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Fall 2006
Volume 06, Number 1

Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy

Book Reviews

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Beyond Epistemology: A Pragmatist Approach to Feminist Science Studies

Sharyn Clough (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 167 pp. $24.95. ISBN: 0-7425-1465-X

Reviewed by Nancy M. Williams
University of Georgia, nancymw2@uga.edu

For some feminist researchers, the central tenet of feminist epistemology—that knowledge reflects the particular perspective of the subject—is invaluable for uncovering androcentric bias in scientific theories and methodologies. However, others disagree. On their view, epistemological theorizing and the concept of situated knowledge only invite unnecessary problems to feminist science studies. So argues Sharyn Clough in her recent book Beyond Epistemology: A Pragmatist Approach to Feminist Science Studies. According to Clough, "epistemology is not the most effective focus for feminists engaged in science criticism" (2).

Her book is divided into eight chapters. Chapters one and two set the stage for Clough’s negative thesis by identifying the problematic aspects of epistemological theorizing. Clough explains that epistemological approaches tend to focus on abstract questions about normative properties of truth and objectivity. On her view, it is an inquiry motivated by representationalism: a philosophical model that invokes a metaphysical gap between knower (the subjective inner mind) and the known (the objective external world). On this model, scientists, and knowers in general, interpret empirical data through gender or political schemas. Of course, if knowers are mere interpreters of some external world, then it is always possible that one’s belief about that world is inaccurate, biased, or partial. So, in order to defeat this global skepticism and bridge the metaphysical gap between knowers and the world, epistemologists attempt to isolate the normative properties that would make their theories "true" or "objective." Unfortunately, Clough believes that these attempts ultimately fail. As long as representationalism is a given, no amount of epistemological evidence will guarantee that feminist claims about androcentric science are objective. In other words, when feminists critique science from an epistemological perspective, they unnecessarily invite the skeptic to ask: "What is the guarantee that feminist views are not themselves biased or partial?" For Clough, feminists’ ongoing engagement with representationalism robs their views of any epistemological bite: "If we attempt to address the oppressive elements of science at the level of epistemology, then the global skepticism toward which epistemology is directed can be used against our own well-justified claims about the instance of scientific bias and abuse" (29).

In chapters three, four, and five, Clough carefully examines the works of numerous feminist philosophers of science, including Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding, and Helen Longino. In these chapters, Clough examines the problematic aspects of epistemology in general and those that seem to affect feminist versions of epistemology in particular. In chapter three, Clough considers Blackwell’s (1875) criticisms of Charles Darwin’s theory of sexual selection. According to Blackwell, Darwin’s claim about inferior "feminine" traits was not based on objective empirical measurement but, rather, on his "extra-empirical" commitments to sexist Victorian norms. Blackwell argued that feminist critics of science must be critical of the fact that (subjective) worldviews and experience filter our access to the objective world. Yet, unlike Darwin’s theory, Blackwell insists that her particular view (that women and men have different but equal mental capacities), accrued by virtue of her experience as a woman, is objective. But Clough is right to point out Blackwell’s inconsistency here: If worldviews and experience filter and bias the facts, then why accept Blackwell’s view as an objective claim about the epistemic privilege of women’s experience? Clough’s analysis goes on to show that Blackwell’s epistemological argument relies on overgeneralizations and elements of feminist essentialism when she assumes that her own experiences (as an educated, white, American woman) are representative of other women and that there are experiences that all women share. But Clough is mostly concerned about Blackwell’s representationalist tone and how it ultimately undermines her criticisms of Darwin’s sexist theories. After all, within the epistemological framework, the skeptic can still ask, "What is the guarantee that the facts about sex selection can ever be accessed directly, unfiltered by feminist worldviews?"

Chapter four is devoted entirely to Clough’s analysis of biologist Evelyn Fox Keller’s early works (before 1985). Clough focuses on Keller’s reliance on psychoanalytic theory and her attempt to develop the idea of "dynamic objectivity." Clough explains that "dynamic objectivity" is based on psychoanalytic object relations theory, which explains the differences in men and women’s cognitive styles in terms of their differences in psychosexual development. Generally, dynamic objectivity refers to feminine ways of knowing where one utilizes a mode of perception that is based on loving attention and engagement. It emphasizes a two-way interaction between scientist and her object of study. On Keller’s view, this non-hierarchal approach is superior to "masculine" ways of knowing, since it does not express a neurotic need to maintain an independent self by dominating the object of study. But for Clough, since object relations theory entails biological determinism, Keller’s latter claim that anyone (male or female) can develop dynamic objectivity is inconsistent. Keller’s characterization of feminine ways of knowing and the masculine gendering of male scientists also causes Clough to voice concern, "because Keller’s theory requires the use of these overgeneralizations…her representationalist attempts to champion objectivity and defeat relativism continue to be unsuccessful, and her thesis is considerably weakened as a result" (76-77).

In chapter five, Clough argues that the early epistemological theories of Sandra Harding (works before 1993) and Helen Longino (works before 1990) encounter similar problems. Although both theorists promote a conceptual midpoint on the epistemological continuum between objectivism and relativism, Clough insists that they remain uncritical of the representationalism that underwrites the debate. Consider Harding’s notion of "strong objectivity." Because she argues that all beliefs have a social filter, Harding disavows the claim that standpoints of women will produce true or objective beliefs. Instead, she introduces a new epistemological position called "strong objectivity." Strong objectivity encourages scientific researchers to include the examination of background beliefs into theories in the hopes of maximizing objectivity. But on Clough’s view, Harding’s proposal remains representationalist. When knowers are conceived as interpreters with social filters, no amount of strong objectivity will defeat skepticism and its variant epistemological relativism. Hence, according to Clough, "the important goals of feminist science studies are best met not be addressing (unanswerable) epistemological problems, but by focusing back on local, empirical research" (5).

Clough develops her positive thesis in chapters six and seven. As she sees it, a Richard Rortyan interpretation of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language will afford feminist critics of science with a nonepistemological and more effective option. Clough explains Davidson’s theory of language as a pragmatic model for belief and meaning, one that considers beliefs or values not as filters through which empirical data passes but as important strands in one’s (empirically-based) web of other beliefs. Interbelief comparison is where all justification happens on this model. So, there is no metaphysical gap to bridge and no need for independent epistemic criteria from which to judge all theories and beliefs. A statement’s veracity is based on the background of other beliefs, which arise from "a triangular causal relationship between three naturalized entities—ourselves, other speakers, and our shared environment" (108). In this way, Davidson’s model of meaning and language is both nonepistemological and nonrepresentational. Unlike other critics, Clough does not think of Davidson as a coherence theorist since "[He] makes the holistic point that empirical data plays a causal role in establishing the content of all beliefs" (110). So, the belief that women are oppressed is ultimately supported by empirical evidence (i.e., documented cases of women being excluded from science and other cultural institutions).

Because it responds to local, changing, and complex realities, Clough suggests that Davidson’s pragmatic alternative will liberate feminist science studies from theoretical inconsistencies and rigid (sex) categories. To illustrate this point, Clough considers Margie Profet’s scientific theory about the evolutionary function of menstruation in chapter eight. Utilizing Davidson’s philosophy of language, Clough effectively shows that feminists can detect certain strains of androcentrism in this case but without the burdens of global skepticism. She also suggests that pragmatic contributions may explain why Profet’s innovative arguments for menstruation have been met with very little critical response in the scientific community.

Clough’s feminist pragmatism is a valuable contribution to the feminist critique of science. Although her argument is compelling, I suspect that some readers might question Clough’s suggestion that Harding and Longino are representationalists. That is, one could argue that they, like Clough herself, understand beliefs not as mere filters that conceptualize data but as background assumptions necessary for making inferences from data to theory. Nevertheless, I enjoyed reading her book and recommend it to anyone who is interested in understanding the complex relationship between beliefs, values, and scientific facts.

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