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APA Newsletters
Fall 1999
Volume 99, Number 1


Newsletter on Philosophy and Law

Abstracts:
Recent Law Review Articles of Interest

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Harel, Alon. "Revisionist Theories of Rights: An Unwelcome Defense," Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 11, No. 2 (July 1998), 227–244

In this article Harel claims that only certain sorts of reasons can ground rights. For example, that it would be economically profitable for someone to have the right of free speech is not a reason for his having such a right. Traditionalists claim that only a subset of the interests of individuals can ground rights and that rights protect individuals against countervailing social interests. Revisionists claim that social interests as well as individual interests can ground rights. For example, if it serves the interests of society to have a marketplace of ideas, this may justify individuals having a right to free speech

Harel defends the possibility that social interests can provides reasons for rights and argues against those that deny it. An assumption typically made is that the traditionalist view provides stronger support for individuals against the interests of society when they conflict. Harel’s main claim is that this does not follow simply from the contrast in the reasons that ground rights on the two views. If rights are only grounded in individual interests it is still possible that a traditionalist could weigh social interests so strongly that they override rights; if rights are grounded in individual and social interests, the individual interests could be given much more weight than the social ones. Hence revisionism could provide a stronger defense of individual interests than traditionalism. Only an additional assumption, that is, that rights have a specially weighty role in reasoning about what should be done (which is not per se part of traditionalist or revisionist views on what reasons ground rights) can support the view that traditionalism provides a stronger defense of individual interests than revisionism.


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