Teleosemantics and Natural Selection, III-I

Marshall Abrams, Independent Scholar

Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e.g. beliefs' truth conditions) in terms of functions (in the teleological sense), where these functions are constituted in part by facts concerning past natural selection involving ancestors of a current entity. While I support basing content on functions constituted by facts about ancestors, I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. Content should instead be based on a theory of functions which, though historical, does not involve selection.

Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism, I-H

Robert Allen, Central Michigan University

The consensus amongst free will theorists is that an agent can will freely to f without presently being able to form another volition. Frankfurt cases have helped to secure this agreement. However, it is still very much an open question whether someone could be willing freely to f if there was nothing that she could have done to keep from forming that volition, her character having been determined.

Robert Kane believes that to be exercising a free will, an agent must have had an alternative at various times in her life, if not the present moment. Thus, he argues that free will entails indeterminism. In this paper, I examine Kane's response to the "Mind objection" to libertarianism: indeterminism would make for lucky, inexplicable actions rather than the opportunity to develop a free will. By establishing two dilemmas, I rebut his claim that a "self-forming action" would be controlled and rational.

A Precarious Pair: Cognitivism About Practical Reason and Non-Cognitivism About Morality, I-F

Chrisoula Andreou, University of Utah

Especially concerning to defenders of the objectivity of morality is the view that while practical reason judgments are straightforwardly true or false, moral judgments are not. This view precludes even the relatively modest claim that moral judgments are no less objective than other evaluative judgments. In my paper, I draw a distinction within the class of practical reason judgments and use it to show that what appears as a promising defense of the view rests on a confusion. I then argue that if the common background assumption that both practical reason judgments and moral judgments are necessarily arrived at via some set of values is on the right track, then the objectivity of morality and of practical reason stand or fall together, in that the combination of cognitivism about practical reason and non-cognitivism about morality is untenable.

The Old Evidence Problem and Beyond: Three Approaches Compared, VI-G

Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Montana State University

Does an old datum support a new theory? According to Glymour's old evidence problem, Bayesianism fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the question. In light of this problem, I distinguish between two questions, the belief question and the evidence question. This distinction helps develop a Bayesian account of evidence. I argue that the old evidence problem conflates the belief and evidence questions. A diagnosis of the problem reveals an evidence question, which my account of evidence is able to address. In addition, my account is able to handle cases besides the old evidence problem. Following the distinction between belief and evidence questions, I discuss and criticize a recent approach adopted independently by Christensen and Joyce to the old evidence problem. Finally, I argue that my account is immune to additional criticisms brought against the Christensen/Joyce account.

What (And How) Can Phenomenology Contribute To The Cognitive Sciences?, II-F

Philip J. Bartok, University of Notre Dame

Several prominent cognitive scientists have recently proposed to co-opt Husserlian phenomenology as a subjectively oriented supplement to their own objective approaches to psychology. The occasion for this turn to phenomenology is the longstanding failure of cognitive science to close the so-called explanatory gap between structural and functional models of the mental and first-person lived conscious experience. I focus here on two issues raised by this proposed "wedding" of the two disciplines: [1] Must phenomenology itself be naturalized if it is to contribute to cognitive scientists' naturalistic studies of the mental? [2] What kinds of constraints can/should phenomenological and cognitive scientific investigations place upon one another? I argue, on the basis of a close examination of a particular case, that phenomenology cannot be naturalized and that cognitive scientific constraints upon its researches cannot be permitted.

Kant on the Practical Significance of Taste: An Intellectual Interest in Natural Beauty as a Mark of Moral Character, V-E

Anne Margaret Baxley, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

In Section 42 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant thematizes on the relation between taste and morality when he explains that we have an intellectual interest in natural beauty, and insists that to take such an interest in the beauty of nature is always a mark of a good soul. This paper attempts to analyze this feature of Kant's account of the practical significance of taste, namely, his theory that an aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty is intimately connected with a good moral disposition. After considering what is involved in loving beauty this way (I), section II explains why Kant thought that an intellectual interest in natural beauty is morally significant. The concluding section of the paper (III) explores one critical question this view raises, which is whether Kant ultimately grants a merely instrumental value to natural beauty insofar as he suggests that it interests us because our experience of it contributes to our moral vocation.

The Queerest Idol: James, Clifford, and the Right to Believe, V-D

Melissa A. Bergeron, University of Miami

William James, in "The Will to Believe," argues that to "forbid" religious belief is to forbid religious action. But, James also insists that the theist has a "right" to adopt a belief insofar as it will yield a desired action. After a brief consideration of this aspect of James' will-to-believe doctrine, I conclude that it is problematic in two crucial respects: he fails to appreciate (1) the nature of the sort of belief that motivates action and (2) the logical relation obtaining between an action and its associated belief.

James' confusion regarding the role of belief in action inspires him to reject W. K. Clifford's evidentialism as cowardly and urge that we respect one's right to believe, given one's need to act. I defend a Cliffordian-type evidentialism and show that it is indeed viable, perfectly reasonable, and motivated by a fear we certainly would be unwise to ignore.

Must an Aristotelian Validation of the Virtues be Internal?, III-H

Noell Birondo, University of Notre Dame

An external validation of the virtues of character is an attempt to demonstrate that possession of the virtues is necessary in order to secure some good, or to avoid some harm, where the good in question, or the harm, is recognizable as such independently of the particular evaluative outlook provided by possession of the virtues themselves. The validation will thus rely on resources that are `external' to the particular evaluative outlook to be validated. Here I advance some considerations for thinking that an Aristotelian validation of the virtues of character cannot, in that sense, be external. I do so by considering one particular attempt at providing such a validation, and by arguing that the attempt falls well short of success. But I suspect that the arguments deployed here can be generalized in order to call this entire approach for validating the virtues into question.

Frankfurt Style Examples, I-H

James Cain, Oklahoma State University

Frankfurt style examples (FSEs) have played an important role in the development of metaphysical accounts of moral agency. Fischer and Ravizza, for example, rely heavily on FSEs to support a theory of moral agency grounded in `guidance control' of the `actual sequence' as opposed to a more traditional account that grounds responsibility in `regulative control' of `alternative sequences.' The legitimacy of this approach requires that FSEs are metaphysically possible. I argue that, given our current knowledge of the nature of decision-making, we have no grounds to accepting the possibility of FSEs.

Kant and Degrees of Wrongness, II-E

Todd Calder, Talbot College, University of Western Ontario

Most would agree that there are degrees of wrongness. For instance, it seems that sadistic torture is a greater wrong than telling a white lie and that stealing a welfare cheque from a single mother is worse than stealing fifty cents from a billionaire. However, it is difficult to make sense of degrees of wrongness within Kantian moral theory. An act is either prohibited by the supreme principle of morality or it is not. In this paper I argue that our best attempts to account for degrees of wrongness within Kantian moral theory fail. In particular, we cannot reduce degrees of wrongness to degrees of treating humanity merely as a means. I then briefly consider how significant this is for Kantians.

Does Philosophical Hermeneutics Surreptitiously Appeal to Immediate Presence?, I-G

W. S. K. Cameron, Loyola Marymount University

This paper attempts to clarify Gadamer's pithy if somewhat oracular claim, "Being that can be understood is language." He clearly intends by this the "expressivist" view that linguistically-constituted presuppositions shape the very content of our thought; and this view, in turn, has been thought to entail either uncritical conservativism or irrational radicalism. One way out of this problem is to focus on the hermeneutic productivity of the negative experience—i.e., the experience which contests our prior presuppositions. But this strategy raises two further problems: first, how could any experience count as "new" if it must appear under the guise of traditional concepts; and how could a linguistic expressivist account for our concept of the "real" world in the first place? I attempt so show how Gadamer can address both these challenges on the basis of his innovative account of concept formation.

A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, V-H

David K. Chan, University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point

Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. Consequentialist moral philosophers hold instead that if killing or letting die have the same consequences, there is no moral difference between the two acts. In this paper, I argue that although it can be justified to minimize harm by killing a smaller number of people, in preference to letting a greater number die, the distinction between killing and letting die does have some intuitive moral significance. This can be accounted for from a non-consequentialist perspective without appeal to a distinction between positive and negative rights.

A Millian Reply to the Egoist, or Giving Virtue a Try, V-H

Michael J. Cholbi, Brooklyn College, CUNY

The rational egoist casts doubt on the rational authority of morality by arguing that the fulfillment of certain moral obligations is contrary to the advancement of one's self-interest. I propose a novel strategy for persuading the egoist to be moral. My "Millian strategy" offers the rational egoist the opportunity to live a moral life. That is, if we invite her to give virtue a try, the rational egoist will compare the life dominated by the pursuit of self-interest with the life in which the fulfillment of moral obligations has a prominent role. After comparing the value of pursuing or satisfying her self-interest with the values of the intersubjective goods the minimally virtuous way of life makes available, the now better informed egoist will at least sometimes opt for the latter, just as those who, in Mill's comparative test of pleasures, will opt for the higher pleasures over the lower.

Fitting Punishments to Crimes: A Response to Nihilism about Moral Desert, I-I

Christopher S. Ciocchetti, Centenary College of Louisiana

Nihilism about moral desert, as described by Russ Shafer-Landau, is the view that there is no fact of the matter about what a wrongdoer morally deserves. If nihilism about moral desert is true, even the weakest desert-based retributivism is untenable. I argue that we can determine specific punishments which wrongdoers morally deserve by focusing on the interpretation of the crime within the relationship between the criminal and the victim. The fitting response to a crime depends on both the victim's experience of the crime and the criminal's known motives. By punishing a criminal according to the victim's judgment (grounded in the victim's experience and criminal's known motives), we give the crime a specific interpretation, giving it a specific place in the relationship, and altering the kind of relationship founded upon it. When punishment does this, it is giving the criminal what he or she deserves.

Sex-Selection Abortion in the Developing World, VI-E

Dennis R. Cooley, North Dakota State University

Abortion upon demand continues to be a controversial subject in many areas around the world. However, not as much attention has been paid to the issue of sex selection abortions, in which a fetus is terminated because of its sex. I argue that such abortions in some areas of the developing world are merely permissible in certain circumstances but morally required in others.

Phenomenology, Apodicticity and Fallibilism, I-G

Martin J. De Nys, George Mason University

A difficulty arises if one holds that fallibilism has universal application in philosophy. That difficulty calls for critical reconsideration of fallibilism and its alternatives. One of the most important alternatives to fallibilism is Husserl's phenomenological notion of apodicticity. Critical consideration of that notion, and of fallibilism as well, requires a careful discussion of the nature of evidence. The result of that discussion is a justified sense of apodicticity that indicates the limits of fallibilism. But that discussion also leads to a distinction between apodicticity and infallibility, and in other ways indicates the legitimate rights of fallibilism.

If We Consider Some Sentence As Indefinite, Do We Violate the Laws of Classical Probability?, V-F

Richard Dietz, Linacre College, University of Oxford

Starting from a standard propositional logic for languages with indefinite (or vague) sentences, we are faced with the following puzzle: Whether a sentence p of our language is indefinite or definite, there is either a positive or a negative answer to the question of whether it is the case that p or whether it is the case that not-p. However, if a sentence is indefinite, it is intuitively misguided to give one's thought to this very question. In a recent paper, Hartry Field presents a conceptual role account of indefiniteness, which (according to him) provides a solution to this puzzle: If we consider a sentence as indefinite (on Field's view) we simply have degrees of belief in the sentence and in its negation which deviate in some characteristic way from classical probability distributions. And this distinctive feature of supposedly indefinite sentences (according to Field) explains why we take speculations about the truth-value of a sentence as misguided, if we regard the sentence as indefinite. His account is in two regards radical. First it questions the widely held intuitive idea that if a sentence is regarded as indefinite, this amounts to an attitude to an ascription of indefiniteness to the sentence. And secondly, it challenges the classical model of how degrees of belief are structured. My arguments highlight some serious problems Field's account is faced with.

Overcoming Oedipal Exclusions: An Irigarayan Critique of Judith Butler, V-G

Sarah Donovan, Villanova University

Both Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray analyze who is excluded from subject formation in the Oedipus complex. Butler argues that the heterosexuality of the Oedipus complex depends upon the abjection of homosexuality. Her method of altering the Oedipal paradigm is defiance of the Oedipal self. Irigaray claims that the heterosexuality of the Oedipus complex is most concerned with excluding women. Contrary to Butler, Irigaray closely, but not faithfully, repeats the logic of the Oedipal self in order to challenge it. This paper argues that Butler's theory risks once again eliding female subjectivity if it is not tempered by Irigaray's method.

Walking the Walk: A Deweyan, Urbanist Moral Psychology, V-D

Gregory M. Fahy, Gannon University

Many urban theorists posit a relationship between the physical organization of cities and the attitudes, beliefs and actions of their citizens. Few, however, develop a satisfactory moral psychology to explain this relationship. I discuss these themes in the works of Lewis Mumford, Jane Jacobs and representatives of the new urbanist movement in city planning. The moral psychology of John Dewey, attuned to the complexity and subtlety of organism-environment transactions, provides a richer and more compelling explanation of this relationship. Dewey's concept of walking habits explains the importance of pedestrian traffic to the sense of community and democracy solicited in many urban environments.

What Do Mathematicians Want? Probabilistic Proofs and the Epistemic Goals of Mathematicians, VI-G

Don Fallis, University of Arizona

Several philosophers have used the framework of means/ends reasoning to explain the methodological choices made by scientists and mathematicians (see, e.g., Goldman 1999, Levi 1962, Maddy 1997). In particular, they have tried to identify epistemic objectives of scientists and mathematicians that will explain these choices. In this paper, the framework of means/ends reasoning is used to study a longstanding methodological choice made by mathematicians. Namely, mathematicians will not use probabilistic proofs to establish the truth of mathematical claims. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic objectives of mathematicians that are typically discussed do not provide a satisfactory explanation of this rejection of probabilistic proofs.

Problems of Application in Habermas's Political Theory, I-E

John Farnum, Portland Community College

If it is possible for Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy to withstand the criticisms of utopianism and incompleteness, one must then attempt to provide a transition from his purely theoretical model of democracy to argue that his theory can be successfully applied to a specific context. In this paper, I will focus upon the feasibility of an application of Habermas's theory at the level of institutional design and argue that while critics have rightly pointed out obstacles for moving from the ideal formulations of the theory to real democratic contexts, an application at the level of political institutions is both possible and desirable for realizing certain democratic principles.

Why the Cosmos Endures: Hume's Argument Against Causal Simultaneity, IV-F

Richard F. Foley, Eastern Illinois University

Hume argues that succession is a necessary property of causal connections, but the importance of this property has been obscured by the more famous analysis of necessary connection. I first explain the different interpretations of "succession" that Hume's text will bear, and argue that succession is the property of the non-overlapping temporal contiguity of cause and effect. I then consider two prominent interpretations of Hume's argument for succession. (1) Stroud claims that Hume's argument is contradictory, but I show that Stroud's criticism fails because he reconstructs the argument incorrectly. (2) Beauchamp, Rosenberg, and Munsat's interpretation contains a non sequitur. My interpretation avoids the non sequitur objection: Hume's argument is enthymematic, and requires the additional premise that if one cause is simultaneous with its effect, then all causes can be simultaneous with their effects. Hume's argument yields an important conclusion for the metaphysics of causation: no cause can be simultaneous with its effect.

Testimony, Agency, Entitlement, IV-G

Peter J. Graham, University of California, Riverside

There are two broadly non-skeptical approaches to the epistemology of testimony. Reductionists hold that testimony is a species of inductive inference. Anti-reductionists hold that testimony is on a par with basic sources of belief such as perception and memory. Reductionists point out differences between testimony and perception, arguing that those differences make an epistemic difference. I argue that the fact that an assertion is an intentional act, and so an expression of agency, does not make an epistemic difference. The existence of agency in the causal chain from fact to belief does not show a priori that interlocution cannot be basic, and our awareness of the possibility of lying does not support the descriptive or empirical claim that we treat the epistemologies differently.

What's in a Name? African Philosophy in the Making, II-G

Peter Gratton, De Paul University

This paper will attempt to read between the particularist and universalist camps of African philosophy, which we will argue can only be thought in contradistinction to each other. We will argue that African philosophy "today is a more flexible and often highly eclectic and syncretic mélange of the African and the Western, the old and the new, the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial." Rethought in these terms, African philosophical practice cannot be reduced to that which at worst is an a-historical (universalist) or relativist (particularist) enterprise, as a number of commentators, including Carole Pearce, are wont to do. On the contrary, we will argue that by operating between these positions, as a syncretic but never stable mélange, "African philosophy" is a performative signifier that by its very name brings together and calls into question an endless number of oppositions: universalist/particularist, African thought/philosophy.

Outer Spaces: Lyotard and Feminist Epistemology, V-G

Margaret E. Grebowicz, University of Houston, Downtown

Why is Lyotard's later work, which consistently thematizes gender difference, not considered "feminist"? This paper offers a reading of the "She" position in Lyotard's essay "Can Thought go on without a Body?" in connection with Haraway's epistemology. Taking issue with Sim's book, Lyotard and the Inhuman, which mistakenly opposes Lyotard to Haraway, I indicate significant affinities between the two thinkers, such as their interests in embodiment and vision, as well as their rejections of the "man" of humanism. The question concerning Lyotard's relationship to feminism forces us to ask what ought to count as feminist thought today. I offer some possible responses to this question, as well as reasons why we should consider Lyotard a contributor to feminist epistemology.

Soul, Soul's Motions, and Virtue in Laws X, III-H

Edward Halper, University of Georgia

Although Plato consistently maintains that knowledge of the Good is necessary and sufficient for virtue, Laws X holds that embracing a three-fold doctrine about the gods suffices for virtue. The doctrine is that the gods exist, care for mankind and cannot be bought off with gifts or sacrifices (885b). This paper argues, first, that in the course of arguing the first point, the Athenian proves implicitly that the soul cannot be moved by something else, and, second that this consequence, problematic in itself, undermines the last two points of his doctrine. However, since soul's being an unmoved mover is a mark of its dignity and superiority over body, and since just this knowledge enables a person to live well, what seems to be a flaw in the Athenian's argument provides an alternative basis for virtue. Plato gives those who object to the gods the tools to find a more sophisticated ground for virtue.

From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine's Argument Against Analyticity, IV-E

Reese M. Heitner, Graduate School and University Center, CUNY

Though largely unnoticed, in "Two Dogmas" Quine (1953) himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements, strictly tautological (e.g., `bachelor = bachelor') statements are true merely in virtue of basic linguistic token-to-type (phonemic) equivalencies, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of basic phonological categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet "phonemic reductionism" in either its linguistic (Bloch 1953) or behavioral (Quine 1990) guises is false. Indeed, the tempting but no less false dualism between "semantically free" logical substitutions versus "semantically corrupted" analytic substitutions represents yet another dogma of empiricist philosophy. Once the standard of basic linguistic equivalence is—like analyticity—acknowledged to be irreducibly semantic, the observation that analyticity is fundamentally parasitic on semantic considerations is no longer philosophically threatening, and moreover permits a linguistically more realistic and philosophically more consistent approach to a number of traditional issues regarding the licensing conditions of substitutional equivalence.

Being Perfect is Not Necessary for Being God, III-G

Jeanine A. Diller Murphy, Independent Scholar

According to perfect being theology, being perfect is necessary for being God. In fact, classic perfect being theologians understand the word `God' to have a sense, and take `being perfect' (or some careful variant thereof) to be conceptually necessary and sufficient for being God. In this paper, I will argue that, whether being perfect is sufficient for being God or not, it is not necessary. One can be God without being perfect. If I am right that being perfect is not necessary for being God, then a fortiori it cannot be necessary and sufficient for being God, and classic perfect being theology would be mistaken. I will make my case first by arguing a key point and presenting a simple thought experiment that uses it, and then by defending this thought experiment against two important objections.

The Terrorism of `Terrorism', I-I

Tomis Kapitan, Northern Illinois University

Since the onset of the "war on terrorism," increased attention has been given to the very concept of terrorism, to what it means to wage war on terrorism, and to whether "war" is the appropriate response to terrorist violence. This paper focuses on the latter, and argues that insofar as the `terrorist' label is used as a political tool that dehumanizes particular groups and erases any incentive for understanding their grievances, then it ought to be dropped from moral discourse about political violence, for not only does it cause further terrorism but it may itself constitute an act of terrorism. I illustrate this thesis by showing how the rhetoric of `terrorism' has not only obscured the


underlying moral and political issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but has contributed to the increasing levels of hatred and atrocity in the Middle East.

Social Justice, Economic Choices, and Health Care Expectations, VI-E

Jonathan Kaplan, University of Tennessee

I argue that it is likely that the hidden costs of the high-quality health care available to some people in contemporary U.S. society are paid for, in part, by people without access to such health-care, and indeed, by people without reasonable access to adequate health-care. This analysis, based loosely on Holmes and Sunstein's analysis of the often hidden costs of rights in general, points towards a possible argument for universal health care of a reasonable standard that does not depend on any specific large-scale theory of social or economic justice. While I believe that arguments along the lines I suggest will likely not be sufficient to achieve a just distribution of health-care costs and benefits within the context of contemporary U.S. society, I argue that such arguments can point towards a more just distribution than exists now, and that this role, while limited, should be appealing nonetheless.

Buridan's Ass and Peter John Olivi, I-H

Sharon Kaye, John Carroll University

What is the thought experiment known as Buridan's Ass intended to accomplish? Determinists have notoriously complained that no one ever faces a perfectly balanced choice and, even if one did, one would not need a will to solve the problem. Libertarians as well are critical of the tie-breaking conception of human freedom, arguing that to compare our choices with equally appealing piles of hay is to render them insignificant. I argue that determinists and libertarians alike have misunderstood Buridan's Ass due to longstanding confusion concerning the true author of the thought experiment. The thirteenth-century philosopher Peter John Olivi is the historical origin for Buridan's Ass and he provides the argument needed to understand it. The difference between human beings and asses is that the former can choose their own ends and the latter cannot. Olivi uses this contrast to make a truly compelling case for the liberty of indifference.

Chance and Spontaneous Symmetry-Breaking, VI-F

Chuang Liu, University of Florida

In this essay I first describe a simple model in which the structural features of SSB can be plainly seen. Then I show that there are really two different meanings for SSB, one, as given in our model, specifies the conditions under which the possibility of SSB is present; and the other, as given by the model plus perturbations describes (not in detail) conditions for the actual breakings of the symmetry. And then I argue that Curie's principle of symmetry is violated by the actual processes of SSB, even though the results of such processes, at the level of their distributions, still make it applicable. Furthermore, the justification of the use of (equal) chance in SSB turns out to have a three-element structure: (1) the uniform distribution of the perturbations that holds even when the ground state becomes unstable; (2) the deterministic transition from the unstable state to the stable states; and (3) the symmetrical (of the same symmetry) arrangement of the symmetry-breaking states. Each of these can be justified if the systems can be models as ergodic thermo-systems. SSB systems I argue can indeed be so modeled. Lastly, I try to explain how SSB is a type of instability that is responsible for producing diverse chancy processes in our universe.

Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn From Others About Beauty and Art?, IV-G

Aaron R. Meskin, Texas Tech University

The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted—even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. Robert Hopkins has recently argued that this Kantian position about aesthetic testimony is mistaken. According to Hopkins, testimony about beauty can provide a degree of aesthetic justification, although it is epistemically weaker than ordinary (i.e., non-aesthetic) forms of testimony. I argue that Hopkins is right to move away from the Kantian orthodoxy about aesthetic testimony, but that his explanation of the weakness of such testimony is unsatisfactory. The problem with aesthetic testimony (particularly in the artistic realm) is simply that it is typically unreliable. Hence, most aesthetic testimony about art does not have much epistemic value.

Are `That' _clauses Really Singular Terms?, V-F

Mark A. Moffett, University of Colorado, Boulder

The received view in the philosophy of language is that English `that'-clauses are singular terms. I begin with a discussion of various examples that call into question the acceptability of the received view. I then argue that the two most promising ways of addressing these examples are themselves open to serious objections. This leads us to a kind of theoretical crisis in the philosophically important analysis of `that'-clauses: not only does the singular term theory appear to be open to significant counterexamples, but so are the most natural ways of adjusting our theory in order to account for those counterexamples. This crisis motivates a re-evaluation of certain fundamental assumptions concerning the grammatical structure of language itself. Specifically, I briefly sketch how a construction-based grammar could handle the problematic cases without abandoning the singular term theory.

Divine Omniscience and Knowledge De Se, III-G

Yujin Nagasawa, Australian National University

This paper critically examines Patrick Grim's argument against the coherence of the notion of divine omniscience. Grim argues that God cannot be omniscient because no one other than I can acquire knowledge de se of myself. In particular, according to Grim, God cannot know what I know in knowing that I am making a mess. Ever since Aquinas, work has been done on the relationship between divine omnipotence and necessary impossibilities. However, this paper is concerned with the relationship between divine omniscience and necessary impossibilities. We shall see that once we accept two plausible theological principles, there is no reason for theists to accept Grim's conclusion that God cannot be omniscient.

A Criticism of Existential Commitment in Russell's Theory of Descriptions, IV-E

Jay Newhard, Independent Scholar

Russell's theory of definite descriptions currently enjoys widespread favor in the philosophy of language. Its thesis that definite descriptions are to be analyzed, in part, as making existence claims, together with the discovery of scope ambiguity, allows Russell to give an account whereon his renowned puzzle case, `The present king of France is bald,' obeys the law of excluded middle. Strawson argues that since, on this theory, both this sentence and its negation make the same existence claim about the present king of France, it follows that both have the same truth value. He concludes that definite descriptions are best understood as involving a presupposition to refer. In this paper, I argue that Russell's thesis that definite descriptions entail existence claims is false and fallaciously argued for. I discuss and reject three notions of presupposition made popular by Strawson's work, and sketch a fourth, more promising notion of presupposition.

Heidegger's Transformation of Kant's Ground of Transcendental Unity: A Crucial Transition Between Being and Time and the Kehre, I-G

Craig M. Nichols, Boston University

In this paper, I focus on a key transitional point between Being and Time (April, 1927) and Heidegger's so-called "turn" (Kehre, c. 1930): Heidegger's critique of Kant's grounding of transcendental unity in transcendental apperception. In his lecture course of Winter Semester 1927, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger expands the "ecstatic" interpretation of temporality he presented in Being and Time, clarifying its correspondence to Kant's three syntheses of the A-edition Critique of Pure Reason. Through this development, Heidegger appropriated Kant's position, while advancing beyond it, but ultimately recognized his own entanglement in the latent dogmatic metaphysics underlying Kant's philosophy. I trace the major points of Heidegger's argument, showing, finally, why this progression pushed him toward the turn, which is here explained as a transformation of Kant's doctrine of the transcendental object into the "nothing," understood as the ultimate and final context of being.

Condemning Forgiveness, I-I

Glen Pettigrove, University of California, Riverside

It is often suggested that we ought not forgive the unapologetic. Sometimes such a suggestion amounts to advice: It is imprudent to forgive or seek to be reconciled with unapologetic wrongdoers. However, at times the suggestion carries more than just the tone of pragmatism. It reflects the conviction that it is morally objectionable to forgive in the absence of an apology. This paper considers several objections that might ground the condemnation of forgiving the unapologetic wrongdoer and argues that these objections are not adequate to condemn forgiveness of the unapologetic.

Is Everything a Turing Machine, And Does It Matter to the Philosophy of Mind?, II-F

Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Pittsburgh

The thesis that everything is a Turing Machine (TM) is sometimes invoked in discussions of functionalism and computational theories of mind. I argue that to the extent that the thesis is true it is trivial, and to the extent that it is nontrivial it is false. Either way, the thesis that everything is a TM is irrelevant to the philosophy of mind. Realizing this brings new life to another view: whether the mind is a TM in a nontrivial sense must be established by studying the functional organization of the mind empirically.

Counting and Indeterminate Identity, VI-F

Ángel Pinillos, Rutgers University

Suppose that we "repair" a wooden ship by replacing its planks one by one with new ones while "reconstructing" it using the discarded planks. Some defenders of vague or indeterminate identity claim that: (1) although the "reconstructed" ship is distinct from the "repaired" ship, it is indeterminate whether the original ship is the "reconstructed" ship/the "repaired" ship and (2) The indeterminacy is due to the "world" and not just the semantic facts. I argue that this is impossible. The argument has two features. First, it differs in spirit from Evans' more general famous proof entailing the same conclusion. This is because I rely on facts regarding counting and sets (I thereby avoid common objections to Evans). Second, I focus on Terence Parsons' recent defense of indeterminate identity. I argue that his attempts at making sense of counting objects involving indeterminate identities fail on technical and philosophical grounds.

True Colors: A Problem for Tye's Color Realism, III-I

Thomas W. Polger, University of Cincinnati

Michael Tye has recently been a vocal defender of color realism or, as I shall call it, color objectivism. Objectivism about color is the view that color properties are identical to intrinsic physical properties of the surfaces of objects. Subjectivism about color is the denial of color objectivism. Objectivists argue that color claims must be taken at face value. In this paper I forego the usual bickering about whether there are surface reflectance properties that can be identified with colors as the objectivist theory requires. Supposing that some such properties could be found, I argue that if objectivism about color were correct it would have the unsavory consequence that we are rarely if ever right—perhaps never right—about the particular colors of particular things. So objectivism does not bear out common attribution of colors to the surfaces of things, after all.

Aristotle's Mind-Dependence Theory of Time, III-H

Tiberiu M. Popa, University of Pittsburgh

Aristotle's handling of the concept of `number,' central to his account of time, has baffled several generations of scholars. In my opinion, it conveys chiefly the fact that the existence of time hinges on our awareness of becoming, on our ability to distinguish between different `nows.' The very use of the term `number' (arithmos) in connection with time seems to suggest that time does not enjoy a more robust ontological condition than mathematical objects, since its existence depends partly on our ability to perform certain mental operations. In this context I would like to mark a functional distinction between Aristotle's appeal to the notion of `measure' and the semantic sphere of `number' in his theory of time.

Game Theory and the New Route to Eliminativism About Rationality, VI-G

Don Ross, University of Cape Town

In this paper, I show in detail why leading game theorists have started to argue that behavioral science should dispense with the concept of rationality and its derivative family of notions, the propositional attitudes. I present reasons for thinking that this makes a more interesting case for eliminativism than the traditional motives based on induction over general issues in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind. However, I then indicate, briefly, why we should still not be persuaded.

Kantian Space, II-E

Brigitte Sassen, McMaster University

This paper offers a Kantian response to an objection his early critics made to the Transcendental Aesthetic. They argued that Kant's account of space could not be squared with the evidence that newly sighted adults cannot differentiate by sight between shapes previously only felt or estimate distances. Appealing to the first and third arguments of the Metaphysical Exposition and to a note to §26 of the Deduction (B160), the response involves showing that as an a priori form of intuition, space must be seen as a transcendental condition: a demand for unity that does not prescribe specific unities.

Liberal Neutrality and Liberty of Conscience, I-E

Walter E. Schaller, Texas Tech University

In Political Liberalism Rawls argues that the exercise of coercive political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with constitutional principles that no citizen can reasonably reject. But since citizens may reasonably reject ordinary legislation that cannot be neutrally justified, it is not obvious that Rawls is justified in restricting neutrality of justification to constitutional essentials. I argue that the analogy Rawls draws between freedom of religion and liberal neutrality—both appeal to the principle of toleration—provides no grounds for the idea that the latter—neutrality of justification—must apply not only to constitutional essentials but also to ordinary legislation. I survey Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Constitution's two Religion Clauses to argue that the rationale for freedom of religion does not support the idea that ordinary legislation is morally objectionable if it can be justified only by appeal to a particular conception of the good.

Are the Intuitions that the Laws of Nature Govern Misleading?, VI-F

Susan Schneider, Rutgers University

In "The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature" Helen Beebee challenges our intuitions about a group of thought experiments authored by John Carroll, Michael Tooley, and others. These thought experiments are generally regarded as playing a central role in the lawhood debate; what is at issue is whether the examples pump the intuition that laws of nature are ontologically basic, suggesting that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of the laws of nature is false. I argue that, contra Beebee, the view of governance that the anti-Humeans have in mind is not one that the key argument of her paper attacks. Further, we should reject her view that the intuition that the laws govern is dialectically meaningless because it is negotiable. The non-Humean position actually has the dialectical advantage because the intuition that the laws govern is not just supported by the philosophical position that the laws are basic; it is also supported by the ordinary, commonsense conception of lawhood. The Humean view, in contrast, is not.

"Abstraction Without Idealization" in Contexts of Oppression, II-G

Lisa H. Schwartzman, Michigan State University

Feminists, critical race scholars, and other social justice theorists sometimes object to the use of "abstraction" in liberal normative theory. Arguing that oppression affects individual agents in powerful yet subtle ways, they contend that allegedly abstract theories often employ problematic assumptions that reinforce oppressive structures of power. I critically examine Onora O'Neill's "abstraction without idealization" as one possible solution to this problem. Because O'Neill defines abstraction as simply the "bracketing of certain predicates," I argue that her methodology fails to guide decisions about what to bracket and what to include in the theory. Furthermore, I suggest that it may not be possible to "abstract" without also relying on some particular ideals. I conclude by arguing that while abstraction is unavoidable, it must be employed with more specific attention to matters of socio-political hierarchy, and it must employ ideals that do not collude with structures of oppression.

Dependency, Cooperation and Claims on Social Goods, VI-E

Cynthia Stark, University of California, Irvine

Rawls's theory of justice has come under fire recently for its purported omission of dependents from justice's purview. What is chiefly at issue is his simplifying assumption stating that all citizens are to be regarded as fully cooperating. Though Rawls does not argue directly for this assumption, three candidate justifications can be excavated from his theory. Two of these turn out to be problematic, I argue—the first because it creates tension within Rawls' view, the second because it skirts the principal concern of his critics. The third candidate succeeds and reveals that Rawls's view does not in fact overlook the justice claims of dependents.

Merleau-Ponty and Freud on the Imagination and Psychopathology, VI-H

James B. Steeves, McMaster University

Contrary to Freud's claim that the imagination is to be blamed for most cases of neurosis, Merleau-Ponty suggests that neurosis is usually caused by a failure to imagine sufficiently. Of particular concern is his concept of the `virtual body,' a form of imagination that is deficient in most cases of neurosis. The paper relates Merleau-Ponty's theory of the imagination to current research and to the method of the guided daydream to demonstrate how the imagination can be used effectively in psychotherapy.

Becoming-Animal: Deleuze and the Movements of the Unconscious, VI-H

Shannon Sullivan, Pennsylvania State University

One of the most powerful aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's work is its opening up of the unconscious to something other than itself. This outside is the socio-political world, and opening the unconscious to it means thinking the unconscious in a productive, co-constitutive relationship with it. This paper examines a particular aspect of the "outside" world that helps make up the human unconscious: that of the non-human. Focusing on the becoming-animal of the unconscious opens up questions about how human desire is formed not just by human societies and practices, but by non-human animal ones as well.

What's the Matter with Political Liberalism?, I-E

Robert B. Talisse, Vanderbilt University

Rawls's political liberalism aspires both to avoid appealing to deep philosophical premises as the foundation of liberal politics and to accommodate all reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral comprehensive doctrines. These two aspirations are not mutually satisfiable. Therefore political liberalism is incoherent.

Metaethical Internalism as Cognitivism-Friendly, I-F

Jon A. Tresan, University of Florida

Metaethical Internalism looks threatening to Cognitivism. Internalism says that moral beliefs require motivational or affective states (`conations'); e.g., that believing that x is right requires a pro-attitude to x. Cognitivism says that moral beliefs are representations. Internalism appears to threaten Cognitivism because it looks like if Internalist Cognitivism is true, moral beliefs are either besires (at once representations and conations), violate Separability (the principle that there are no necessary relations between distinct things), or are about intrinsically action-guiding properties. This appearance, however, is due to a failure to distinguish between these two versions of Internalism: de dicto Internalism: Necessarily, if a moral belief exists so do certain conations. de re Internalism: Moral beliefs are, necessarily, such that if one exists so do certain conations. I argue that only de re Internalism threatens Cognitivism, but traditional Internalist intuitions support only de dicto Internalism. Internalism isn't unfriendly to Cognitivism after all.

Of Miracles: Hume's "Abject Failure" Reconsidered, III-G

William L. Vanderburgh, Wichita State University

John Earman contends that Hume's argument against miracles is an "abject failure." This paper aims to give a friendly reconstruction of the main thrust of Hume's argument, and to show that some of the assumptions built into Earman's attack are ones Hume would (for good reason) utterly reject. Earman also misunderstands the thrust of Hume's argument against miracles: the claim is not that miracles can never occur, but that we can never have adequate evidential warrant for believing that a miracle, that is, a violation of a law of nature, has occurred. Although a complete analysis of Earman's book is not possible in the short space available, the considerations adduced in this paper are enough to give credence to the claim that Earman has failed to establish that "Of Miracles" is an abject failure.

Phenomenology, Linguistic Intentionality and Helping the Mentally Ill, VI-H

Wilfried Ver Eecke, Georgetown University

In this paper I make use of Sokolowski's comparison between perceptual and signitive (linguistic) intentionality and of Husserl's remarks about a child's acquisition of language in order to explain the use of language in the new therapeutic method for schizophrenics developed by the Swedish psychiatrist Palle Villemoes. I make use of Sokolowski's idea that signitive (linguistic) intentionality loses (even represses) the textual richness of perception while it provides linguistic guides for action (if it is a hotel, it must have an entrance even if I do not see the entrance). Husserl makes it clear that children learn to use names from their parents. Sokolowski's ideas imply that the child must have emotional confidence in order to imitate the adult's naming. Husserl discovers then the puzzle of learning the use of pronouns since others use pronouns differently than a child. As solution I suggest that children or schizophrenics can learn the use of pronouns only if some form of separation has been established from the persons teaching them language. Villemoes takes great care in first establishing a deep form of idolization of his patients and then in establishing a form of separation in his therapy.

My main thesis then is that signitive (linguistic) intentionality can be understood as also creating a deeper form of subjectivity now capable of creating a world of objects superimposed on a world of sense perception. Mental illness understood as lacking in a rich form of intentionality can then be treated by introducing these forms of missing intentionalities. Phenomenology thus continues to provide a philosophical basis for non-biological forms of treatment of mentally ill persons.

Kant on Events and Causal Powers, IV-F

Eric Watkins, University of California, San Diego

In this paper I argue that Kant's reply to Hume regarding causality does not consist in an explicit refutation of Hume's position, since Kant does not accept the event-event model of causality that is presupposed by Hume's position. In the first two sections of this paper I show that neither simple nor complex event-event models of causation are consistent with the notion of mutual interaction that Kant argues is necessary for knowledge of simultaneity. Rather than rejecting mutual interaction, which would be quite costly given its prominent role in Kant's Newtonianism, I suggest that we can turn to a notion that Kant had developed throughout his pre-Critical period to explain mutual interaction, namely the notion of an indeterminate ground. While this notion is, broadly speaking, a version of a traditional causal powers model of causality, Kant modifies it in distinctive ways in the Critical period.

Moore, the Diaphanousness of Consciousness, and Physicalism, III-I

Kenneth Williford, University of Iowa

Moore's 1903 "The Refutation of Idealism" is justly famous, but his 1910 paper "The Subject-Matter of Psychology" has been sadly neglected. I extract from both papers Moore's central claims about consciousness. Moore offers a version of content externalism according to which different acts of consciousness are distinguished by the differences in their objects. Moore also insisted upon the phenomenological diaphanousness of consciousness: consciousness, apart from a revealing of its objects, does not seem to be anything in particular. Moore argues that the subject of consciousness might be some part of one's body and that the diaphanousness of consciousness implies that consciousness itself cannot be physical. Moore draws this conclusion because he is committed to the dubious thesis of the strong transparency of consciousness. Once this premise is rejected, one can argue that far from posing an obstacle to physicalism, Moore's view opens a way to it.

Discourse Ethics and Moral Vision, I-F

John R. Wright, Miami University

This paper challenges the ontological picture of the social world behind Habermas's claim that moral validity is truth-analogical. By Habermas's view, the interests and value orientations of all rational agents must be accessible (verfügbar) and at our disposal for transformation through argumentation. Instead, I argue that if our interests and value orientations prove irresponsive to argumentation, it need not lead to a charge of irrationality. Rather, this irresponsiveness may be a function of difference in moral vision, as described here. Moral vision could be accessible to rational change if we broaden our view of moral discourse.

Spinozistic Self-Preservation, V-E

Andrew D. Youpa, University of California, Irvine

In Part 4 of his Ethics, Spinoza puts forward and defends what might appear to be the controversial Hobbesean thesis that the desire to preserve oneself is the basis of virtue (4p22). Indeed there is a tradition of commentators offering an egoistic, Hobbesean interpretation of Spinoza's ethical theory. In this paper, however, I shall argue that we should not understand Spinozistic self-preservation in the commonsense, empiricist sense of prolonging our lives. Instead I argue that, for Spinoza, self-preservation is a matter of perfection-preservation and perfection-enhancement, which does not essentially involve prolonging the duration of an individual's existence.