APA Newsletters

Spring 2001
Volume 00, Number 2

Newsletter on Philosophy and Law

From the Editor

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From the Editor

Theodore Benditt

As the new editor of the Newsletter I certainly want to applaud the fine job done by the previous editor, Richard Nunan, and to thank him for his help and advice in making the transition. Indeed, Richard provided much of the general editorial effort for the current issue and Brian Leiter (Law, Texas at Austin) is guest editor for the issue. Thanks are due also to members of the APA's Committee on Philosophy and Law who have provided abstracts for this issue: Professors Claire Finkelstein (Law, UC-Berkeley), Bill Edmundson (Law, Georgia State), Lester Hunt (Philosophy, Wisconsin) and Joan McGregor (Philosophy, Arizona State).

For your information, Professor David Luban (Law, Georgetown) has been appointed Chair of the Committee on Philosophy and Law as of July 1, 2001, and Professor Julie van Camp (Philosophy, Cal State-Long Beach) has been appointed a new member. Thanks are due to Stefan Baumrin (Philosophy, Lehman Graduate School, CUNY), who is completing his term as chair of the Committee.

Topics and editors for the next three issues of the Newsletter are:

Fall, 2001

NATURAL LAW UPDATE

Submission Deadline: June 15, 2001
Editor: Theodore M. Benditt
Department of Philosophy
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Birmingham, AL 35294-1260
tbenditt@uab.edu
(205) 934-4083

Natural law theories are among the oldest approaches to both ethics and law. In moral philosophy, 16th and 17th century skepticism led, on the one hand, to new sorts of natural law theories that were both more modest in the moral demands they saw nature as supporting and more protective in identifying areas of human life in which people should be free of interference. But skepticism led also to the development of entirely new approaches to ethics which came, over time, to be more prominent than natural law thought. At the same time, natural law thinking about law also began to seem less impressive than other approaches, most notably legal positivism and, more recently, analyses of law highlighting social interests and political ideology.

In recent years there has been a resurgence of natural law thinking in both ethics and law. Important books and collections of essays have been published making the case for or against some version of natural law. It seems appropriate for the Newsletter to take stock of these developments. Essays are welcome which address central themes related to the recent literature on natural law theory.

Spring, 2002

THE RULE OF LAW

Submission Deadline: January 15, 2002
Editor: Theodore M. Benditt
Department of Philosophy
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Birmingham, AL 35294-1260
tbenditt@uab.edu
(205) 934-4083

The rule of law is a central ideal in our thinking about government. It proposes, at a minimum, that people should be governed by means of general rules promulgated in advance, so that they may know what is expected of them and conform their behavior appropriately. The point of the ideal is to eliminate official despotism and even to minimize the need for discretion on the part of government officials. Ambiguity and arbitrariness are the evils to be avoided. The rule of law is said to require that the state and its officials be subject to law and that the law and its application be public, general, and regular. The rule of law, it is sometimes said, is the law of rules.

It is less clear, though, what the rule of law requires in judicial decision-making. What does the ideal have to say when it comes to so-called particularized justice (equity) that may not be strictly in accord with a legal rule? What does it say with regard to any of a variety of exercises of discretion by judges? Jurists and philosophers across the spectrum are advocates of the ideal, though there are different ideas of what it requires. And for some, on both sides of the fence, Election 2000 seriously tested the idea of the rule of law. Proposals are welcome; please send to tbenditt@uab.edu.

Fall, 2002

FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

Submission Deadline: June 15, 2002
Editor: Patricia Smith
Department of Philosophy
CUNY-Bernard Baruch College
P.O. Box G-1437
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010-5526
patricia_smith@baruch.cuny.edu
(212) 387-1675

Feminist jurisprudence is the analysis of law from the perspective of obtaining justice and equal treatment for women. It contains many different facets, focus points, and theories. Recently some feminists have been focusing on global issues and the idea of women's rights as human rights. It is interesting that the subordination and even the overt persecution of women is always a civil internal matter, unsuited to intervention by other nations. The horrors

of Afghanistan poses a warning to concerned men and women everywhere. In the face of emerging militant fundamentalist sects, economic exploitation, and domestic violence women are widely at risk, but national sovereignty apparently precludes intervention. Globalism itself poses interesting debates. If you are interested in submitting feminist work in any of these areas, please send abstract to: patricia_smith@baruch.cuny.edu

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APA Newsletters

Spring 2001 Volume 00, Number 2

Spring 2001
Volume 00, Number 2