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Newsletters Index (99:1)
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APA
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Fall 1999
Volume 99, Number 1
Newsletter on Philosophy and
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Abstracts:
Recent Law Review Articles of Interest
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Harel, Alon. "Revisionist Theories of
Rights: An Unwelcome Defense," Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 11,
No. 2 (July 1998), 227244
In this article Harel claims that only certain sorts of reasons can ground rights. For
example, that it would be economically profitable for someone to have the right of free
speech is not a reason for his having such a right. Traditionalists claim that only a
subset of the interests of individuals can ground rights and that rights protect
individuals against countervailing social interests. Revisionists claim that social
interests as well as individual interests can ground rights. For example, if it serves the
interests of society to have a marketplace of ideas, this may justify individuals having a
right to free speech
Harel defends the possibility that social interests can provides reasons for rights and
argues against those that deny it. An assumption typically made is that the traditionalist
view provides stronger support for individuals against the interests of society when they
conflict. Harels main claim is that this does not follow simply from the contrast in
the reasons that ground rights on the two views. If rights are only grounded in individual
interests it is still possible that a traditionalist could weigh social interests so
strongly that they override rights; if rights are grounded in individual and social
interests, the individual interests could be given much more weight than the social ones.
Hence revisionism could provide a stronger defense of individual interests than
traditionalism. Only an additional assumption, that is, that rights have a specially
weighty role in reasoning about what should be done (which is not per se part of
traditionalist or revisionist views on what reasons ground rights) can support the view
that traditionalism provides a stronger defense of individual interests than revisionism.
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