians only provide for a child’s transient medical needs; his or her parents provide for all of his or her needs and are responsible for raising the child into an autonomous responsible adult. Goldstein and colleagues at Yale University’s Child Study Center described the harm that health care professionals cause when they think they can replace parents.26 By deciding that the child’s decision should be respected over the parents’ decision, physicians and bioethicists are placing their judgment that the child’s decision should be respected over the parents’ judgement that the decision should be overridden. This is less of an issue of respecting the child’s autonomy, but rather, in deciding who knows what is best for the child. In general, parents are the better judge as they have a more vested interest in their child’s well-being and are responsible for the day-to-day decisions of child-rearing. It behooves physicians and bioethicists to be humble as they are neither able nor willing to take over these daily tasks. I do not mean to suggest that children, particularly mature children, should be ignored in the decision-making process. Diagnostic tests and treatment plans should be explained to children to help them understand what is being done to them and to garner, when possible, their cooperation. Parents should include their children in the decision-making process to get their active support, to dispel fears if possible, and to help them learn how to make such decisions. However, when there is parental-child disagreement, the child’s decision should not be decisive nor should health care providers require third-party mediation. The decision belongs within the family. The idea that parents can be both involved in the parent-child disagreement and the final arbiter represents what would be an unacceptable conflict of interest in most settings. Ferdinand Schoeman explains this on the grounds that parents represent their own interests as well as the interests of the family as an integrated whole. Though entrusting individuals with the responsibility of making judgments for the common good when their own interests are involved does not accord well with modern constitutionalist conceptions, we should not discount on a priori grounds the prospects for such an arrangement’s being feasible in certain contexts. The context in which such kinds of representation can work are those in which people in fact conceive their roles and their very identity as requiring such an attitude.27 According to Schoeman, parents in intimate families perceive themselves as representatives of the family ’s interests, and this identity can be separated from their roles as representatives of their own interests. As such, parents can serve as both moderator and disputant in intimate family decisions. Again, this is not to suggest that parents should not give their child’s opinions serious consideration, particularly if the child is competent; only that parents should retain final decision-making authority until the age of emancipation. Although the child’s present-day autonomy is overridden, respect for family autonomy serves to promote the direction and development of the child’s life-time autonomy. As such, respect for family autonomy respects the child’s developing personhood. Despite my arguments, I should add that parental autonomy in health care is not absolute and there are cases in which an adolescent’s decisions should be decisive. For example, I argue elsewhere that a child’s dissent should be binding for some cases in which a child is selected to participate as an organ donor, or as a subject of human experimentation.28 But in neither of these areas would I allow the child to consent unilaterally. Rather, the decision to participate would require the consent of both the child and his or her parent(s). But this paper has focused on the question of when, if ever, adolescents should be given sole decision-making authority.
5. Conclusion–Part I In summar y, adults are presumed competent and their autonomy is (should be) respected unless they are proven incompetent. There are, however, morally relevant differences between competent children and adults which justify different treatment with respect to autonomy. A competent child’s short-term autonomy can be morally overridden to promote her life-time autonomy. I base this conclusion on a competent child’s greater potential to improve her decision-making skills, her greater potential to broaden her background knowledge, and her parents’ valid interest and responsibility in supporting and guiding her moral and cognitive development, even though she has achieved a threshold level of competency. Competency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition on which to base respect for decision-making autonomy in pediatrics. Parents have a valid interest and responsibility in guiding their child’s moral and cognitive development and these interests outweigh the costs of denying the child’s present-day decision-making authority. As such, I believe that the AAP’s recommendation to empower competent adolescents to consent and refuse treatment on their own is misguided. Part 2: Two Case Studies in Adolescent Autonomy
6. Introduction In part I, I argued against granting adolescents sole decision-making autonomy in health care. Here I want to consider the implications of such a policy revision and compare them with the implications of our current policy. To do so, I examine two controversial issues that challenge both processes. The first issue is health care decision making regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. In the November-December 1997 issue of the Hastings Center Report, Robert Weir and Charles Peters argued for the need to affirm the decisions adolescents make about life and death.29 At its extreme, this raises the question of whether physician-assisted suicide, if legalized, should be extended to adolescents.30 The second issue is health care decision making regarding contraception. Since the 1970s, all fifty states have specialized consent statutes, statutes which vary in their scope, but which give adolescents some autonomy to seek and consent independently to the diagnosis and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse, contraceptive counseling, and/or the procurement of contraceptives.31 Some states even allow minors to consent to abortions without disclosure or consent from the minor’s parents.
7. Refusal of Life Sustaining Treatment In their Hastings’ article, Weir and Peters review the literature of adolescent decision-making and conclude that the data that exist suggest that adolescents over the age of 14 years have decision-making capacity.32 The data that support their conclusion are scant and are based on hypothetical cases answered in a survey setting. The problem is that most of the studies do not reflect how decision making actually occurs because the studies depict hypothetical situations which may not accurately capture the differences that would be revealed in a more naturalistic setting.33 For example, it is not known whether the stress of illness has the same influence on the decision-making capabilities of adolescents and adults. There are some who believe the impact may be worse on adolescents, although to be fair, even they have few data to support this.34 Weir and Peters distinguish three classes of children with respect to decision making regarding life sustaining treatment: 1) adolescents over the age of 14 years who are capable of making decisions; 2) children under the age of 14 years who usually lack decision-making capacity; and 3) adolescents over the age of 14 years about whom there are doubts regarding their decision-making capacity. Their conclusions are similar to those proposed by the AAP. If the child is less than 14 years of age, but appears to have decision-making capacity, Weir and Peters argue for including the child to the greatest extent possible–that is to seek parental permission and the child’s assent for end-of-life decisions. This would mean that children would have to be told they are dying. The literature supports this position, but currently there are some parents who are unable or unwilling to do so. Weir and Peters believe they must.35 I am less adamant: I would encourage it, I would try to explain to parents that children understand a lot more than we believe, but I am not sure I would always override their decisions. But let us focus on the child older than 14 years of age. With respect to mature adolescents over the age of 14 years, Weir and Peters argue: Ethically, the physicians should be guided by considerations of patient autonomy and the power of moral persuasion to follow the instructions of the adolescent, unless a particular adolescent demonstrates that he or she lacks sufficient decision-making capacity.36 Nevertheless, they acknowledge that "legally, the parents may still be the responsible party according to state statute."37 That is, they believe that if a child is older than 14 years and the physician finds him sufficiently mature, the physician should respect his refusal of life-sustaining treatment even if the parents want to continue aggressive care. What does it mean to be "sufficiently mature"? This assumes that we can determine maturity and competency, despite the fact that no tests exist. My concern is that the finding of "sufficient maturity" may be a euphemism for "the physician agrees with the child’s decision." This is not respect for autonomy, but the decision by the physician to replace his or her determination of what is in a child’s best interest with the decision made by the parents. But ignore my cynicism for a moment and ask what would it mean to empower adolescents to refuse life-sustaining treatment? I could envision a scenario in which parents are unrealistic about their dying adolescent’s prognosis and would want aggressive care despite the adolescent’s plea "enough is enough." Many of the cases of this sort reach consensus– the parents eventually hear the child and understand the "futility" of resuscitation and continued ventilation. But not always, and so some children are forced to bear unnecessary suffering–hopefully tempered by the physician’s obligation to provide sufficient palliative care. This is the sad case and it is the one that draws one to Weir and Peters’ conclusion. But medical prognostication is not always right and it may be that the child will survive. And it is this doubt which explains why families are given the choice. If we are absolutely certain that treatment X would serve no purpose, treatment X cannot be offered ethically to the family. Imagine, then, a different scenario: an adolescent who refuses life-sustaining treatment because he does not like the side effects of treatment, despite his good long-term prognosis. Such is the case of Billy Best, who made headlines in 1994, prior to Weir and Peter’s article.38 Billy was 16 years old, had leukemia and an eighty percent chance of cure with conventional chemotherapy. But the chemotherapy made him weak and made his hair fall out, so he ran away to avoid further treatment. My first reaction to Billy was to ask why or how could anyone judge him sufficiently mature, assuming that the media description of his reasons were accurate? The chemotherapy was temporary and his chance of complete recovery very high. Eventually, however, Billy convinced his parents to support his decision to refuse further chemotherapy, and his physicians acceded to the family’s demand. The physicians could have attempted to seek legal authority to force treatment (because he is a minor and his parents’ decision not to pursue further chemotherapy could be defined as neglect), but chose not to.39 Billy had completed most of his treatment course, and given the family consensus, the doctors decided that the incremental gains were offset by the harms and costs that judicial restraint would impose. But imagine if Billy could not convince his parents and the doctors decided to respect his decision anyway. If I were his parent, I would say, "Say that again doctor. You can save my child’s life, and you won’t? Because he doesn’t want to be bald?" I’d find another physician quickly, and call the state board as well! The easy objection is that autonomy is about the right to make decisions with which others disagree. And, in fact, adults make many bad decisions. But the inadequacy of some adults (or some of their decisions) is not the standard on which respect for autonomy is or should be based. Laura Purdy explains the problem with a least common denominator approach: "Even liberationists, after all, lament the mistakes and immorality of adults. It seems to be that instead of asserting children’s rights to be equally silly and weak, it would be at least plausible to argue for the overriding importance of helping children develop the self-control and other enabling virtues necessary for living more satisfying and moral lives."40 Of course, how would life sustaining treatment be administered? Billy ran away from Boston and was located skateboarding in Texas. Would I, in my role as physician, place him under house arrest? Restrain him if necessary? When I answer yes, this disturbs some of my supporters. And then I am pushed: Would I be willing to restrain him if the treatment success were only 10% but his parents still insisted and he still objected? Here I still want to respect the parents’ right to make health care decisions for their child, but I am more uncomfortable that respect for their decision requires that I restrain their child. I would want more help from his parents: they need to get his cooperation. But in the end, I might still restrain him. I raise these hypothetical scenarios to consider the consequences of each policy. In both cases, problems arise when parents and their children disagree. If Billy wanted non-treatment and his parents demanded treatment, Weir and Peters would withhold it, even if death were to ensue, and I would force treatment. By treating Billy, he would have most likely lived to hate me. And this reminds many of the case of Dax, the 26 year old with severe burns who was treated for 18 months against his will.41 But Billy is not Dax. Dax is an adult and he should have had the right to refuse life sustaining treatment. If Billy lived to 18 and relapsed, he too would have had the right to refuse further treatment. All I want is to give him the chance to make this decision with a little more life experience to enhance his judgment skills. Post script: Billy Best is alive and well, 8 years later. After discontinuing chemotherapy, he and his family pursued alternative medical treatments. I am relieved, as it confirms the physicians’ decision not to seek a court order to impose treatment. But it does not change my position about what I would have done had his parents demanded treatment.
8. Adolescent Sexuality and the Specialized Consent Statutes The second issue involves health care practices that fall under the specialized consent statutes. The statutes were designed to encourage adolescents to seek health care for problems which they might deny, ignore, or delay if they had to obtain parental permission. Here I will focus on the adolescent’s right to seek contraception without parental involvement. While the purported purpose of the specialized consent statutes to encourage early responsible sexual health care for adolescents is laudable, I will argue that 1) the empirical data do not support the claim and 2) that the moral and pragmatic arguments do not justify such a usurpation of parental responsibility. There are several pragmatic and moral reasons to support such statutes. The pragmatic position is compelling: Given the fact that adolescents can be and frequently are sexually active even when birth control and other sexual health services are relatively inaccessible, they should be given the opportunity to be responsible for their sexual activity. The pragmatist does not need to concede or refute whether the availability of such services increases the numbers of sexually active adolescents. Rather, he or she must argue only that the number is sufficiently large, even when such services are unavailable, as to portend a public health crisis. I accept the pragmatist’s position thus far. But the argument makes two other assumptions which must be fleshed out: 1) that adolescents are competent to make these decisions; and 2) that a policy that grants adolescents autonomy will achieve greater sexual responsibility than would a policy that requires parental involvement. Consider if the two assumption are false. If the first assumption is false, that is, if adolescents are not competent to make health care decisions, then the statutes are misdirected. If adolescents are incapable of giving informed consent in the area of sexual and reproductive health services, then the statutes unfairly hold them responsible for such measures. If the second assumption is false, that is, if granting autonomy to adolescents does not produce greater sexual responsibility, then the argument for extending autonomy fails. Since parents have, and I have argued, should have presumptive responsibility for their minor children, even if they are competent, legislation should override their responsibility only if it can be shown that the policies will promote adolescent well-being significantly better than a policy based on parental responsibility. The state should not override parental authority on a single issue in which the state is only slightly more effective unless the state is able and willing to take responsibility for the myriad of other concerns of its adolescent citizens. The rationale for requiring significantly better well-being is that state intervention inadvertently risks undermining parental authority in other realms—realms in which we both need and want enduring parental commitment. Unless granting adolescent autonomy will promote significantly better sexual and reproductive health care for adolescents, the state must defer to parental authority. Again, I will assume that the first assumption is correct and that some adolescents are competent to make such decisions. Let us examine the second assumption which is that the specialized consent statutes will promote significantly better health care for adolescents in the realm of sexual and reproductive services than if adolescents required parental involvement. Despite the confidentiality assured by the specialized consent statutes, adolescents typically delay seeking sexual and reproductive health care for almost one year after they become sexually active.42 Of course, if parental involvement would cause adolescents to delay such services indefinitely, then the statutes achieve significantly better results. Proponents of these statutes need to get empirical evidence that adolescents will seek earlier and better care if they are assured complete confidentiality. Since such data do not exist, the presumption ought to be in favor of parental involvement. Another pragmatic reason to support adolescent autonomy is that this position avoids conflict. Some adolescents want to act without their parents’ consent because they know that their parents’ religious convictions condemn premarital sexual activity and birth control. But why do we permit these adolescents to seek medical help when we do not allow them to get sex education against their parent’s beliefs? That is, if parents can remove their children from sex education classes because we supposedly respect their traditional lifestyle, then why do we allow physicians to go behind their backs and prescribe birth control to their daughters? And would anyone suggest that we should not tell parents when their adolescents are failing in school to avoid conflict? Surely poor grades are common and are a major cause of intrafamilial strife. The moral argument in support of the specialized consent statutes is based on the moral claim that competency should entail autonomy which I argued is not the case. It ignores the fact that parents are responsible for responding to the child’s current identity, needs and interests and for shaping the child’s future identity, needs and interests. To grant autonomy to competent children requires that it serve their current selves and their future identities. Parents must be able to justify restricting a child’s present day autonomy in order to enhance his or her overall or long-term autonomy. Consider, then, the moral and pragmatic arguments to rescind the specialized consent statutes. First, parents have decision making authority for their children because parents are best situated to decide and to act upon what is in their children’s best interest, and because parents are financially and socially responsible for them. This is true for their education, health care, and religious upbringing. There are no compelling moral arguments that show why medical care with regard to sexual health issues should be an exception. Second, we should rescind the specialized consent statutes because they send adolescents the wrong message. They teach adolescents that their decisions regarding sexuality are unrelated to other aspects of their lives. Consider that parents dictate what schools and church their children attend and in which activities their children may participate, but these same children have legal sanction to ignore parental discretion in the area of sexuality. Consider that these children cannot consent to a throat culture without parental permission,43 but can authorize their physicians to perform a pelvic examination. Third, the specialized consent statutes affirm the adolescents’ attitude that their sexuality is solely a private matter. It is not. Adolescent sexual activity has numerous public consequences for which the adolescent is ill-prepared to accept responsibility. It entails responsibility to themselves (by delaying sexual gratification until they are emotionally and psychologically prepared), responsibility to their partners (by practicing safe sex), and responsibility to their community (by avoiding parenthood until they are both emotionally and financially capable of caring for a child). By arguing against the specialized consent statutes, I do not mean to deny the need for a public commitment to prevent and treat the unwanted consequences of adolescent sexual activity. In that vein, the specialized consent statutes are on the mark: they affirm the community’s belief that the cost of unwanted adolescent pregnancy and untreated sexually transmitted diseases is too high. But the implementation of these statutes entails moral hurdles for the ethical physician: collusion against parents, disrespect for parental conceptions of the good, and a disregard for the adolescent’s need for further parental guidance. There must be other ways to minimize the negative consequences of adolescent sexuality without the specialized consent statutes which I discuss elsewhere.44
9. Conclusion–Part 2 Health care decisions are one of many decisions that are made by parents for and with their children. As such, who should have decision making authority and who should have the right to intervene must be kept in context. In our culture, we place great weight on the right of parents to raise their children according to their own values. This right is not absolute and we can and must challenge parents who are neglectful even if well-meaning. But in the vast majority of cases, we should leave medical decisions for children within the family. We should do so with our eyes open to its implications for adolescents, their families, health care providers, and society at large. *Part I of this paper is based on a previous work, Lainie Friedman Ross, "Health Care Decision Making by Children: Is it in their Best Interest?" Hastings Center Report, 1997; 27: 41 45. This was revised into chapter four of my book, Children, Families and Health Care Decision Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998. Part II of this paper is based on two previous works, Lainie Friedman Ross, "Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy: A Liberal Response." Politics and the Life Sciences, 1996; 15: 1321, and Lainie Friedman Ross, "Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy: An Unrepentant Liberal Approach." Politics and the Life Sciences, 1996; 15: 323-28. These articles were revised into chapter eight of my book, Children, Families and Health Care Decision Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Endnotes
    See, for example, J.L. Nelson, "Taking Families Seriously." Hastings Center Report 1992; 22:6-12; E.H. Loewy, "Families, Communities, and Making Medical Decisions." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 1992; 2:150-3; H. Brody (ed.) The Role of the Family in Medical Decisions. Theoretical Medicine 1987; 8(3):253-383; N.S. Jecker, "The Role of Intimate Others in Medical Decision Making." The Gerontologist 1990; 30:65-71; and J. Hardwig, "What About the Family?" Hastings Center Report-1990; 20(2):5-10. A. Buchanan and D. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989; F. Schoeman, "Parental Discretion and Children’s Rights: Background and Implications for Medical Decisions-Making." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (February 1985):45-62. See, for example, W.G. Bartholome, "Hearing Children’s Voices." Bioethics Forum 1995; 11:3-6; Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association, "Council Report: Confidential Health Services for Adolescents." Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 1993; 269:1420-1424; and G.S. Sigman and C. O’Connor, "Exploration for physicians of the mature minor doctrine." Journal of Pediatrics, 1991; 119:520-525. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, "Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice." Pediatrics 1995; 95:314-317. Ibid., p. 317. Ibid., p. 316. Ibid., p. 316. Competency is a legal term that signifies that an individual has legal decision-making capacity for the decision at hand, although it is often used in the medical ethics literature to refer to a person with decision-making capacity, morally or clinically defined. In this paper, I will use "competent" as an adjective to describe someone who has decisions making capacity clinically and morally. I use the terms to refer to capability regarding a particular decision and not to some abstract concept of "global competency" or "global decision-making capacity". I summarize and critique the empirical data in L.F. Ross, Children, Families and Health Care Decision Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 57-60. The notion of rational beings as project pursuers is explored in detail by Bernard Williams, "Utilitarianism and Integrity." In J. Perry and M. Bratman (eds.)., Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 558-566. L.M. Purdy, In Their Best Interest? The Case Against Equal Rights for Children. New York: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 45. The specific age at which emancipation should be granted is a political and not a moral question. Any age cut-off will liberate some immature individuals and will delay the liberation of some mature children. I do not argue for any particular age because I believe that the age should be chosen by societal consensus, and may differ in different cultures and different periods of times. W. Gaylin, "Competence: No Longer All or None." In W. Gaylin and R. Macklin, (eds.), Who Speaks for the Child: The Problems of Proxy Consent. New York: Plenum Press, 1982, p. 35. L.F. Ross, Health Care Decision Making for Children, op cit., pp. 28-34. Gaylin makes a similar argument. See Gaylin, "Competence: No Longer," op. cit., p. 31. Gaylin reaches the same conclusion. See Gaylin, "Competence: No Longer," op. cit., pp. 47-48. R. Farson, "A Child’s Bill of Rights." In J. Feinberg and H. Gross (eds.), Justice: Selected Readings. Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1977, pp. 325-328.
18. J.C. Costello, "If I can Say Yes, Why Can’t I Say No?" Adolescents at Risk and the Right to Give or Withhold Consent to Health Care." In S.R. Humm et al. (eds.), Child, Parent, and State: Law and Policy Reader. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 490-503.
    See, Purdy, In Their Best Interest?, op.cit., p. 78. And in fact, Norwegian research with ten- to twelve-year-olds suggests that children’s competence follows adults’ expectations. (See A. Solberg, "Negotiating Childhood: Changing Constructions of Age for Norwegian Children." In A. James, and A. Prout (eds.), Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: New Directions in the Sociological Study of Childhood. London: Falmer Press, Basingstoke, 1990. Gaylin makes a similar argument in "Competence: No Longer," op. cit., pp. 47-8. J. Blustein, Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. p. 19. See, for example, H. Cohen, Equal Rights for Children. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1980; J. Holt, Escape from Childhood. New York: EP Dutton and Co., Inc., 1974; and H. Rodham, "Children Under the Law." Harvard Educational Review, 43 (1973), pp. 487-514. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690) edited by P. Laslett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Ibid., Treatise II, p. 63. Ibid., Treatise II, p. 60-61, 67. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, A.J. Solnit and S. Goldstein, In the Best Interest of the Child. New York: The Free Press, 1986. p. 3. F. Schoeman, "Right of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family." Ethics, 91(1) (October, 1980), p. 19. L.F. Ross, Children, Families and Health Care Decision Making, op. cit. R.F. Weir and C. Peters, "Affirming the Decisions Adolescents Make about Life and Death." Hastings Center Report 1997; 27(6):29-40. Susan Wolf addresses this issue and argues against extending assisted suicide to the pediatric population. But she notes that the Dutch experience initially permitted only adult euthanasia but has expanded to pediatric cases. See, SM Wolf, "Facing Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Children and Adolescents." In L.L. Emanuel (ed.), Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998: pp. 92-119, 274-294. A.R. Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. Weir and Peters, op. cit., pp. 31-32. D.G. Scherer and N.D. Reppucci, "Adolescents’ Capacities to Provide Voluntary Informed Consent." Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 12, no. 2, (June 1988), p. 133. W. Gardner, D. Scherer, M. Tester, "Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights." American Psychologist Vol. 44, no. 6 (June 1989), pp. 899-900. Weir and Peters, op. cit., pp. 37-38. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 38. The story first ran on November 3, 1994 in the Boston Globe; Best lived in Boston. It became a national story. J. Auerbach. Norwell youth runs from cancer treatments. The Boston Globe. November 3, 1994, Thursday, City Edition. METRO/REGION; Pg. 30. R.A. Knox. Billy Best’s case reveals gray area of patient rights, The Boston Globe, November 23, 1994, Wednesday, City Edition, METRO/REGION; Pg. 1. Of course, whether the courts would have forced treatment is unknown. Purdy, op. cit., p. 78. The case of Dax is described in an anthology by L.D. Kliever (ed.). Dax’s Case: Essays in Medical Ethics and Human Meaning. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1988. Committee on Adolescence, "Contraception and Adolescents." Pediatrics, 86 (1990):134 citing L.S. Zabin and S.D. Clark, "Why They Delay: A Study of Teenage Family Planning Clinic Patients." Family Planning Perspectives, 13 (1981): 205-217. I realize that this is also changing under the mature minor statutes which allow "mature" adolescents to consent to much of their own
medical care. (G.S. Sigman, and C. O’Connor, "Exploration for physicians of the mature minor doctrine." Journal of Pediatrics, 119 (1991): 520-525.) Nevertheless, this freedom is not commonly sought when the issue is not sexual, reproductive, or psychiatric. Rather, in general, parents are an important influence in their children’s decisions and adolescents tend to seek their suport and advice in most other matters. (See, L.B. Hendry, W. Roberts, A. Glendinning, and J.C. Coleman, "Adolescents’ perception of significant individuals in their lives." Journal of Adolescence, 15 (1992):255-270.) In addition, adolescents are often willing to conform to parental influence (See, Scherer and Reppucci, "Adolescents’ Capacities" op. cit.) particularly female adolescents (See, C. Gilligan, N.P. Lyons, and T.J. Hammer (eds.), Making Connections: The Relational Worlds of Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.) 44. L.F. Ross, "Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy: A Liberal Response." Politics and the Life Sciences, 1996; 15: 13-21, and L.F. Ross, "Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy: An Unrepentant Liberal Approach." Politics and the Life Sciences, 1996; 15: 323-28. These articles were revised into chapter eight of my book, Children, Families and Health Care Decision Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Commentary: Parental Authority and Health Care Decisions
Joel E. Frader Northwestern University Like most philosophers, I am fond of public deliberation and debate. However, I am also a practical person. I seek guidance about how to function in the real world. With regard to parents and health care decisions for their children, real world action takes place in many different contexts. Unfortunately, the papers preceding this commentary, in trying to provide moral insight to suggest correct behavior, do not address context-specific circumstances. In general, their authors make many, many assumptions about different aspects of family, social, and medical situations such that, in the end, the papers provide us with little practical help. First, I have to disclose an historical conflict of interest and admit a personal failing. As Dr. Ross knows, I and the Committee on Bioethics that I chaired have responsibility for much of the specific language in the published American Academy of Pediatrics policy statement on Parental Permission, Informed Consent, and Child Assent. Some of my reactions to her disagreements with that policy may arise, albeit unconsciously,