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Fall 2006
Volume 06, Number 1

Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy

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Rabossi on Human Needs and Ethical Naturalism

Eduardo Rivera-López
Universidad Torcuato DiTella

Eduardo Rabossi’s importance for analytical philosophy in Argentina has been enormous. Rabossi’s philosophical interest has been wide and diverse. He has done research and published on metaethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and metaphilosophical problems. My focus here is his practical philosophy (ethics and political philosophy). In this area, he has contributed with excellent translations of many of the fundamental contemporary analytical moral philosophers: Moore (Principia Ethica), Stevenson (Ethics and Language), Hare (The Language of Morals), Harman (The Nature of Morality), and Austin (How to Do Things with Words). Moreover, he has written illuminating articles and books on moral relativism, naturalism, the naturalistic fallacy, basic needs, the justification of punishment, and, of course, human rights. All these topics were largely ignored in Argentina in the sixties and early seventies.

But this is not all. Rabossi has taught us to understand philosophy as a form of rational dialogue and discussion. Therefore, the best way to pay tribute to him is by rationally discussing his views and arguments. In this article, I focus on his account about ethics and human needs. This issue is especially worth discussing because it is at the basis of his naturalistic account of human rights, which is acknowledged as one of his most original philosophical contributions.1

I.

Rabossi did not try to build a unified ethical theory. He did not develop a comprehensive work intended to solve all problems of morality. Probably he thought (and rightly so) that there cannot be such a thing. His contributions to ethics are therefore fragmentary and programmatic. Nevertheless, in his articles we discover some basic concerns, which taken together may outline a coherent and unified program of a naturalistic, ethical theory.

The main features of this program are the following:

1. The rejection of arguments against metaethical naturalism, specifically, against Moore’s famous "naturalistic fallacy" argument.

2. The development of a theory of morality as a social and contingent fact, understood primarily as a social instrument designed to overcome (in Rawls’s terms) the circumstances of justice, that is, facts about human nature and its circumstances.

3. The idea that among the facts of human nature relevant to morality human needs play an especially important role. Propositions about basic needs are factual propositions (true or false) but, at the same time, have normative force. They can act as a bridge between the normative and the factual. They can even provide a useful criterion for the individualization of human rights.

4. The claim that the eminently empirical or social character of morality does not necessarily lead to ethical relativism, or at least not to ethical skepticism.
These are interesting theses that raise a number of issues. Here, I concentrate on only some aspects of theses 1 and 3. Concerning 1, the "naturalistic fallacy" issue, I argue, contra Rabossi and the ethical naturalists, that the core, if not the form, of the Moorean argument is sound, and that this is the case even if we take into account more recent developments in metaethics. Regarding thesis 3, the role of basic needs in moral theory, I reject Rabossi’s view that needs can work as a linkage between facts and morality. All this will enable me to suggest a view about progress in moral theory that, I hope, is consistent with some other ideas of Rabossi, not just about ethics but about philosophy as rational dialogue in general.

II.

Rabossi's strategy against Moore’s position in Principia Ethica is to claim that accusing naturalists of committing a "fallacy" is misleading and a case of petitio: Moore assumes what he is trying to prove. Rabossi follows here, with some variations, a classical article by William Frankena.2 In brief, the structure of the dispute is the following.

Let us focus first on Moore’s argument. According to him, naturalists confuse a simple non-natural property, "good," with other natural properties, like "pleasant," "desired," etc. They believe there is one property with two names, when in fact there are two different properties. This mistaken identification leads naturalists to try to define "good" in terms of some natural properties. But in doing that, naturalists are committing a fallacy: the naturalistic fallacy.

Frankena and Rabossi respond the following: To call this move a fallacy is essentially misleading. The disagreement between intuitionists and naturalists is not a logical but a substantive one. Intuitionists say naturalists are blind because they do not see certain properties as different from natural properties, thus confusing them. But, by the same token, naturalists could accuse intuitionists of moral hallucination: of seeing moral properties where there are not. The dispute cannot be settled by saying that one of them commits a fallacy, since whether there are certain kinds of properties in the world or not is a substantive or ontological matter, not a logical one. In Rabossi’s words:

"The naturalistic fallacy would consist in postulating the identity of two properties, which are numerically and categorically different, and this postulation would imply a serious mistake, since ‘pleasure and goodness are, in fact, different properties’. The force of this argument is weakened when we remember that this last point is one of the central issues that naturalists and non-naturalists need to clarify. It is not admissible, then, to use it as the basis for the refutation of one of the positions in conflict."3

It is certainly true that the term "fallacy" is not the best one to refer to the alleged mistake of the naturalists. To say that defining "good" in naturalistic terms is wrong because it is a fallacy certainly assumes what one tries to prove. But beyond the inadequacy of the term, I believe that this anti-Moore argument would be sound only if Moore had offered no argument to justify his position, if he had only said that defining "good" is wrong because "good" is a simple non-natural property. But he did offer arguments to support this premise. One of them is the famous "open question argument."

The open question argument (which I will not go into here) is not a logical argument. It seeks only to test our semantic intuitions. It is also, in my opinion, a non-conclusive argument: it does not prove that naturalism is wrong. It only shows that the naturalist has the burden of proving that there is some conceptual analysis of the property "good" in terms of natural properties. Each naturalistic attempt to provide such analysis will be subject to the open question test. Insofar as the test shows that the analysis does not exhaust the meaning of "good," we will be justified in presuming that "good" is, in fact, irreducible.

In the last twenty years there have been many naturalistic attempts. Some of them are definitional: they look for a definition of "good," that is, an analytic statement of identity (identity of meaning). One of the more sophisticated attempts follows Ramsey’s and Lewis’s method of defining theoretical terms in epistemology.4 Others try to find, instead, an a posteriori statement of identity, like the famous "water = H2O."5

I cannot enter into the details of these views here,6 but I would like to stress a crucial point. All these attempts try to apply to metaethics methods from other fields of philosophy, especially epistemology and philosophy of mind. Naturalism is considered a cross-field theory. But, in my opinion, we should be careful in doing so. There is at least one important disanalogy between naturalism in metaethics and naturalism in, say, philosophy of mind. In philosophy of mind, naturalism has an ontological goal: it tries to show that some entities or properties (like beliefs, desires, mental representations, etc.) have no separate existence and are reducible to physical entities or properties.

In contrast, the main motivation of metaethical naturalism is not ontological but justificatory. For example, Mill's concern, in his famous naturalistic passage of Utilitarianism, is not ontological. He is not trying to show us that a discernible property "desirable" does not exist as different as the property "desired." He is trying to convince us that the desirable is the desired and not other possible things. In other words, he is trying to justify his substantive claim that something is morally good (or desirable) if (and only if) it is factually desired. So, even if authors like Michael Smith or Frank Jackson were successful in their naturalistic attempts, the outcome would be of no metaethical interest. They would have reduced the set of moral conviction of the so-called "folk morality" to a set of naturalistic statements, but they would have given absolutely no reason to believe in such moral convictions. And this is the central point of metaethical naturalism, as the case of Mill clearly shows. Smith and Jackson do exactly the opposite: they try to justify folk morality in some independent (and usually quite weak) way and only then they proceed to reduce it. That is why they speak about a "mature folk morality" or about "moral platitudes."7

III.

There have been other naturalistic approaches in the last twenty or thirty years, which are more interesting precisely because they have some justificatory ambitions. Some even look for a natural objective basis for morality. Rabossi explored one of these approaches in a few articles. I will discuss Rabossi’s approach somewhat more deeply.

In brief, the idea is the following:

- Some human characteristics and circumstances are very relevant to human social interaction and shape some basic human interests (for example, the interest of survival). These facts were described by Hume and, more recently, by Hart and Rawls. Among them we find vulnerability, approximate equality in physical and mental powers, limited altruism, and moderate scarcity of resources.

- Some of these facts also have normative force. One of them is the fact that human beings have basic needs.

- Statements about basic needs are both factual and normative. They are true or false, but, at the same time, when true, they give us a moral reason for action.

- Therefore, the concept of basic need can function as a linkage between the normative and the factual and, in this sense (in Rabossi's words): "explain how moral behavior is founded and justified on the basis of natural facts."8

This approach, unlike those mentioned above, does have a justificatory aim. Basic needs are objective and, as Rabossi states, "for a substantial set of statements of needs, there is a peculiar and non contingent relationship between each member of the set and a correlative statement saying that what is needed ought to be produced or realized."9

When we speak about statement of needs in this context, we refer to what Rabossi calls "vital needs" and "basic needs." A relevant statement of needs would be "I need water to live," but not "I need a dictionary to write this paper."
Some of the aspects of the basic-need approach worthy of discussion are the distinction between basic and non-basic needs and the list of basic needs. These are probably Rabossi’s main concerns. However, I will focus only on the question of the extent to which the notion of basic needs can serve a naturalistic project. Contrary to Rabossi's idea, I believe the project fails, except in a secondary and rather rhetorical way.

The thesis that the concept of basic needs can help to close the gap between facts and norms, at least in Rabossi's version, oscillates between two possible understandings. As often happens in philosophy, one is strong and interesting but, unfortunately, wrong, and the other is true, but weak and relatively trivial.
The strong thesis claims that the factual and normative elements of the concept of basic needs are, in some sense, two sides of the same coin. When I say that X is undernourished and, therefore, needs food, I am, in virtue of the very meaning of "needing food," saying that X has a claim on us to receive food. Or, alternatively, that someone has a duty to provide X with food. Or, at least, that there is a prima facie moral reason to provide X with food. In Rabossi's words: "If it is true that S needs shelter, then S has a prima facie reason to have it or to claim it."10 This, to be sure, is plausible in our ordinary language: having an unfulfilled basic need seems to be a sufficient reason for generating a prima facie duty to help in others.

But is having an unfulfilled basic need really a sufficient reason for creating this kind of duty in others? It depends. If we inject into the meaning of "unfulfilled basic need" the idea that it should be fulfilled, the answer is positive. In this sense, the basic-needs approach is similar to those approaches that seek the bridge between the factual and normative in some "thick moral concepts" like courage, pride, or promise. I am not going to revive a forty-years-old discussion, but it is quite clear that, as Hare has pointed out,11 the issue is not whether we can distinguish between normative and factual terms but between normative and factual meanings, which can be included in the same term or not.
In the case of basic needs, the distinction between the descriptive or natural element and the prescriptive element is clear and accepted by Rabossi. We can partially "reduce" basic-need statements to what Rabossi calls "functional needs" (like "I need a dictionary in order to write this paper"). For example, we can say that X needs food in order to survive. This statement is completely descriptive. All we are saying is that X will die if she does not receive food. Of course, we have a normative stance toward her survival. We positively value that X live and that she have a non-degrading life. Therefore, we conclude that we have a prima facie duty to produce this valuable state. But our moral attitude toward X's survival or quality of life is completely independent of her actual situation. It in no way arises from the fact that she is starving, nor from the general fact that people need food to survive.

As I have said, Rabossi accepts the distinction between the technical meaning of need (P is necessary for Q) and the normative underlying element (we value Q). He states:

There is nothing wrong with the existence of a norm or standard to evaluate 'F' ['F' is the goal; in my example, X's survival]...There is no reason to think that...vital and basic needs are not similar to functional needs. Concerning the evaluative decisions toward F (especially those presupposed when speaking of vital or basic needs), they are all but arbitrary. It seems to be contradictory to think that human nature and human beings do not seek a non-degrading existence and self-realization.12

I agree with Rabossi in that the values of a non-degrading life and of self-realization are not arbitrary. But note that, at this point, he is no longer defending what I have called the strong thesis. He is not saying that having an unfulfilled basic need is sufficient to create a prima facie reason to satisfy it. He is saying that the normative evaluation of the goal is not arbitrary because not to seek those goals seems contradictory. But contradictory to what? What does the term "contradictory" mean in this case? An adequate answer to this question is crucial to Rabossi’s enterprise.

A first possibility would be that not to seek the goals of a non-degrading life and of self-realization is contradictory to human nature. But that is not possible within the framework of Rabossi’s theory. Rabossi does not understand "human nature" in a metaphysical way. In an empirical understanding of "human nature," it cannot be contradictory not to seek some goal whatsoever.

"Contradictory" could perhaps mean that, just as other animal species seek survival and reproduction, human beings seek a non-degrading life and self-realization. These features would be, so to speak, empirically intrinsic to our species. Not to seek those goals would be not exactly contradictory but surely strange. Suppose that it were so. So what? Why should this fact create a reason for me to promote non-degradation or self-realization in others? A possible answer could be that human beings are intrinsically concerned with promoting these goals in others (through identification mechanisms, for example). Maybe this is also true. But there are many other features that may be intrinsic to human beings and yet do not serve as the basis for justifying norms or moral attitudes. Take, for example, human beings’ tendencies to kill their enemies or to be selfish in many circumstances. We need a criterion to discriminate between those features relevant to morality and those that are not relevant or even opposite to morality. We need a criterion that enables us to justifiably say that helping people in need is better than killing enemies, even if both tendencies are, from the empirical perspective, equally intrinsic to our nature. And this can only be an evaluative criterion.

What Rabossi probably meant by "contradictory" is that basic needs are very relevant to the justification of some norms, obligations, and moral reasons. That would be the weak thesis and it is hardly controversial. Nobody would say that facts are irrelevant to moral evaluations or moral reasons. But they are not sufficient to provide us with moral reasons.

Maybe the appeal of the basic-need approach lies in that it helps us to focus on some moral "platitudes," that is, moral statements that nobody could reasonably reject: for example, that a minimum of autonomy or dignity is morally valuable and, therefore, everybody has a right to it. But this moral claim cannot be founded on the fact that we need certain things (like water or food) to achieve this minimum.

Conclusion

Although the concept of basic needs (or the statements of basic needs) is at the same time factual and normative, we can easily separate both elements with a simple semantic analysis. This very feature of statements about basic needs explains its strong rhetorical force: we are speaking about true facts (someone is starving, someone is in need) that also create some moral demand of us. But we, as philosophers, should be skeptical about rhetoric.

The discourse of basic needs cannot close the gap between facts and morality, but, as I suggested above, it can help us to see the reasonability of holding some basic values and having some duties. It can help us to be aware of some basic normative agreements among us. And this is extremely important. To explain why, I would like to close by quoting some of Rabossi’s ideas about rational dialogue. As Rabossi rightly points out, in a rational (or critical) dialogue, "the arguments must include premises accepted or presupposed by the participants."13 This means that no discussion can progress if the participants do not share at least some beliefs. If the basic-needs approach helps us to focus on some shared moral platitudes, then it can, at the same time, contribute to a rational moral discussion and, therefore, to moral progress.

Endnotes

1. See Rabossi, 1990. His view on human rights has been adopted, for example, by Richard Rorty in 1993, pp. 115-16.

2. Frankena, 1939.

3. Rabossi, 1979, p. 93.

4. Jackson, 1998.

5. Railton, esp. pp. 157-58.

6. For an application of the open question argument to these new approaches, see Horgan/Timmons, 1992.

7. See Jackson’s concept of "mature folk morality" in Jackson, 1998, pp. 131-34, and Smith’s concept of "platitudes surrounding our moral concepts" in Smith, 1994, pp. 39-41.

8. Rabossi, 1983b, p. 219.

9. Rabossi, 1983a, p. 49.

10. Ibid.

11. Hare, 1972, p. 241.

12. Rabossi, 1983a, p. 48.

13. Rabossi, 2002, p. 359. Rabossi calls this condition "Co-acceptation cannon."

References:

Frankena, W. "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind, 48:192 (1939): 464-77.

Hare, R. M. "Descriptivism." In The Is/Ought Question, W. D. Hudson. 240-58. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1972 (1963).

Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. "Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantic: The ‘Open Question Argument" Revived." Philosophical Papers XXI, (1992): 153-75.

Jackson, F. From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Rabossi, E. Estudios Eticos. Valencia, Venezuela: Universidad de Carabobo, 1979.

Rabossi, E. "Necesidades humanas y moralidad." Actas del II Simposio Internacional de Filosofía. 31-52. México: UNAM, 1983a.

Rabossi, E. "Acerca de la fundamentación de la ética." Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía IX, 3 (1983b): 211-21.

Rabossi, E. "La teoría de los derechos humanos naturalizada," Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales (Madrid), 5 (1990): 159-75.

Rabossi, E. "Diálogo, falacias y retórica. El caso de la falacia naturalista," Manuscrito XXV, 2 (2002): 345-80.

Railton, P. "Naturalism and Prescriptivity." In Foundations of Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller and J. Paul. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Rorty, R. "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality." In On Human Rights. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, edited by S. Shute and S. Hurley. 111-34. New York: Basic Books, 1993.

Smith, M. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

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