APA Newsletters

Spring 2001
Volume 00, Number 2

Newsletter on Teaching in Philosophy

Book Reviews

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David Papineau, Review of Philosophical Naturalism Blackwell Publishers, Oxford UK, Cambridge, USA. ISBN 0-631-18902-5 (cloth), ISBN 0-631-18903-3 (paper).

Reviewed by Samir Chopra (schopra@gc.cuny.edu)

A standard understanding of philosophical naturalism is the affirmation of the continuity of philosophy and science, a view originally promulgated by the logical positivists and given its most radical form by Quine ("epistemology reduces to cognitive science"). However, this is not the reading that David Papineau chooses toto concentrate on in Philosophical Naturalism. choosing instead to concentrate on physicalism (via a rejection of dualism) in philosophy of mind and consciousness, an externalist (reliabilist) approach to epistemology that rejects certainty as a quality of knowledge, and a discussion of realism and anti-realism vis-a-vis the existence of mathematical objects. While providing an answer to the question "How does one write a book on naturalism and avoid citing Quine's "Naturalized Epistemology"? the book, nonetheless, contains a great deal in this book that can be, and is, identified with naturalist positions. It therefore serves as a compact introduction to the issues raised by naturalist theorizing in philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Papineau begins with a discussion of the debate over reductionism in the philosophy of mind and argues that physical characteristics fix mental characteristics across all worlds with the same laws of physics. Keep the laws of physics fixed and by the "completeness of physics", two systems with the same physical properties will display the same physical consequences in any physical circumstances even if those systems are in different possible worlds. Therefore, assuming that mental differences must manifest themselves physically in some physical circumstances, the two systems will be mentally identical. However, the so-called "completeness of physics" relies on physics being defined as the science of those categories needed to explain some "pre-theoretically given class of paradigmatic physical effects". The implausibility of ever isolating such a class is not an issue discussed by Papineau.

Further arguments for a physicalist position in mind are provided via the teleological theory of representation. According to Papineau, the answer to the question of a) how physicalism can provide accurate truth conditions for beliefs and b) what a belief is about really if its truth conditions can be met by a variety of external states of affairs is that the real truth condition for a belief is the condition that it is the biological purpose of that belief to be co-present with. Such a purpose is determined by a selection mechanism that selects a belief precisely because it occurs in conjunction with that condition.

Papineau then argues that consciousness raises no special problems for physicalism and concludes that conscious states are realized by physical states. This enables a view of conscious mental states as genuine causes of behaviors - perhaps the strongest argument for a physicalist view of consciousness. Papineau first considers the positive arguments for dualism, one example being the standard qualia argument: subjective, phenomenal experience will always be left out of any objective, physicalist theory. Frank Jackson's example of Mary who knows everything there is to know about the color red but still has a new experience when actually presented with the color red is picked by Papineau to locate the allure of dualism in something termed the "antipathetic fallacy". This fallacy is a refusal to acknowledge that conscious feelings inhere in the brains of conscious agents. We imagine that since Mary has only had third-person access to the color red before she saw the color red, she was not referring to the experience of seeing red before. The physicalist's response to Jackson's example is not that Mary acquires new knowledge in being confronted with the color red but that she acquires a new ability-namely, the ability to recreate that experience in imagination and memory. Papineau's discussion closes with a standard physicalist response to the problem of consciousness: when asked to explain why it is that certain physical states are conscious and not others, the response is that to be conscious just is to be in those physical states. The new ground covered here is the discussion of the antipathetic fallacy.

Papineau rejects certainty in knowledge (taking, as test cases, the problems of induction and scepticism) but defends reliabilism, defined as the quality possessed by belief-forming processes that generally lead to true beliefs and hence, to knowledge. The rejection of certainty is important as it places so-called Cartesian 'first questions' within the purview of the natural sciences rather than as pre-theoretical starting poitns. The view of reliabilism that Papineau defends requires reliability of belief-forming processes not merely in the actual world, but in all possible worlds that are compatible with the relevant agent's current belief state. This allows Papineau to hold that inductive reasoning is reliable (in that it generally delivers true beliefs) and hence, is a valid mode of inquiry for attaining knowledge.

Unfortunately, Papineau does not present an adequate discussion of some crucial problems that reliabilism is faced with. For example, he does not address the problem of the necessity but not sufficiency of reliable processes for the justification of our beliefs. A good example of such a discussion (along with other objections to reliabilism) can be found in Laurence Bonjour's The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 1985, ISBN: 0-674-84381-9). This also includes the example of Norman, the completely reliable clairvoyant.

Papineau finally moves on to a discussion of mathematical realism and anti-realism and the peculiar epistemological problem created by the question of the existence of mathematical objects. Papineau ends up defending a variant of Hartry Field's fictionalist view of mathematics: that mathematical objects are useful fictions and that mathematics is indispensable because of the simplicity that it provides in making quantitative statements about the world rather than providing any access to transcendental truth. Of course, fictionalism, rather than being thought of as providing an anti-realist view about mathematical objects can be thought of as providing a realist view of fictional objects. But this is not an angle explored by Papineau. The book closes with a discussion of the contrasts between mathematical, moral and modal knowledge.

Papineau is a clear, straightforward writer and this makes the treatment of what are, generally, very difficult topics to comprehend, fairly amenable to systematic handling. Graduate students (or upper level undergraduate students) will find this book to be very readable. I am disappointed, however, both by the lack of a wider range of anti-physicalist responses as well as by the failure to provide bibliographical sources so that students may track down anti-physicalist views on their own. Papineau cites only two sources as arguments against physicalism: Tim Crane's 'Why indeed? Papineau on supervenience' (Analysis 51, January 1991, pp, 32-37) and Tim Crane and Hugh Mellor, 'There is no question of physicalism' (Mind 99, 1990, pp. 185-206). A worthwhile addition to this list would be Objections to Physicalism, edited by Howard Robinson (Clarendon Press; ISBN: 0198236778) which provides essays on anti-physicalist positions in philosophy of mind and in philosophy of mathematics. These pieces should provide a useful antidote to the doctrines espoused in Papineau's book. One of which is a response to Papineau. Another worthwhile reference is: Objections to Physicalism, edited by Howard Robinson (Clarendon Press; ISBN: 0198236778) which provides essays on anti-physicalist positions in philosophy of mind and in philosophy of mathematics. These articles and book should provide a useful antidote to the doctrines espoused in Papineau's book.

I do not think Papineau's arguments for physicalism are the strongest possible, and at numerous points in my reading, I found myself raising objections (as indeed, I have above). For example, nowhere does Papineau acknowledge that a simple response to physicalism may be dualism, or perhaps some form of monism. Furthermore, although Papineau explains in the Foreword that he has chosen to call the book Philosophical Naturalism rather than Philosophical Physicalism on the grounds that his philosophical stance is not tied to current physical theory but will be determined by whichever theory best explains our current conceptions of 'matter' he nowhere explains how, if his thesis is not dependent on current physical theory ,it can be dependent on some agreed upon notion of 'matter'. Surely, what matter is, is a notion decided by current physical theory. How can a philosophical position that aims to make philosophy continuous with natural science still hold on to some pre-theoretical notion of matter? These quibbles, however, are those that any capable student will be able to raise, and if nothing else, the book could be used as a resource for sustained critiques of physicalist theorizing.

Some brief stylistic objections. Footnotes are always irritating and Papineau has an abundance of them, including the device of raising an issue in a footnote and promising to answer it in yet another! These are unnecessary diversions from the text. Furthermore, Papineau sprinkles his text with too many "of course", "obvious" and "clearly" constructions. When an author claims obviousness or utter clarity for as many of his claims and arguments as Papineau does, it makes one a bit wary of the claims being advanced. As an example of this rhetorical style, Papineau claims in the introduction that he will demonstrate that physicalism is "not a prejudice but a consequence of some evident truths". This is, to say the least, out of place in a book claiming to be analytical in nature.

Having raised these objections, I should close by saying that the book would make a useful addition to reading lists for classes on epistemology and philosophy of mind. The relative independence of the sections makes it easy for them to be utilized for classes with different orientations. The first two could be used in a philosophy of mind class, and the third and fourth for advanced classes on epistemology.

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APA Newsletters

Spring 2001 Volume 00, Number 2

Spring 2001
Volume 00, Number 2