Rowe's Argument from Freedom, V-J

Michael J. Almeida (University of Texas, San Antonio)

William Rowe's Argument from Freedom concludes that there is some world in which every creaturely essence is transworld depraved. If Rowe's Argument from Freedom is sound, then we have a very powerful argument for the central thesis of the Free Will Defense. I show that Rowe's version of the Argument from Freedom is unsound. I consider several modified versions of the argument and show that we have no reason to believe any modified version is sound. I conclude that the significant freedom of creaturely essences makes it at least as reasonable to believe that every world contains at least some do-gooders.

Fallible, Infallible Noûs, I-J

Allan Bäck (Kutztown University)

In several texts Aristotle asserts that noûs grasps the first principles of science infallibly. Like his similar assertion, that in sense perception we grasp the form of the object, as it is in itself, without its matter, this claim makes Aristotle look rather silly from a modern perspective. For he seems to assume that our ideas reflect reality accurately. Yet, on the other hand, Aristotle does admit that noûs, like sense perception, can err. I offer a way of reconciling these texts and of saving The Philosopher from silliness, in his theory of human knowledge.

Moral Perplexity, II-H

Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)

Moral perplexity describes the state of an agent who regards herself as having two incompatible reasons for action (neither of which is decisive), and finds impossible to deliberate further. It is generally argued that moral perplexity is of no philosophical relevance unless it is independently shown that incompatible requirements really bind the agent. Against this view, I argue that reflection on moral perplexity urges us to re-examine the grounds upon which the distinction between spurious and genuine conflicts is based, and calls into question the ideal dimension of ethical theory. To properly account for moral perplexity, we ought to reconsider the bounds, the purpose, and the structure of deliberation. Conflict-resolution is not the sole task of deliberation, which ought to be conceived more broadly as the structuring of agential integrity. This finding is of consequence for ethical theory in that it suggests that we redefine its normative aims.

Against Phenomenal Direct Reference, IV-G

Gordon P. Barnes (University of St. Thomas)

In recent years it has been suggested that we refer to the phenomenal qualia of our experiences directly — without the mediation of any concepts or properties. If correct, this thesis would undercut three of the more forceful anti-physicalist arguments of recent years: the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, and Max Black's objection to the Identity Theory. However, the thesis is false, or so I will argue. My argument turns on what I will call the rational re-identification of phenomenal kinds. My contention is that if we referred to the qualia of our experiences directly, then we would not be able to rationally re-identify the phenomenal kinds of our experiences, but we can. So the thesis of phenomenal direct reference must be false.

The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium, V-E

Jared G. Bates (University of Minnesota, Duluth)

In 1955, Goodman set out to "dissolve" the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudo-problem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. This dissolution, which has enjoyed tremendous acceptance, essentially involved an application of what has since been called the method of reflective equilibrium. Largely in connection with naturalism in epistemology, the reflective equilibrium method has lately been the subject of considerable attention (Goldman & Pust 1998, Graham & Horgan 1998, Jackson 1998, Kornblith 1998). I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is-in a way to be explained-itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously circular. This paper, then, examines how the old problem of induction crept back in while nobody was looking.

Core Physical Knowledge and The Marks of Thought, V-F

Sara Bernal (Rutgers University)

Several ways of looking at infants' physical knowledge emerge from the literature on infant object cognition. On one view, infants are seen as possessors of an intuitive physical theory [Spelke 1988]. On a second, some of their object­relevant capacities are seen as resulting from the operation of a mechanism of visuospatial attention [Scholl and Leslie 1999]. On a third, the representations of that mechanism are still identified with infants' object representations, but are taken to have more in common with conceptual representations [Carey and Xu 2001]. Here I'll focus on the second and the third accounts. I'll find that some key contrasts that have been claimed between them are in fact spurious. Sorting that out will lead to discussion of the differences between perceptual and conceptual processes and
representations, which will provide me with the materials for laying out my own view of object apprehension.

Kantian Objections to a World State, IV-J

David A. Billings (Calvin College)

In this paper I critically examine Kant's objections to a world state. After explaining the difference between a world state and a world federation, I reconstruct a case against a world state based upon the principles that underlie Kant's objections. Two distinct lines of argument emerge. The first concerns the risks of harm associated with a world state. The other line of argument — which, however, is very far from being explicit in Kant's writings — suggests that there is no transition to the world state compatible with the requirements of justice. I find that Kant's objections, though not without merit, are not compelling as he developed them. Yet despite the weaknesses, they do pinpoint areas that should be of concern even today for both world state supporters and opponents.

Skepticism and Warranted Assertion, IV-F

Timothy A. Black (University of Utah)

Consider this skeptical argument: 1. I don't know that I'm not a brain-in-a-vat. 2. If 1, then 3. 3. Therefore, I don't know that I have hands. I argue that we should favor a Moorean response to this argument, a response according to which the standards for knowledge are always comparatively low and according to which we may deny both 3 and 1. This response is troubled, however, by the fact that there are contexts in which it seems false that we know we have hands. Yet, as I argue, we can employ the notion of warranted assertibility in explaining why it sometimes seems false that we know we have hands since we are sometimes warranted in asserting that we don't know, it can seem false that we do know. The Moorean can therefore preserve her response to the skeptical argument while still explaining why that argument sometimes seems effective.

Yablo on Proportionality, Causation, and Exclusion, II-E

Thomas D. Bontly (University of Connecticut)

A familiar conundrum in the philosophy of mind is the problem of causal exclusion: if mental properties are physically realized, they seem to be in danger of having their causal efficacy usurped "from below" by their physical realizations. Recently, Stephen Yablo has proposed an intriguing solution: causation, he says, is subject to a proportionality constraint, one that mental events can satisfy while their physical realizations often cannot. After showing how Yablo's approach can be extended, I argue that the proportionality requirement is not in fact a constraint on the causal relation itself but rather a pragmatic feature of our causal talk, and I explain how it derives from general principles of language use. Proportionality therefore has little if anything to do with the metaphysics of causation and so cannot save mental causation from the exclusion problem.

Global Distributive Justice and Desert, I-G

Gillian Brock (University of Aukland)

The facts about global poverty are staggering. Consider, for instance, how 1.5 billion people subsist below the international poverty line. On several accounts, alleviating the worst aspects of poverty would impose fairly small costs on us in affluent countries, yet we continue to do little about alleviating this situation. Several reasons are given as to why this poverty, though regrettable, is no serious concern for the affluent of developed countries. Often it is claimed that there are no morally salient connections between our actions and their poverty. Another consideration frequently used to resist proposals concerning redistribution to assist the needy concerns our claims in virtue of desert: the thought is that people have strong claims to deserving the fruits of their labors and imposing any redistributory taxes would fail to respect their just deserts. In this paper I examine such claims in virtue of desert in more detail. I argue that there are significant problems with this notion of desert that is so confidently invoked. When we try to reconstruct a coherent notion of desert, we find we must be committed to a principle of (fair) equality of opportunity, which means we must care about people's starting positions and also desert-generating processes. It is only when both of these elements reach a moral threshold that claims of desert can defensibly gain moral recognition. I also argue for parallel conclusions concerning entitlement. So, the main argument of this paper reveals that there are indeed some morally salient connections between the affluent of developed countries and those in poverty. Considerations of desert and (fair) entitlement can bring this into better view.

Another Way of Naturalizing Virtue Ethics, V-G

Stephen R. Brown (University of Oklahoma)

One way that virtue ethics may be "naturalized" is by specifying what counts as a virtue in terms of benefits to the agent. I consider another way of naturalizing virtue ethics, which involves providing a naturalistic account of what makes a human being good qua human being. This view, originating in Aristotle and recently explicated at length by Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, appeals to the "form of life" of our species to ground ethical evaluations. There is a crucial difficulty, however, that could undermine the theory's claim to being called naturalistic and may lead into outright paradox.

Another Insistence of Man: Prolegomena to the Question of the Animal in Derrida's Reading of Heidegger, V-D

Matthew Calarco (Sweet Briar College)

Jacques Derrida has recently devoted considerable attention to what he labels "the question of the animal." More often than not, this question arises for Derrida in a reading of one of Heidegger's texts. In order to appreciate more fully the stakes of Derrida's posing of this question with respect to Heidegger, I offer in this essay a prolegomena to the question of the animal in Derrida's work. The essay begins
with a careful analysis of Derrida's essay, "The Ends of Man," in which Heidegger's "Letter on `Humanism'" is read in terms of the motif of man's "proper." Starting from this Derridean reading of Heidegger's humanism, I return to Heidegger's "Letter" in order to uncover the manner in which Heidegger distinguishes man's "proper" from what is "improper," namely, animality. This reading reveals that, while Heidegger offers a convincing critique of metaphysical humanism, this critique nevertheless ends up uncritically reinforcing the anthropocentrism of this same tradition. I conclude with the suggestion that Derrida's recent writings on the question of the animal should be read as an extended meditation on the effects of this lingering anthropocentrism in Heidegger's thought.

Intrinsic, Derived, and Anthropocentric Teleology in Politics i.8, II-K

Richard J. Cameron (University of Alaska, Anchorage)

Anthropocentrists concerning teleology believe that all things have the good of humans as at least one aspect of their natural end. And in an infamous passage from Politics i.8 Aristotle seems to endorse anthropocentric teleology. Those who deny that Aristotle accepts such commitments have not, thus far, offered a compelling account of this passage. In this essay I offer an interpretation grounded firmly in both the narrow and wider context of the Politics and which locates Aristotle's thoughts in this passage squarely within the context of his remarks on teleology, organs, and parts elsewhere in the biological and metaphysical works. And on this interpretation, Politics i.8 offers no support for the claim that Aristotle endorses anthropocentric teleology. I argue, therefore, that the most straightforward and compelling evidence for Aristotle's anthropocentric teleology does not withstand scrutiny. Even here Aristotle appears to endorse only nonanthropocentric natural teleology.

Two Intentional Reflections: On the Debate about the Intentionality of Judgments of Taste in Kant's Critique of Judgment, I-F

Joseph Cannon (Northwestern University)

An examination of judgments of taste in terms of the role they play in a Kantian theory of the activity of art production provides new arguments in support of an intentional theory of aesthetic judgment, and against a causal theory. However, there are elements of Paul Guyer's "two-reflection" version of a causal theory that, if translated into the context of an intentional interpretation of judgments of taste, correct some inadequacies in recent attempts to formulate such an account. Henry Allison's intentional interpretation, for example, insufficiently deals with the problem of the relationship between the present or intended beautiful object in intuition and the feeling he takes Kant to identify with the representation of the subjective purposiveness of the object. This can be corrected by applying the structure of Guyer's two "reflections," interpreted as two intentional valences of a single act, to Allison's intentional account.

A Feminist Response to Skepticism, IV-F

John M. Capps and Evelyn Brister (both Rochester Institute of Technology)

This paper explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, we argue that feminist epistemology draws attention to the particular epistemic interests exhibited in skeptical lines of questioning. Recognizing these interests leads to viewing the skeptic's objections as value-laden and thus not automatically worthy of our assent. While our response is broadly contextualist — in that justification and knowledge are routinely to be had in ordinary skeptic-free contexts — it also addresses a problem facing some recent contextualist theories. In contrast with these theories it does not treat the skeptic's standards (and interests) as necessarily more correct or more rigorous than everyday standards.

Depression, Practical Reason, and the Pursuit of Happiness, I-H

Michael J. Cholbi (Brooklyn College, CUNY)

Depressed individuals experience strongly negative reactive attitudes such as guilt and shame, but also seem to experience volitional paralysis, unable to move themselves to act. While Humean theories of practical reason can deal with the volitional paralysis by postulating an absence of desires, in doing so they seem to prevent a Humean explanation of the negative reactive attitudes. I argue (1) that this dilemma dissolves once we distinguish self-regarding desires from other-regarding desires. Depressed individuals lack the former, and so are unmotivated to serve their welfare, but feel negative reactive attitudes vis-à-vis the latter. (2) However, Humean theories, like many modern theories of value and rationality, cannot explain depressed individuals' disenchantment with their own happiness, since these theories view happiness as a natural and universal source of reasons. I defend a learned helplessness model that understands both the pursuit of happiness and depression as learned dispositions.

The Problem of Negative Existentials Does Not Exist: Another Case for Dynamic Semantics, III-E

Leonard Clapp (Illinois Wesleyan University)

This paper has two goals: To show that the problem of negative existentials can be solved within the theoretical framework of dynamic semantics, and to use this result to make a case for dynamic semantics as opposed to traditional static semantics on the grounds that the problem cannot be solved within the constraints of static semantics. I will first describe the problem that negative existentials pose for static semantics, showing that there are only two strategies for solving it from within this theoretical framework, neither of which can succeed. Finally, I will describe dynamic semantics, and explain how the problem can be solved within this alternative framework.

Rational Faith and Democratic Legitimacy: Habermas and Michelman on Constitutional Founding, IV-H

Ciaran Cronin (University of Illinois, Chicago)

Jürgen Habermas's attempt to reconcile constitutionalism or the rule of law and democracy through a proceduralist theory of deliberative democracy has been criticized by Frank Michelman on the grounds that his discursive criterion of democratic legitimacy is in reality a substantive one and his proceduralism becomes embroiled in a regress of justifications. Habermas responds that these problems can be overcome provided that we distinguish between the conceptual reconstruction of the system of rights and their implementation in democratic "constitutional projects." In this paper I argue that Habermas's account of normative validity in terms of hypothetical agreement under ideal conditions of discourse does offer a viable procedural account of democratic legitimacy. However, his model of retrospective legitimation of the constitution remains vulnerable to an epistemic version of Michelman's regress objection. Ultimately, their dispute turns on contrasting models of rational faith informed by their respective disciplinary approaches, but Habermas's faith is nevertheless the one liberal democrats should embrace.

The Myth of the Given in Sellars and Althusser, II-J

Andrew Cutrofello (Loyola University, Chicago)

John McCumber has made the controversial suggestion that analytic philosophy came to prominence in the United States as a strategic response to McCarthyism. McCumber does not discuss the work of Wilfrid Sellars, whose attack on the "myth of the given" exerted a powerful influence on the profession. There are a number of striking similarities between the work of Sellars and that of the French Marxist Louis Althusser who also, under the influence of Gaston Bachelard, attacks the idea of givenness. One might expect that Althusser could show Sellars how to build a richer conception of ideology into his account of what Robert Brandom calls our practice of "giving and asking for reasons," and that Sellars could provide Althusser with a more subtle conception of scientific inquiry. I argue for the exact opposite conclusion: it is Sellars who has the better resources for a critique of ideology, and Althusser the better account of science.

Hegel, Property, and the Female Body, V-H

Michelle Darnell (Purdue University)

Hegel's sexism is frequently dismissed by contemporary philosophers. While not excusing Hegel, many philosophers simply reject his sexist beliefs as wrong but additionally maintain that such beliefs are not influential on Hegel's system as a whole. In opposition to this view, I argue that Hegel's system suffers from the rejection of his sexism: the system is in fact dependent on viewing the female body as property, which ultimately is to be controlled by men.

"The Empiricism of Locke and Newton": Suggestions for a Reappraisal, IV-E

Mary A. Domski (Indiana University, Bloomington)

G.A. Rogers (1978, 1979, 1981a, and 1981b) has argued that the method of natural philosophy promoted by Locke in the Essay is vindicated by the method adopted by Newton in the Principia, and as such, there is good reason to look at these major works of the late 17^th Century as manifestations of "the empiricism of Locke and Newton." As influential as Rogers' account has been, I believe we need to reexamine the empiricism that supposedly underwrites both the Essay and the Principia, and my modest hope in this present paper is to make clear the tension that exists between Locke's empiricism and Newton's empiricism. In particular, I hope to show that there is an apparent difficulty in aligning Locke's skeptical account of our knowledge of substances with Newton's method of deriving demonstratively certain conclusions about the physical world.

The Method to Foucault's Madness, II-J

David F. Dudrick (Colgate University)

In Folie et déraison, Foucault provides a history of the experience of madness. While this history is straightforward enough, it comes in the midst of some of Foucault's most puzzling pronouncements, ones that seem to advocate madness. While it may seem that there is no necessary relationship between these two aspects of the work, they are essential elements in its central aim: the affirmation of a precontextual, prediscursive reality. In this paper, I provide a reading of Foucault's work on madness that elucidates relationship between these two aspects of the work, and which evaluates its philosophical implications.

Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings, III-K

Jason Thomas Eberl (Saint Louis University)

I discuss how Aquinas's understanding of the relationship of soul and body yields the conclusion that a human being is constituted by an organized material body informed by an intellective soul, and that a human being is not identical to either her soul or her informed material body. I address Aquinas's contention that an intellective soul can exist without informing a material body and show how this ability does not contradict the thesis that a human being exists naturally as embodied. Though a human being's existence transcends her material body and she can persist without it as constituted by her soul alone, such does not entail that a human being ceases to bear some relationship to her body. While a human being is more than the sum of her parts, she cannot fully exist and act without being constituted by those parts.

Prankster's Ethics, III-H

Andrew Egan (MIT) and Brian J. Weatherson (Brown University)

Causing harm to others for your own amusement is wrong. So is causing harm simply because you are too lazy to avoid causing it. But let's not underestimate how much amusement a well-timed bout of immorality can produce. If done with suitable panache and publicity, the amusement can be more extensive and more intensive, than the harm. Call such suitably public acts pranks. Pranks are not only entertaining, they can be instructive, and informative. All things considered, it would be better if there were a few pranks than if everyone was morally sound. But it is always wrong to perform a particular prank. We argue for these last two claims through a series of examples, presented both descriptively and ostensibly. If the claims are true, then even some weak forms of consequentialism that are immune to familiar anti-consequentialist arguments are false. Further, performing pranks because they have good consequences is even worse than performing them for fun, which tells against some consequentialist accounts of virtue.

Ideology and the Rhetoric of Agency in Heidegger's "Origin of the Work of Art," V-D

Karen S. Feldman (University of California, Berkeley)

In this paper I argue for the inevitable equivocality of any rhetoric of agency when it comes to describing the effects of the artwork with respect to its human spectator. I take J. Hillis Miller's criticisms of Heidegger's supposed "ideological" confusion as my point of departure and use arguments from Thomas Sheehan's recent article "Making Sense: Toward a Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research" in order to indicate where Miller errs in his criticisms. Focusing on Heidegger's essay on "The Origin of the Work of Art" I show how an analysis of the operations of the obscure rhetorical trope of syllepsis in Heidegger's essay undercuts both Miller's and Sheehan's claims for Heidegger's rhetoric of agency.

David Hilbert and Werner Heisenberg on Consistency, Simplicity, and Reduction, III-J

Mélanie Frappier (University of Western Ontario)

David Hilbert's role in the elaboration of the philosophy of those who, like Werner Heisenberg, created quantum physics while working with him in Göttingen has yet to be duly explored. This talk is a contribution to this project. Already, Mara Beller (1999) has pointed out that numerous arguments used by Heisenberg in favour of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics are close in spirit to Hilbert's precept that consistency is ultimately the only warrant we have in our search for knowledge. Still, her claim needs to be qualified. It is true that, when evaluating specific theories, Heisenberg used a consistency requirement similar to the one advocated by Hilbert in his axiomatic program. However, in his assessment of theories having overlapping
domains (like Newtonian physics and quantum mechanics) Heisenberg gave more weight to the non-logical requirement of simplicity, thus rejecting Hilbert's intertheoretic consistency criterion and the reductionist program associated with it.

The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?, V-F

Rocco J. Gennaro (Indiana State University)

The "higher-order thought" (HOT) theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it. The HOT theory has been attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg has called "the problem of the rock" which seems to show that the HOT theory proves too much, e.g. a rock would then become conscious when a thought is directed at it. On the other hand, it has also been alleged that the HOT theory does not address the so-called "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness. If so, then the HOT theory would prove too little. The HOT theory, then, is arguably between a rock and a hard place. I defend the HOT theory against these objections. I also show that they are really just two sides of the same coin, and that the HOT theory is immune from David Chalmers' criticisms of other reductionist accounts of consciousness.

Possibly v. Actually the Case: On Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter, V-E

Nathaniel Goldberg (Georgetown University)

Davidson's recent Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, anthologizing articles from the 1980s and 1990s, encourages us to reconsider his arguments. One such argument is Davidson's omniscient-interpreter argument ("OIA") in "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." The OIA, allegedly establishing that it is necessary that most beliefs are true, is meant to answer the skeptic. In Part I of my paper, I consider the charge that the OIA only establishes that it is possible that most beliefs are true; if correct, then it is also possibly the case that most beliefs are false—the skeptic's very position. Next, I consider two responses on Davidson's behalf, showing that each fails. In Part II, I show that the OIA establishes neither that it is necessarily nor possibly but actually the case that most beliefs are true. I then conclude that this is enough to answer the skeptic.

Making Meaning Happen: Computational Models for Meaning as Use, III-E

Patrick N. Grim, Trina Kokalis, Ali Alai-Tafti, Nicholas Kilb, and Paul St. Denis (all Stony Brook University, SUNY)

The core thesis of theories of meaning as use is that meaning is not something in an individual head but a matter of behavioral coordination across a community. We offer a series of computer simulations which instantiate and extend this thesis. The basic model is a cellular automata environment of wandering food sources and
predators; individuals gain points by capturing food sources and lose points when hit by predators. Cells follow simple strategies dictating when they open their mouths, when they hide, and when they make sounds heard by immediate neighbors. In our simplest models, strategy change is by pure imitation of successful neighbors. In more complex simulations, we instantiate strategies as neural nets, with strategy change by partial training on the behavior of more successful neighbors. The magic in all of these models is that simple signaling emerges persistently and robustly across growing communities of communicators.

What Really is Right with Constructive Empiricism, III-J

Joseph F. Hanna (Michigan State University)

James Ladyman (2000) argues "what's really wrong with constructive empiricism" is that "…it requires that there be an objective modal distinction between the observable and the unobservable." My intent is to counter Ladyman's claim that the irreducibly modal character of empirical adequacy is something that is "really wrong with constructive empiricism." I argue that disposition concepts refer to non-modal properties of types rather than to the modal properties of tokens of those types. Solubility, for example, is an "occurrent," though unobservable, property of a type of substance (involving the structure of associated atoms); and observability is, similarly, an "occurrent," though unobservable, property of a type of event (involving the structure of associated physical systems). Empirical adequacy, like truth, is an objective, semantic notion; the empirical adequacy of a theory depends upon all actual tokens of the relevant observable type, not just upon the tokens that have actually been observed.

Practical Knowledge, Due Measure and Limit in Late Plato, I-J

George Harvey (University of Kentucky)

Together, the Statesman and Philebus provide important clues about Plato's most considered (and final) conception of practical expert knowledge. In the Statesman, forms of practical expertise are defined in relation to specific standards of due measure. To the extent that the art of due measure relates to "what coming into being necessarily is" (Statesman, 283d), there is the suggestion that practical arts are grounded in, and gain their legitimacy from, certain ontological conditions that make due measure possible. Missing from the Statesman is any demonstration showing that these ontological conditions actually obtain. While no such demonstration is to be found in the Philebus, I think that certain passages of this dialogue provide some indication of how these conditions are satisfied, as well as some important insights about practical expert knowledge in late Plato.

Person-Focused Emotions, I-H

Bennett W. Helm (Franklin & Marshall College)

Typical accounts of the emotions understand them to be largely independent of each other, as if a creature could have the capacity for fear, say, without also having the capacities for many other emotions, such as anger, joy, relief, hope, and disappointment. I shall argue here that this is a mistake in general, and in particular it gives us a faulty understanding of more complex emotions like pride and shame — emotions that I shall call "person-focused emotions." In particular, I shall argue, these person-focused emotions essentially involve a commitment to the import of a particular person, and as such feeling one person-focused emotion commits one to feeling others in the relevant counterfactual situations. This, I shall suggest, will reveal the importance these emotions have in our relationships with ourselves and other persons.

On A `Fatal Dilemma' For Moderate Foundationalism, III-G

Daniel Howard-Snyder and Christian Lee (both Western Washington University)

Among contemporary foundationalists, Moderate Foundationalism is preferred over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against Moderate Foundationalism, offered by a contemporary strong foundationalist, Timothy McGrew.

Temporal Externalism and Our Ordinary Linguistic Practice, I-E

Henry Jackman (York University)

A number of authors have recently defended a type of `temporal externalism' (hereafter TE) according to which, roughly, the content of our thoughts and utterances at a given time can depend upon the linguistic practices of either ourselves and our community after that time. The response to TE has typically been little more than an incredulous stare, but Jessica Brown has recently suggested some actual criticisms of TE, and the most serious of these relate to how TE supposedly "fails to accord with our ordinary ways of assessing the truth value of utterances." However, Brown's criticisms miss the mark, and that they do so primarily because they fail to distinguish our ordinary ascriptional practices from our more general beliefs about what sorts of things can affect what we mean. Consequently, if we wish to find a reason to reject TE, we need to look elsewhere.

What Was Kripke's Mistake?, II-G

John Justice (Randolph-Macon Woman's College)

In Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, Scott Soames argues that Saul Kripke's thesis that names are nondescriptional entails that a name's meaning is just its referent and that true identity sentences with names are knowable a priori. I argue that Kripke was correct to deny that such identity sentences are knowable a priori. His mistake was his claim that proper names
are nondescriptional. I provide an account of the descriptive meanings of names that explains their rigidity and satisfies Kripke's other conditions on the senses of names.

Two Problems for Bealer's Intuitions, III-G

David Kasmier (University of Southern California)

In a number of recent essays, George Bealer has attempted to provide a realist alternative to the direct perception account of rational intuition. In this essay I argue that his theory suffers two internal problems. The first is an apparent circularity in his explanation why intuitions are "appropriately" tied to the truth and therefore are evidential. The second is a dilemma entailed by Bealer's phenomenological account of intuitions. Either his account entails a direct perception theory or it else it commits him to a psychologistic theory of intuitions as evidence.

Moral Response-Dependence and the Motive of Duty, III-H

Jason R. Kawall (University of Tennessee, Chattanooga)

In recent years there has been significant interest in metaethical theories in which morality and moral properties are characterized in terms of the reactions or responses of certain kinds of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that all such theories face a devastating flaw insofar as they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty (at least in a non-vacuous fashion). That is, they are unable to provide a plausible reason for anyone to desire to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right actions. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various kinds of approvals, and various kinds of individuals. When these distinctions are drawn, we find a wide range of moral-response dependent theories that can accommodate the motive of duty.

The Moral Case for a Policy of Assassination, I-G

Stephen Kershnar (SUNY College at Fredonia)

In some cases, the U.S. should adopt a policy of assassinating national leaders. On just war theory, national leaders are sometimes combatants. This is because some leaders are both causal and logical agents of an unjust military campaign. Such leaders occupy this logical role because in some cases their position has an essential link to their nation's military projects. On a self-defense theory, some national leaders may be killed because they are threats. They are threats because they originate a causal process that will likely bring about large amounts of unjust harm. On a consequentialist theory, such a policy would likely bring about the best consequences since it would be a vital tool in the protection against genocide, unjust military aggression, and other horrendous state actions that have characterized the twentieth century.

What's so Transparent about Transparency?, IV-G

Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

Representationalists often use intuitions about the transparency of experience to defend their view that qualitative content is representational content. According to these intuitions, we cannot attend to our experience except by attending to the object of that experience. Although the transparency intuition appears to be widely shared, even among non-representationalists, in this paper I suggest that there are two ambiguities inherent in discussions of transparency. One concerns the strength of the transparency intuition, the other concerns it scope. Once we bring these two ambiguities to the surface, I suggest that we can see that the sense in which experience can be said to be transparent is considerably weaker than the representationalists ordinarily suppose. Insofar as the phenomenological data suggests that experience is transparent, it does not support the kind of transparency needed for representationalism.

Kant's Defense of the League of States, IV-J

Pauline Kleingeld (Washington University in St. Louis)

Kant has long been criticized for scaling back the ideal of a state of states (which he claims is an idea of reason) to that of a voluntary non-coercive league of states on the empirical grounds that states do not want to join the former. Critics claim that Kant rightly repudiates arguments from unfeasibility in other contexts and that he should have advocated a state of states with federal coercive powers instead of a voluntary league without such powers. In this paper, I argue that Kant has good reasons for advocating the establishment of a non-coercive league of states and that he does so without rejecting the stronger ideal of a world republic.

Reasons and the Alternatives, II-H

Christopher Knapp (Binghamton University)

Some decisions are very hard to make. This is especially true when one of the options is neither better than, nor worse than, nor equally as good as an alternative. In this paper, I argue that what it seems rational to choose in such cases suggests that how much reason there is to choose any particular option can depend on how good the alternatives are. If this is right, it will require a revision of standard accounts of rational decision-making. In particular, if reasons for choosing can depend on the value of the alternatives, then two intuitively plausible, putative necessary properties of rational preference orderings are not necessary properties after all.
Rational agents can have preferences that are neither weakly transitive in Leonard Savage's sense, nor exhibit what Amartya Sen called property.

Thagard's Historicist Methodology of Science, III-J

William J. Knorpp (James Madison University)

Paul Thagard defends a naturalistic account of science by articulating a historicist account of the justification of scientific method. Thagard argues that we can justify inferences on the basis of descriptive scientific studies of actual inferential behavior, and, thus, that it is possible to move "from the descriptive to the normative" in an interesting and important way. I argue that Thagard's suggestion is unpromising in part because it requires us to use both a priori reflection and empirical investigation in order to justify principles of inference. The position thus inherits the problems both of traditional epistemology and of naturalistic epistemology.

Justice and the Politics of Deference, I-G

Avery H. Kolers (University of Louisville)

Moral progress is not evident within extant political systems. A good-faith commitment to justice therefore requires oppositional collective action. Collective action requires that agents be in solidarity. Solidarity, a deferential notion, requires agents to subsume their judgment under that of others. Solidary actors accept judgments on the basis of provenance, not substance. This paper articulates and defends a moral principle of "progressive solidarity," which guides oppositional political action. Progressive solidarity requires deference to the decisions of the least well off. Although some room remains for individual judgment, solidarity nonetheless challenges moral autonomy. The paper distinguishes solidarity from sympathy and other similar attitudes, and concludes by defending the "provenancial" account of responsibility which solidarity entails. Solidarity contravenes cherished assumptions about individual responsibility, but solidarity is a crucial moral principle, required if we are to work effectively for justice.

Descartes on the Folly of Trying to Define Truth, I-K

Adam A. Kovach (Haverford College)

Descartes agrees with contemporary philosophers who say, with Davidson, that it is folly to try to define truth, but for reasons that are likely quite foreign to them. In this paper I offer an interpretation of Descartes' refusal to define truth, mainly on the basis of some remarks made in a letter Descartes wrote to Mersenne in 1639. I show that Descartes' refusal to define truth is grounded in his view that the idea of truth is innate, and that Descartes' nativism is not a simple doctrine. According to Descartes, our knowledge of what truth is derives from our ability to catch ourselves in the act, as it were, and grasp what we are doing when we form judgments. This forms the basis for Descartes' claim that "there is no way to learn what truth is if one does not know it by nature."

On Behalf of a Suarezian Middle Knowledge, III-K

Dean A. Kowalski (University of Indianapolis)

Since Suarez, there have been Molinists who incorporate versions of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) into their exposition of how, logically prior to any creative act, God can know what any creature would freely do were she created and placed in just those circumstances. While some are dubious of Suarez's particular elucidation of CEM, there remain contemporary Molinists, such as Richard Gaskin and William Lane Craig, who are sympathetic to his basic approach. Also since Suarez, nevertheless, there have been anti-Molinists who repudiate any defense of middle knowledge that relies upon CEM. Siding with Gaskin and Craig, it will be argued that various, standard objections to CEM, at least as the careful Molinist understands the principle, are not nearly as forceful as many believe. Consequently, a CEM-based defense remains a live option for the Molinist.

Korsgaard, Identity and Normativity, III-H

Larry Krasnoff (College of Charleston)

In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that if one is committed to any practical identity, however contextual, one is also committed to a version of the categorical imperative and ultimately to universal moral obligations. A communitarian position is thus incoherent: the communitarian's own commitments lead back to the liberalism that communitarianism sought to reject. In this paper I argue that this argument can be made to work, but only by burdening the notion of identity with a rather questionable assumption. Here it will be important to stress that this assumption is not originally Korsgaard's, but that of the communitarian critics. What Korsgaard's argument thus shows is that communitarianism is indeed incoherent, but not for the reasons Korsgaard suggests.

The Ironic Self; The I as a Work of Art in Early Romantic Thought, I-F

Gerard Kuperus (DePaul University)

This paper seeks to discuss the notion of the self in the works of some of the Early Romantics by comparing the self to Friedrich Schlegel's discussion of irony. There can be found some striking similarities between the endless development of the self, an eternal becoming, and the act of irony, which is never completed, but always extends itself even beyond the intentions of the (ironic) author. It is my thesis in this matter that the development of the self is in a way ironic in the romantic sense: the self develops through a paradox, never is what it is, but always develops itself through what it is not, i.e., the world to which it stands in relation.

Twin Earth, Dry Earth, and the Significance of BIV Skepticism, IV-F

William S. Larkin (Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville)

Ted Warfield, following a path blazed by Hilary Putnam, has argued that we can know non-empirically that we are not brains in vats. I construe this as a threat to the philosophical significance of BIV skepticism. I attempt to block Warfield's argument by (1) showing that Twin Earth thought experiments cannot be used to show that some concept is widely individuated without presupposing some empirical knowledge, (2) arguing that we simply cannot know non-empirically via any route that one of our actual concepts is wide, and (3) responding to an objection based on Boghossian's Dry Earth argument for the claim that if we intend a term to express a wide concept, then either it does so or fails to express any concept at all.

The New Privileged Access Problem, IV-G

Krista Lawlor (Stanford University)

Privileged access is a long-standing problem. It seems I am better placed than anyone to know my attitudes, and speak my mind with special authority. The problem has been to explain first-person authority in naturalistic terms. Now naturalists face a new problem of privileged access—the problem of executive privilege. Defenders of executive privilege argue that we have misunderstood first-person authority, that it is executive in nature, and consequently insulated from empirical overthrow. I argue that a computational approach to the problem of executive authority makes better sense of commonsense commitments. I use results from cognitive psychology to help build the case.

Defending a Duty to Obey the Law as the Correlative of a State's Right to Rule, IV-H

David Lefkowitz (University of Maryland, College Park)

William Edmundson has recently argued that a legitimate state's right to rule correlates with a general prima facie duty not to interfere with the law's administration (DNI), rather than with a general prima facie duty to obey the law (DOL). Properly understood, a DOL can meet two criticisms Edmundson raises against it: the stop sign in the desert case and the requirement of content-independence. The immunity of a DNI to these criticisms, therefore, does not prove its superiority to a DOL. Moreover, Edmundson fails to adequately address the gap his view creates between a state's justified claim to create a DOL, and its subjects having only a DNI. This weakness in his argument provides one reason to conclude that if a legitimate state has a right to rule that correlates with a duty on the part of its subjects, that duty is a DOL, and not a DNI.

Is Spinoza's Account of Striving Top-Down?, I-K

Martin T. Lin (University of Toronto)

Most commentators have regarded Spinoza as a partisan of the mechanical philosophy, i.e., the view that all natural phenomena can be understood in terms of the mechanical laws of motion. Robert Brandom has offered an interesting and provocative interpretation of one of Spinoza's central doctrines which challenges this widely held assumption. According to Spinoza's conatus doctrine, all things strive [conantur] to persevere in their being. Brandom argues that this striving must be understood as a top-down force, which stands over and above Spinoza's mechanical laws of motion, by means of which complex wholes maintain the internal organization of their parts. I shall argue that, on the contrary, Brandom's interpretation is inconsistent with central features of Spinoza's metaphysics, and that the standard view of Spinoza as mechanist is well founded.

What Should a Correspondence Theory Be?, II-G

Patricia A. Marino (Stanford University)

A traditional problem for correspondence theories of truth takes the form of a dilemma: If they ask for correspondence to a raw, unconceptualized, mind-independent world, then they seem implausible. But if they don't, they collapse into their coherence and deflationary rivals. I offer a solution to this problem by articulating the basic features of a correspondence theory and arguing for the dispensability of the troubling one. I start with four features: independence of the world to which things correspond, cleavage between truth-bearer and truth-maker, univocality of the truth predicate, and implications for discourses with doubtful content. I argue that appearances to the contrary, independence is not necessary, and can be replaced by a minimal descriptiveness condition while the other features remain. I discuss the differences from deflationism and coherence, and conclude that the correspondence theorist can avoid the dilemma.

Aquinas on Malicious Acts, III-K

Colleen McCluskey (Saint Louis University)

Thomas Aquinas argues for an account of human action that is firmly rooted within the eudemonistic tradition. A course of action's at least being perceived as good in some respect is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for choice. In light of this, one wonders how to explain those cases where human beings fail to do the right thing, especially when they perform actions that they clearly recognize as evil. Aquinas is cognizant of such cases and is aware of his duty to provide an accurate and satisfying explanation of them. In this paper, first I discuss Aquinas's account of action in general and then his account of evil actions, especially those that appear to us to be particularly heinous. I conclude that a wholly successful account of these actions rests ultimately upon Aquinas's theory of character development.

Temporal Overlap is Coincidence, II-E

Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)

It is widely believed that four-dimensionalism has the resources needed for solving the puzzles of material constitution, while three-dimensionalism does not. I argue that this belief is mistaken. Problems facing three-dimensionalist solutions to these puzzles reappear under the four-dimensionalist translation scheme. Four-dimensionalists thus gain no advantage by appealing to partial temporal overlap, since such overlap amounts to coincidence. Many three- and four-dimensionalists, I claim, labor under two false assumptions: (1) that partial temporal overlap is innocent if partial spatial overlap is innocent; and (2) because four-dimensionalists employ a notion of absolute parthood, while three-dimensionalists typically don't, four-dimensionalists are untouched by difficulties about temporally relative parthood.

From Reflective to Hermeneutical Phenomenology: The Young Heidegger's Critique of Husserl, V-D

Sean J. McGrath (University of Toronto)

While working as Husserl's assistant, the young Heidegger radicalized phenomenology by applying intentionality analysis and phenomenological reduction to the problem of historical experience. Husserl believed that an apodictic account of essences was possible through controlled reflection on conscious acts. The young Heidegger, by contrast, assumed a self-deceptive tendency lodged at the heart of the being that we are, an inability to think our own historicity. Phenomenology becomes hermeneutical, the interpretation of that which can be otherwise, and the provisional thematization of that which is concealed, forgotten, distorted, or repressed. Husserl's Cartesianism is overcome as Heidegger experiments with methods for outflanking self-deceptive consciousness. The result is a perspectival and interpretive phenomenology that aims at a rigorous account of historical life as it is lived by us.

Instrumental Reasoning and the Motivational Power of Beliefs, I-H

Chris D. Meyers (Southern Methodist University)

The "conativist" theory of motivation, which claims that all motivation has its source in some desire of the agent, ultimately fails to adequately explain intentional action. The conativist theory implies that all practical reasoning is instrumental, i.e., that reason can only influence action through a combination of means/ends beliefs and a desire for the ends. However, a closer look at instrumental reasoning will show that it can explain behavior only if beliefs can motivate action. This is because a desire plus a belief that a particular action is the means to realizing that desire results not in another desire but in a belief that one ought to do that action. Thus conativism is incompatible with instrumental reasoning. Since instrumental reasoning is a common phenomenon of deliberation and intentional action, any plausible theory of motivation must allow for it to be possible for beliefs to motivate action.

In Defense of Anselmian Trinitarianism: A response to Keith Yandell, V-J

Timothy D. Miller (Trinity Evangelical Divinity School)

Keith Yandell has made significant contributions to the effort to give a logically consistent formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity; in my essay I respond to one peculiar aspect of his contribution. Yandell argues that the Anselmian doctrine of God's logically necessary existence is inconsistent with Trinitarian Theism because it prohibits the Theist from making any metaphysical distinction between members of the Trinity. He also argues that the non-Anselmian doctrine of God's logically contingent existence does allow the Theist to give an account of metaphysical distinctions. He concludes that in
order to be logically consistent, Trinitarian Theists ought to reject the Anselmian doctrine. I argue that there are two problematic premises in Yandell's argument and that, depending on how these premises are understood, his argument is either invalid or unsound. Either way, his argument fails to demonstrate any inconsistency in Anselmian Trinitarianism.

The Many Challenges of Republic II, II-K

John M. Mouracade (Oklahoma Baptist University)

In Republic II, the moral life is attacked in order to provoke Socrates into defending the prudential value of being moral. Socrates comes to the defense of morality and the remainder of the Republic contains his response to the challenge of Book II. But Glaucon and Adeimantus phrase the challenge in numerous ways. Although the importance of Book II's challenge has long been recognized and often commented on, few have addressed how we should understand the various challenges put forth by Glaucon and Adeimantus. Richard Kraut suggests that we take these as interchangeable. In this paper, I support and defend Kraut's suggestion while arguing that this view has the unforeseen consequence that pleasure is central to the defense of the moral life. I conclude by showing that this understanding of Book II fits well with the proofs of Book IX, especially the two arguments explicitly connecting justice and pleasure.

The Explanatory Power of Skeptical Scenarios, III-G

Peter J. Murphy (Utah State University)

One way of using skeptical scenarios to show that we have no knowledge of the external world draws on underdetermination. Central to the ensuing argument is the claim that a properly selected skeptical scenario explains one's evidence — taken as one's perceptual states — as well as real world hypotheses do. I address two challenges to this claim. According to one, real world hypotheses provide a better explanation of the modal structure of our perceptual states than skeptical scenarios do. According to the other, real world hypotheses better explain the regularities and anomalies that show up in different sequences of perceptual states. I argue that the first anti-skeptical challenge fails, and that the second does not, in any clear way, succeed.

Compositionality without Conceptuality? Evans' Generality Constraint Reconsidered, I-E

Bence Nanay (University of California, Berkeley)

The advocates and the opponents of the idea of nonconceptual content both accept that a mental state has conceptual content if and only if it is compositional. The aim of this paper is to question this premise and suggest that compositionality is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for conceptual content. The widely accepted account of compositionality is Gareth Evans' Generality Constraint. I will analyse what Evans meant by the Generality Constraint and
compositionality. After showing that the majority of both the supporters and the opponents of the idea of nonconceptual content regard the Generality Constraint as a sufficient condition for conceptual content, arguments are provided against this assumption. I will also examine whether it is consistent with Evans' text to claim that compositional mental states are not necessarily conceptual. Finally, I will examine what consequences this claim bears on the nonconceptual content debate.

The Kantian Moral Ideal: Reflections on Onora O'Neill's account of the Categorical Imperative, IV-J

William N. Nelson (University of Houston)

An important question for moral theory is how to characterize the attitude of a moral person. In Kantian terms, this is the question of how to characterize a good will. For Kant, a person with a good will evaluates options by applying the categorical imperative. But Kant offers what appear to be more than one distinct conceptions of this imperative. Onora O'Neill has tried to show that, (as Kant believes), the formula of universal law is equivalent to the formula of the end in itself. I argue that, in trying to show this, she stretches each idea beyond its natural meaning and, in the process, produces an account of morality with unreasonable consequences. At the end, I sketch, very briefly, a possible account of a minimal Kantian ideal in which the central commitment is a commitment to equality.

Autonomy and Self-Identity, V-G

Marina Oshana (Bowling Green State University)

In discussions of autonomous agency, little attention is paid to how a person conceives of herself. This paper explores two questions. One, in what fashion is autonomous agency dependent upon and characterized in terms of the person's conception of herself? Two, insofar as a person's conception of herself informs her autonomy, must the agent endorse, or at least fail to repudiate, the elements constitutive of her self-conception? I shall argue that while one's self-conception is an essential component of autonomy, autonomy does not require that an agent's self-conception be authentic in a standard sense.

Elmer's Befuddlement and the "Naive" Direct Reference Theory, II-G

Thomas W. Peard (Baker University)

In Nathan Salmon's prominent work Frege's Puzzle, he poses a neo-Fregean puzzle for a semantic theory that he calls the "(doubly) modified naive theory" (MNT). MNT is a version of the direct reference theory (DRT) which holds that the semantic content of a singular term, as used in a given context, is its referent in that context. While Salmon believes that DRT is true, he claims that ultimately MNT fails because it cannot adequately resolve a puzzle about belief which arises from an example he calls Elmer's Befuddlement. In this paper I argue that, contrary to Salmon's view, MNT is capable of resolving this puzzle. I
argue further that MNT is to be preferred to Salmon's version of the direct reference theory because, unlike MNT, Salmon's theory invokes the problematic notion of guises of propositions which are akin to Fregean senses.

Wanting Isn't Trying: Why Kane's Response to the Chance Objection Fails, III-F

James Petrik (Ohio University)

Libertarian accounts of freedom are often charged with reducing free choices to mere "chance" events that do not meaningfully engage the agent's motivational psychology and thus do not ground ascriptions of moral responsibility. Robert Kane argues that this objection can be overcome by viewing free choices as occurring in situations where an agent has equally strong desires to pursue each of several incompatible courses of action. According to Kane, such occasions may involve a real metaphysical indeterminacy concerning which action is chosen; nonetheless, the eventual action chosen connects meaningfully with the agent's motivational psychology in that the action is something the agent was "trying and wanting to do all along." I argue that Kane's response to the chance objection fails because it conflates the concepts of "wanting" and "trying".

The Instruction of Ethics by Tragedy: Ricoeur's Reading of Antigone in Oneself as Another, II-J

Robert Piercey (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur interrupts the development of his "little ethics" to discuss Sophocles's Antigone. It is far from clear why he does so, or what the discussion of the play adds to the book's argument. This paper shows that Ricoeur's reading of Antigone makes a crucial contribution to the ethics developed in Oneself as Another. First, the paper offers some background to the topic by briefly discussing Hegel's reading of Antigone, and explaining how it has guided subsequent interpretations of the play. Next, it examines Ricoeur's discussion of Antigone in The Symbolism of Evil, in order to show how Ricoeur's approach to the play in this early work differs from Hegel's. Finally, it explains why the reading of Antigone in Oneself as Another sheds important light on Ricoeur's views about what moral philosophy can and cannot achieve.

Do Wrongdoers Have a Right to Make Amends?, V-G

Linda Radzik (Texas A&M University and University of Minnesota,
Twin Cities)

Do people deserve a chance to right the wrongs they have committed? Would denying an offender the opportunity to make amends amount to an injustice? It turns out that there are many reasons to grant such a right. However, there is also one powerful objection to a right to make amends. This alleged right threatens to put undue pressure on victims to forgive their abusers. In this essay, I will argue that this objection can be met and that wrongdoers do indeed have a right to make amends.

Dissecting Juristic Trickery: Kant on Punishment and the Social Contract, II-F

Frederick Rauscher (Michigan State University)

I assess Kant's responses to Cesare Beccaria's argument that capital punishment is wrong because no one could will in a social contract to lose one's own life. Because Kant agrees with Beccaria that punishment is harm done by the state to a person against the person's will, and because Kant also agrees that the social contract is a product of the will, he must explain how punishment nonetheless is not a contradiction in will. I review various arguments Kant uses in his unpublished Nachla8 and his published Doctrine of Right to attempt to resolve this problem, showing why he rejects most of these approaches. The successful argument Kant finally uses reveals the nature of the rational will in Kant.

A Semantic Approach to Kant's Practical Philosophy, II-F

Timothy Rosenkoetter (University of Chicago)

Kant's practical philosophy is usually interpreted so that Kant is ultimately arguing from a view about what we are (namely, free beings). I propose that Kant argues not from what we are but from what we can refer to. The fundamental practical question underlying Kant's more obvious concerns is: what can be an object for our rationally directed capacity of desire? I sketch the practical analogues of reference and truth, guided by Reflexion 6660: "The expression `it is good' expresses a relation to desire as the expression `it is true' a relation to belief." I motivate this semantic approach by showing that the distinction between metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals is not ontological. It is, instead, founded upon the distinction between two actions of the subject's spontaneity (judgments vs. maxims), each of which aims at correspondence to its own kind of objective correlate (spatio-temporal objects vs. a good will).

Carnap's Aufbau Rehabilitated, V-E

C. Wade Savage (University of Minnesota)

Michael Friedman and others maintain that Carnap in his Aufbau was involved in a Kantian project to explain how intersubjective knowledge arises from individual intrasubjective experience, and not in the phenomenalist project of reducing all knowledge to sensational experience. I contend that, although the Kantian influence is present, the project was initially phenomenalist, and that Carnap came to realize that it was unachievable for the reason Quine gives. I suggest, however, that the project can be reconstrued as a viable computational version of foundationalism, and that Carnap himself may have suggested how to construe it in this manner.

Neutrality of Justification vs. Strong Egalitarianism: Wall's Criticisms of Rawlsian Liberal Neutrality, IV-H

Walter E. Schaller (Texas Tech University)

In a recent article ("Neutrality and Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy, 98 [2001]), Steven Wall criticizes two ways in which defenders of neutrality of justification (NJ) might seek to limit the state's responsibility for the non-neutral outcomes of laws and policies (and thereby neutrality of effect). They could invoke the intending/foreseeing distinction but this would bring NJ into conflict with strong egalitarianism (which holds the state responsible for at least some unintended, non-neutral outcomes) and which is endorsed by many justificatory neutralists. They might also appeal to the distinction between two kinds of disadvantage—resource and environmental—and hold the state responsible only for intended environmental disadvantages. Focusing on Rawls as a representative proponent of neutrality of justification, I argue that it is possible to reconcile neutrality of justification and strong egalitarianism without appealing either of those two problematic distinctions.

The Status of Parts of Animals and the Elements in Aristotle's Physics II.1 and Metaphysics Z.16, I-J

Margaret Scharle (University of California, Los Angeles)

In Physics II.1 Aristotle claims that plants, animals and their parts, and the elements (earth, air, fire, and water) have a nature (192b10-15) and thus are substances (192b34). Often Metaphysics Z.16 (1040b5-10) is cited to show that Physics II.1's list of substances is provisional, and that Aristotle's considered opinion is that parts of animals and the elements are not substances, but only "potencies". By appealing to a distinction neglected by commentators despite its central importance—Physics II.1's distinction between having a nature and being a nature—I show that the passages are compatible: there is a sense in which parts of animals and the elements have a nature and thus are substances (as Physics II.1 claims) and a sense in which they are a (material) nature and thus are not substances (as Metaphysics Z.16 claims).

Hegel's Theory of Refutation: The Cases of Spinoza and Leibniz, V-H

Daniel J. Selcer (DePaul University)

Most work on Hegel's relationship to figures in the history of philosophy revolves around his detailed analyses of particular figures in his lectures on the history of philosophy or his general programmatic claims in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I argue that Hegel's Science of Logic develops a theory of philosophical refutation in confrontation with the ontologies of Spinoza and Leibniz. This theory is part of a methodological strategy that seeks to appropriate potentially opposing historical positions by developing their implications beyond the limits imposed by their original authors, instead of offering counter-
arguments or pointing to conceptual flaws. Examining Hegel's engagement with Spinoza and Leibniz in the Logic, I demonstrate that Hegelian refutation is the reanimation and extension of a philosophical position rather than its rejection.

The Moral Theory of Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749): Lockean `Reflection' and the Foundations of Morality, IV-E

Patricia Sheridan (University of Guelph)

Locke's moral theory has long been criticized for its failure to make clear how his epistemological principles could provide the foundations for his realist natural law theory. Cockburn's response to Locke's eighteenth-century critics emphasizes an aspect of Locke's theory of ideas of which he himself makes little use in his moral theory. Cockburn argues that it is by reflecting upon the operations of our own minds that we can reach an understanding of both human and divine nature. According to Cockburn, morality is grounded in human nature, and the truth of moral laws is guaranteed by the fact that humans are designed by God. Her emphasis throughout remains focused on human nature as the foundation of morality and on God's nature as the guarantee of its truth.

Assessing the Case Against A Posteriori Physicalism, II-E

Warren E. Shrader (University of Notre Dame)

This paper assesses arguments by Frank Jackson and Daniel Stoljar against a posteriori physicalism, which can be formulated as the thesis that while every mental state is identical to a physical state, some of the statements expressing these identities are knowable only a posteriori. Stoljar claims his argument is an advance in the debate over Jackson's in that it does not rely on a controversial thesis about the nature of necessary truths, a thesis Stoljar claims is crucial to the soundness of Jackson's argument. I discuss and clarify this thesis, arguing that Jackson actually relies on a slightly different version of the thesis. I then show that Stoljar's argument, depending on how it is interpreted, is either invalid or still requires the truth of the controversial thesis. I conclude by defending Jackson's argument against possible objections explicit or implicit in the work of Ned Block, Robert Stalnaker, Chris Hill and Brian McLaughlin.

Descartes on Composite Natures, I-K

Justin Skirry (Purdue University)

In this paper, I examine Descartes' remarks on invented and true and immutable natures composed of really distinct parts found in the First Replies in order to shed some light on his conception of mind-body union. Based on these considerations, I criticize the previously unchallenged view prevalent among scholars that causal interaction constitutes the union of mind and body. I show that to understand the union in this way is to misconceive it as the nature of the body being contained in the nature of the mind since the capacity for
motion, which is a demonstrable property of the body, is being mistakenly attributed to the mind. Hence, Descartes' conception of mind-body union would be invented and not true and immutable on this account. In the end, this is a serious challenge to the interactionist view and points to the need for serious reconsideration of this aspect of Descartes' metaphysics.

Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons, I-E

Donald P. Smith (University of Notre Dame)

I know that I exist. That is, I know that there is something identical with me. But I don't just know that. I also know that I definitely exist. That is, I know that there is something definitely identical with me. Let us call this the thesis of definite existence for persons, hereafter, DEP. For maximal precision, I express the thesis with respect to me in terms as follows: (DEP) $x definitely I = x. The conjunction of DEP and a widely held view about the source of the vagueness of singular terms, viz. the theory of semantic indecision, entails that I am not a composite material object. Accordingly, if DEP and this view are true, then either I am a simple material object or I am an immaterial soul.

Free Choice and Moral Character: A Difficulty for Libertarians, III-F

Thomas B. Talbott (Willamette University)

In my paper, I raise some questions concerning the strange libertarian idea that, in the words of Robert Kane, free agents "make themselves into the kinds of persons they are" and pose something of a challenge to it as well. I also challenge the common libertarian assumption that bad choices typically reinforce a bad character even as good choices typically reinforce a good character. For more often than not, the effects that our choices have upon our own character are neither predictable nor under our own control.

The Conclusion of Practical Reason, II-H

Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)

Aristotle's contention that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action often baffles action theorists. I will first examine a few reasons to object to this contention; these objections seem to support the view that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. However, I'll argue that this isn't a tenable position, and I'll propose a way to understand Aristotle's contention that can overcome these objections.

A Three-dimensional Analysis of Reasoning, V-F

Mariam Thalos (University of Utah)

Descartes held that reasoning is a universal instrument, rendering service in every kind of problem that can be faced. And on that basis he denied nonhuman beasts a faculty of reasoning, in any increment. David Hume, by contrast, maintained that the all-purpose machine is impossible, on grounds that there can be no such thing as a rule for generalizing from experience. And on that basis he affirmed that the reasoning power of beasts is continuous with that of humans—and that, moreover, all of reasoning owes a great deal to instinct. I shall argue there is a means of harmonizing these two positions, by introducing distinctions that enable a finer-grained, three-dimensional analysis of this thing called "reasoning." The analysis will shed light on the vexed question of whether the mind is a representing, computational organ (whether the mind is a site for information storage, retrieval and processing) by illuminating reasons why study of an organism's physical organization—its body—is important to study of its mind.

Plurals and Simples, III-E

Gabriel Uzquiano (University of Rochester)

I argue that statements ostensibly about composite material objects cannot be paraphrased in terms of plural reference and quantification over simples alone. Nor will it do to attempt to generalize the devices of plural reference and plural quantification to include plurally plural reference and quantification or even to postulate the existence of higher-order plural properties of simples. We do better if we help ourselves to singular reference and quantification over sets of simples, but, as a result, we obtain paraphrases that invite to the identification of what appear to be composite material objects with sets of simples. But this is not a welcome outcome for someone who plainly denies that there are material objects such as chairs, tables, or planets.

The Sublime is Not Now: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Dispute, I-F

Bart P. Vandenabeele (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium)

First, I argue against the traditional view of Schopenhauer's theory of the sublime that stresses the role the sublime plays in bridging the wide gap between aesthetics and ethics. Although this traditional interpretation is definitely influenced by Nietzsche, I do not maintain it is exclusively Nietzschean as such. Secondly, I offer some points of contention concerning their accounts of the feeling of the sublime, mainly focussing on the kind of `split subjectivity' involved. I will show that Nietzsche's analysis of Dionysian intoxication cannot be taken to simply develop out of Schopenhauer's philosophy. I argue that Nietzsche's philosophy of music although highly influenced by Schopenhauer's cannot as easily be reconciled with Schopenhauer's theory as is commonly believed, due to their differing accounts of the nature of the feeling of the sublime.

Aristotle On The Best Good: Is Nicomachean Ethics 1094a18-22 Fallacious?, II-K

Peter B.M. Vranas (Iowa State University)

The first sentence of NE I.2 has roughly the form: "If A [there is a universal end] and B (because, if not-B, then C), then D [this end will be the best good]". According to some commentators, Aristotle uses B to infer A; but then the sentence is fallacious. According to other commentators, Aristotle does not use B (until later on); but then the sentence is bizarre. Contrary to both sets of commentators (but following Wedin 1981), I suggest that Aristotle uses B together with A to infer validly that there is a non-instrumental—and thus unique—universal end (hence D). On this interpretation the above two problems disappear, but a subtler problem emerges: not-B does not entail C.

How Hegel Defends Kantian Freedom, by Reconceiving Its Relation to Being and Nature, V-H

Robert M. Wallace (Colgate University)

Hegel shares Kant's conception of freedom as transcending the agent's finite, more or less natural characteristics, but he wants to show that in doing this, freedom is not radically opposed to nature, but instead it consummates nature by achieving a kind of "reality" that nature itself aims at but fails to achieve, and thus it does not need to be located in a fundamentally different realm from nature—nor does it need to present itself to a different "standpoint" from that to which nature presents itself. The paper explains Hegel's little-appreciated solution to this Kantian problem by explaining in some detail, and defending against influential critics, his most complete statement of that solution, in the argument leading up to the "true infinity," in the first part of his Science of Logic.

The Role of Indirect Passions in Hume's Ethics, IV-E

Andrew C. Ward (Georgia Institute of Technology)

In his The Analogy of Reason, Joseph Butler claimed that every person is "conscious that he is now the same person or self he was, as far back as his remembrance reaches." For Butler, if there is no "simple, uncompounded, spiritual substance", the "present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday," and there can be no responsibility for past actions. In contrast, Hume claims that while some people may have an experience of such a self, he is "certain there is no such principle" in him. More radically, Hume says that he, along with the rest of mankind, is nothing but a "bundle or collection of different perceptions." In this paper I argue that by focusing on Hume's accounts of indirect passions and personal identity it is possible, contrary to Butler's assertion, to reconcile moral responsibility for past actions with a "bundle concept of self."

A Morally Unsurpassable God Must Create the Best, V-J

Erik J. Wielenberg (DePauw University)

I present a novel argument for the position that a morally unsurpassable God must create the best world that He has the power to create. The argument is based on certain claims about virtue and the nature of unsurpassable moral goodness. I then defend the argument against grace-based considerations of the sort proposed by Robert Adams.

On the Necessity of the Death Penalty in Kant's Moral and Political Philosophy
Benjamin S. Yost, University of California, Berkeley

In this presentation, I will discuss the importance of the death penalty in Kant's moral and political philosophy. In my view, Kant's explicit arguments for the death penalty in the Metaphysics fail. But I still think the death penalty is a fundamental component of Kant's thought. I will first suggest that Kant's view of the death penalty is rooted in his concept of the person, or more specifically, within the relation to death that is correlative to becoming a person. I will then argue that the death penalty is a necessary component of Kant's philosophy of right, because he thinks that if a civil society lacked the death penalty, it would be unable to recognize itself as a just civil society — a society that respects the personality of its citizens — and would be incapable of actualizing a just system of laws.

Is Conscious Will an Illusion?, III-F

Jing Zhu (University of Waterloo)

Daniel Wegner develops a detailed account of the experience of willing as an illusion in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (Wegner 2002). In this paper I will critically examine Wegner's account and show that in his account there are unwarranted leaps on lines of reasoning, which considerably decreases its empirical plausibility and conceptual coherence. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of conscious will, which are relevant to our general understanding of human agency, freedom and moral responsibility, are largely left out in Wegner's discussion of conscious will. This substantially diminishes its implications and significance for some profound philosophical issues.