Of Theories of Coercion, Two Axes, and Some Grinding (II-H)

Scott Anderson, University of British Columbia

In this essay, I argue that recent accounts of coercion can be mapped onto two different axes: whether they focus on the situation of the coercee or the activities of the coercer, and whether or not they depend upon moral judgments in their analysis of coercion. I argue that almost no recent theories have seriously explored a non-moralized, coercer-focused approach to coercion. I offer some reasons to think that a theory in this unexplored quadrant offers some important advantages over theories lodged in the other quadrants. In particular, I suggest that it is crucial to thought about coercion to focus on the willingness and ability of the coercer to use his powers against the coercee.

 

Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer (IV-G)

Chrisoula Andreou, University of Utah

But, as can be seen via consideration of the puzzle of the self-torturer, conduct of the relevant sort can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. In particular, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. It follows from the reasoning in my paper that being sympathetic and well-informed may not be enough to prevent us from destroying the earth. We may also need to settle on sub-optimal options that are within the range of acceptable. If we don't, we will arguably end up stuck with sub-optimal options that are well outside the range of acceptable.

 

Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? (VI-G)

Murat Aydede, University of Florida

According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain, feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. This paper examines some of the main difficulties for such views that naturally stem from our ordinary conception of pain and tentatively concludes that the defenders of these views have not yet adequately solved them. The tentative nature of the conclusion is meant to highlight the exploratory nature of the discussion; thus, the arguments presented here against perceptual accounts are meant to pose challenges for their defenders-challenges that have yet to be met.

 

Horkheimer's Materialist Stance (III-H)

J.C. Berendzen, Loyola University of New Orleans

For many, the word "materialism" refers to a metaphysical position, but for critical theory, springing from the work of Marx, materialism is different. Marxian materialism, as developed in Max Horkheimer's critical theory, foregoes metaphysical theorizing in favor of social research that focuses on people's lived circumstances, especially suffering. One may argue, however, that critical theory should still recognize its material ontological commitments. But if we see Horkheimer as using a materialist stance, using the notion of stance developed by Bas van Fraassen, we can make sense of the materialist rejection of metaphysics. The critical theory which comes out of the materialist stance should be seen not as merely ignoring metaphysical underpinnings that should be investigated. The rejection of metaphysics is not the rejection of theory; rather, it is the acceptance that theory begins from a particular value-driven standpoint that cannot be ontologically grounded.

 

Re-Writing the Transcendental Moment: Merleau-Ponty on Novel Expression and Rationality (V-G)

Kirk Besmer, Gonzaga University

I present Merleau-Ponty's account of novel expression, developed in the middle period of his career, as a response to a long-standing problem for phenomenology, namely articulating how natural language can be transformed to adequately express transcendental insights. I argue that by integrating Saussurian linguistics with the phenomenological concepts of the "living present" and "evidential motivation," Merleau-Ponty articulates an account of language that provides for the possibility of novel expression whereby language escapes its historical conditioning to express new truths. I conclude by claiming that Merleau-Ponty's account of novel expression is nothing less than a re-writing of the transcendental moment, which is no longer the privilege of the properly purified transcendental ego but belongs to the speaking subject fully at home a living, natural language.

 

Putting Zombies to Rest: The Role of Dynamics in Reduction (III-F)

Peter Bokulich, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

I argue that property dualism is not supported by the purported logical possibility of qualitative zombies. Chalmers's analysis of the logical supervenience of ordinary macroscopic facts on microphysical facts fails to account properly for causal properties. His arguments rely too heavily on kinematic facts and thereby obscure the dynamical facts at the macroscopic and microscopic levels. A proper analysis of the relation between causal and dynamical properties at different levels reveals that we can only imagine qualitative zombies if we beg the question against qualia being physical.

 

Surface Externalism: Confronting the Dark Side of Twin Earth (III-F)

David Bourget, University of Toronto

This paper is a response to a recurrent criticism of Putnam's Twin Earth argument for externalism. Imaginative thought experiments suggest that
we do not systematically individuate natural kinds by their deep structure. Internalists such as Segal (2000, ch.5) take this to refute Putnam's argument. This criticism has been largely ignored, so I first bring out its force. I then address it by divorcing externalism from the deep-structure essentialism associated with it by Putnam. This is made possible by the introduction of a new externalist account of reference-fixing. In the process, I expound evidence of a new kind for externalism.

 

Axiomatic Boethius vs. Dialectical Aquinas in De Hebdomadibus (VI-F)

Carlos Bovell, Institute for Christian Studies

Although Boethius and Aquinas share many things in common with respect to their understandings of the relationship between philosophy and theology, an examination of Boethius's De Hebdomadibus and Aquinas's An Exposition of the "On the Hebdomads" of Boethius shows that there remain significant differences between them. The differences include different understandings of the types and roles of proof appropriate to theology; different conceptions of the limits of philosophy for theological reflection; and different understandings of the nature of theology. All three of these are illustrated in this essay during the course of an exposition of the horns of a dilemma that Boethius sets up toward the beginning of his third theological tractate.

 

Russell's Theory of Descriptions vs. the Predicative Analysis: A Reply to Graff (I-H)

Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri_St. Louis

In "Descriptions as Predicates'' Delia Graff argues against Russell that descriptions should not be treated as quantified noun phrases but rather as complex predicate expressions. To support this claim, she first argues that predicative descriptions do not give rise to the sorts of scope ambiguities they would give rise to if they were quantifiers. She then argues that a predicative semantics, unlike a quantificational semantics, does not require us to posit an ambiguity in the indefinite and definite articles of descriptions. In this paper, I present a number of objections to Graff's results, based on a reassessment of the data.

 

Chasing Chimeras: Aesthetic Constructions of the Animal (IV-E)

Brett Buchanan, DePaul University

In this paper, I examine the writings of Derrida and Kofman to locate how they each speak of the animal's gaze. I begin by briefly addressing the animal's face, particularly as posed by Levinas, but then turn to Derrida's analyses in his essay "The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)." The themes I follow concern how we "named" the animal, how the animal's gaze illustrates "our" human nudity and innocence before the animal, the shame and embarrassment "we" feel when confronted with the questioning animal, and how the animal's gaze mirrors our own selves as human animals. I then turn to Kofman's analysis of a painting by Balthus in her book Mélancholie de l'art. This painting picks up many of the above themes, all of which revolve around the issue of how we see ourselves, literally and figuratively, in relation to the animal's gaze.

 

Kant on the Diabolical Will: A Neglected Alternative? (III-G)

Matthew Caswell, Boston University

Kant's prohibition on diabolical agency turns on the necessary conditions of accountable immorality. That is, because freedom and moral obligation reciprocally entail each other, a diabolical agency "exempt" from the moral incentive could not be held accountable, and thus could not count as evil. But this appears to leave open a neglected alternative: Couldn't a will subject to moral obligation nevertheless subordinate its moral interest to a love of evil for its own sake? I show that this possibility can be excluded upon consideration of the logic of rational agency. Kant's opposition to the demonization of evil is thereby vindicated.

 

Vice Versa (VI-H)

Dale Clark, University of Utah

In her book Uneasy Virtue, Julia Driver presents an account of virtue according to which certain character traits are morally virtuous when they generally lead to good consequences for society. Various philosophers have taken Driver to task over this account of virtue, which she terms "pure evaluational externalism." One concern is that in accepting Driver's account of virtue one embraces the idea that if the world were drastically different, traits traditionally understood as pernicious would be virtuous. It may even turn out that in our own world some of our more repugnant character traits have simply been misunderstood. While these writers have speculated as to the forms such nouveau virtues might take, the purpose of this essay is actually to identify just such a new virtue, in the very world in which we live.

 

"Predicates and Properties" (I-H)

Anthony Corsentino, Harvard University

This paper discusses a question of considerable recent interest in the philosophy of language: whether predicates of ordinary language manifest contentual context-dependence. Contextualist treatments of a predicate maintain that its literal content varies from one context of use to another, either in accordance with lexical principles (as semantic contextualists maintain), or in ways that are linguistically uncontrolled (as pragmatic contextualists maintain). The standard alternative to contextualism is implicaturism, which holds that what varies with context is not the predicate's literal content, but what its use additionally conveys. "Predicates and Properties'' briefly surveys the reasons for adopting these approaches and raises objections to each. It then proposes an alternative account of predicate context-dependence, whose cardinal feature is its rejection of an assumption that the competing approaches share and is responsible for their defects: viz., that the literal content of a predicate determines its extension.

 

The Worldly and Human Significance of Art: An Exercise in Understanding through Arendt and Gadamer (I-G)

James Couch, Southern Illinois University

The paper being submitted concerns the importance of the work of art for Hannah Arendt. Looking at the dangerous tendency of mass society to
deem individuals superfluous and how society's constrictive character disallows a fuller disclosure of appearances, we can begin to see the importance Arendt places on being able to see differently than the everyday concern with life and utility. The work of art provides objects capable of withstanding such a foreclosure of appearance, giving us a world from which meaning can be found, ultimately allowing us to exercise our understanding of ourselves and others. Hans-Georg Gadamer offers further insight into the experience of art, by awakening ourselves to the experience with art, developing a "hermeneutic vigilance" that fosters the way in which we can come to more fully see and appreciate the individuality that is essentially a part of being human.

 

Gossip and Higher-Order Intentionality (VI-H)

Margaret Cuonzo, Long Island University

In contrast to recent attempts to redeem gossip from its long-standing characterization as an immoral activity, gossip in this essay is shown to involve a subtle form of deception. Central to the present account is an analysis of the speaker's intentions, in particular what the speaker believes the subject of the gossip would like to be revealed, as well as the speaker's own disinclination to engage in gossip in the presence of the subject of the discussion. This account is supported by intuitions that, seemingly, any competent speaker of a natural language would share, Gricean rules for communicative success, the pertinence of moral claims to gossip, and, finally, some recent work on the evolution of language. Such a view has some interesting consequences, such as that gossip turns out to be an activity that can only be justified in terms of its consequences and the limited options of its users. In addition, gossip need not be thought to refer to "personal" or "private" topics of conversation.

 

Numbers and Electrons (II-G)

Cian Dorr, University of Pittsburgh

Someone who doesn't believe in subatomic particles can "explain" all the facts putatively explained by subatomic particles by appeal to the theory that as far as non-subatomic particles are concerned, it is as if a given theory of the subatomic were true. Likewise, a nominalist can "explain" all the facts putatively explained by numbers by appeal to the theory that if such- and-such mathematical axioms were true and the concrete world were just as it actually is, such-and-such platonistic theory would be true. Give the similarities between these theories, one might suppose that the latter theory must be just as worthless as an explanation as the former. I argue that this is a mistake: it misses an epistemologically important difference between necessity-like operators and possibility-like operators.

 

Is There Something It is Like? (VI-G)

Simon Evnine, University of Miami

In this paper, I argue that there are problems in understanding Nagel's notion that there is something that it is like to be a bat, or a human. Various models are explored for attempting to make sense of it. "There is something it is like to be an S" might simply be a pleonastic transformation of "Ss have conscious experiences." In that case, however, the "what it is like" will not have the requisite ontological depth to sustain Nagel's claims about it. It might be a brute fact, but that is mysterious. Finally, I explore whether it can be shown to be related to the "what it is like"s of an S's sensory experiences. But this avenue too runs into problems.

 

The Neutrality of Rightness and the Indexicality of Goodness: Beyond Objectivity and Back Again (II-E)

Iskra Fileva, Boston University

According to objectivist moral theories the viewpoint which an individual has to adopt in deciding how to act is the objective viewpoint, the questions, "What should I do?" and "What is the right thing to do objectively speaking?" are, according to such theories, one and the same question. Critics have charged that purely objective reasoning in practical matters is impossible for humans, or else is undesirable because too cold or else is too demanding.
I believe that objectivist moral accounts are misguided but not for the reasons pointed out by their critics. The questions, "What should I do?" and "What is the right thing to do objectively speaking?" differ because the latter question is not a question about me; the objectively right course of action may, and in all likelihood does, require the efforts of others besides me. But neither is it the case that I can find out what I should do by simply subtracting what others should do from what I and they collectively have to do. No, because others may very well fail to perform what they should. If they fail, I may need to make up for that failure by taking on some of their duties. But a decision to perform someone else's duties, I wish to hold, is not taken from an objective viewpoint, since to fulfill someone else's duties is to do more than could be objectively required of one. I shall maintain in this regard that attempts to bridge the gap between what others should do and what they actually do are to be qualified as "virtue." I shall then claim that the demand of objectivity in turn place constraints upon virtue. Finally, I shall hold that while rightness is "neutral"-the right thing to do must be right period-virtue is "indexical"-the virtuous thing to do is always virtuous on someone's part.

 

Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms (IV-H)

Greg Frost-Arnold, University of Pittsburgh

The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as "Santa Claus," has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort is directed at developing an acceptable formal semantics based upon an informal and intuitive idea introduced by Field (1973) and discussed by Camp (2001); their basic strategy is to use supervaluations. Their idea, as it stands, encounters serious difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply-signifying terms are also presented. Finally, the relative merits of the three semantics are briefly discussed.

 

Dilemmas of Rawlsian Opportunity (I-I)

Paul Gomberg, Chicago State University

There are widespread and deep inequalities of opportunity that particularly affect black people in the United States. White people are twice as likely as black people to graduate from college. At every level of educational attainment black men earn much less than white, and the gap is greater for more educational men. Most of this difference seems due to differences in people's occupations; black workers are over represented in lower paying jobs. Can philosophical theories of justice speak to these issues? It would seem that John Rawls's theory of justice, though ideal theory, might provide an expressive basis for rejecting racial inequalities of opportunity, perhaps as a special class of class inequalities. However, Rawls does not reject all class-based effects on life prospects.
In Rawls's philosophy, fair equality of opportunity requires that "those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin." At the same time, he asserts that one's "starting place" in society inevitably affects one's life prospects. How is this apparent contradiction to be resolved?
Rawls believes that one's class of origin tends to affect one's motivation to develop one's "native endowments," even in a well-ordered society. Class of origin affects one's prospects by affecting motivation. This resolution may lead us to question Rawls's sociological assumptions, particularly his beliefs that there were socially important differences in "native endowments" and that social class must affect motivation. If we reject these assumptions, we may seek a more expansive conception of equal opportunity, one that can provide a more adequate basis for rejecting racial disadvantage.

 

Jankélévitch and the Question of Music (IV-F)

Michael Greene, Bradley University

In Europe Jankélévitch along with Bloch and Adorno are widely regarded as the three most important twentieth century philosophers of musical aesthetics, but while Bloch and Adorno are familiar to Americans interested in musical theory, Jankélévitch's thought is largely unknown. One of the most commonly employed metaphors for music is language, and in Music and the Ineffable, Jankélévitch challenges this metaphor, showing how it obscures music's power and charm. Contrasting music with language, Jankélévitch argues that music is inexpressive, but not because it expresses nothing but that it expresses nothing in particular, implying innumerable possibilities of interpretation, leaving us free to choose. Jankélévitch emphasizes the relation between music and time, arguing that there is something about music, like time, that is ineffable, and he examines how those who claim to find metaphysical significance in music ignore what is essential about music.

 

The Will as Reason (V-E)

Pamela Hieronymi, University of California_Los Angeles

I hope here to defend an account of the will as "reason in its practical employment," against a view of the will as an independent capacity for choice. Certain commonplaces seem to reveal the need for an independent faculty of will, to execute judgment in action. However, I will argue that if we think of the will as an independent faculty, we have difficulty accounting for the particular ways in which we are answerable for our willing. Fortunately, we can accommodate the commonplaces and avoid the difficulties by abandoning the assumption that practical reasoning concludes in a judgment. Rather, reasoning which concludes in judgment-reasoning directed at the question of whether p-is theoretical reasoning. Reason in its practical employment is directed at the question of whether to f; it concludes, not in a judgment about f-ing, but rather in an intention to f.

 

Berkeley on "All the Dispute is about a Word" (II-F)

Marc Hight, Hampden-Sydney College

In the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley makes the rather surprising claim that there is no significant distinction between the various qualitatively identical ideas had by distinct finite minds. Disputes about whether distinct finite minds perceive the (numerically) same idea are philosophically idle. This passage is generally regarded as an ill-considered muddle. In this paper, I argue that Berkeley is trying to make a sophisticated distinction that makes sense within the confines of his immaterialist metaphysics. Berkeley invokes a concept I call non-definite distinctness. There are certain sorts of distinctions that, even if metaphysically true, have no practical consequences if you are an immaterialist. I conclude the paper by noting two applications for the distinction within Berkeley's immaterialist system.

 

Self-Ownership and Coercion (II-H)

Robert Hughes, University of California_Los Angeles

Many libertarians accept the self-ownership principle, which is a moral prohibition on most uses of force. In particular, self-ownership prohibits governments from forcibly interfering with people making promises and agreements. If libertarians accept the self-ownership principle because they believe it protects people's autonomy, presumably they believe it is acceptable for governments to interfere with serious forms of coercion (e.g., coercion involving threats to life). Robert Nozick, a notable libertarian, argued plausibly in one of his early articles that a statement that looks superficially like an offer can constitute a serious coercive threat. Governments cannot protect people from such coercive threats without placing limits on their freedom to make promises and agreements. So considerations of autonomy cannot be used to motivate a right-wing libertarian view based on the self-ownership principle, such as Nozick's view in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

 

Intellectual Akrasia: Universal Cause and Action in Aristotle's Poetics (V-H)

Jolanta Jaskolowska, Lexington College

Aristotle argues in the Poetics that poetic composition is more philosophical and more serious than historical writing because it addresses the universal instead of the particular. I argue that the greater universality with which the poet and the spectator understand the action in tragedy is a function of how the poetic composition removes the agent as the formal and efficient cause, substituting an alternative final cause for the action other than the one enunciated by the protagonist. I conclude that this change in our understanding comes about through the reversal of fortune, making the poetic inference a kind of post hoc propter hoc fallacy in which the agency of the protagonist is replaced by a universal sense of providential justice, a conclusion similar in its criticism of poetic reasoning to the Medieval Arab commentators on Aristotle.

 

Rethinking "The Circumstances of Global Justice Non-ideal Conditions (I-I)

Hye-ryoung Kang, University of Colorado_Boulder

In this paper, I am concerned with what kind of circumstances of justice obtain in the current the global context. Nationalism claims that circumstances of justice do not obtain in the global context, and therefore there are no occasions for justice across borders. Cosmopolitanism contends that the Rawlsian concept of the circumstances of justice obtains across borders, and therefore "cosmopolitan principles" are the best remedy in such circumstances of justice. I argue that neither of these views is adequate to capture the current circumstances of justice which are encountered by women across the world, and that neither view is able to provide appropriate remedies for injustice in the global context. I shall offer an alternative, more empirically adequate account of the circumstances of global justice. I will point out that, given this account of the actual circumstances of justice, justice discourse should involve transnational transformative and empowering remedies.

 

In Defense of Musical Ontology (IV-F)

Andrew Kania, Trinity University

Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology. He first argues that musical ontology has no consequences for musical aesthetics or practice, and that no one is in fact, or should be, puzzled by questions of musical ontology. Thus, no one should engage in debate over questions of musical ontology. He then argues that, contrary to musical ontologists' claims, the ontological facts about music depend on facts about its value. I show, first, that Ridley's main argument about the relationship between musical ontology and value fails, since it equivocates on the notion of the "content" of a musical work. Second, I show that his subsidiary argument does not succeed, and that he fails even to keep controversial ontological assumptions out of the very article where he makes these claims. Third, I show how the ontology of music can have important consequences for questions of musical value.

 

Indexicals and Modality (I-H)

Tomis Kapitan, Northern Illinois University

It is widely assumed that indexicals are directly referential; their contribution to the truth-valued content of an utterance are their referents only, and not features used to identify referents, viz., meanings, characters, or modes of presentation. According to David Kaplan, this thesis-henceforth, "DRI"-is allied to the claims that indexicals designate rigidly, that the truth-valued contents of utterances containing indexicals are singular propositions, and that indexicals always take "primary scope" in combination with modalities. I argue that by rendering indexicals modally inert, an account based on DRI cannot accommodate the validity of inferences expressed through indexical utterances. I propose an alternative account that treats indexical tokens on a par with actualized indexical descriptions that are, by that very fact, rigid, amenable to scope distinctions, but not directly referential. Though singular propositions à la Kaplan are abandoned, indexicals are given the modal respect they deserve.

 

An Adverbial Theory of Numbers (II-G)

Joongol Kim, Western Illinois University

In this paper I prove a fundamental fact about numbers that has been unduly ignored, namely that if there are exactly m Fs and there are exactly n Fs, then m must be identical with n. To that end, I present and develop an adverbial theory of numbers.
Imagination and Values: An Exercise in Moral Mapping (II-E)
Edward Kleist, Loyola University of New Orleans
Hume remarked on how our moral value-commitments set limits for what we are willing to imagine. Moral values also guide imagination when we envision variant scenarios and options for action. How do your values reveal themselves through imagining? What does the manner through which your values appear tell us about the nature of values? Imagination furnishes a non-perceptual manner of arriving at moral determinations anchored to the irreducibly first-person experience of moral approval and disapproval. The commitment to one's values, surviving through every willingly imagined alteration of perspective, indicates a subjective necessity to values. At the same time, the values leaving their trace in what we imagine, direct imagination to furnish reasons which necessitate belief and action. This subjective necessity generates an ideal of affective moral consistency and a criterion of suitability for proposed action.

 

Freud Said-Or Simon Says? Informed Consent and the Advancement of Psychoanalysis as a Science (IV-G)

Hylarie Kochiras, University of North Carolina_Chapel Hill

Although human subject research requires voluntary informed consent, psychoanalytic publications escape those requirements by escaping the definition; they lack a systematic methodology. Psychoanalysis instead retains its traditional practice, publishing case material without patient knowledge or consent. Acknowledging risks to current patients, analysts justify traditional practice as benefiting future patients, by advancing
psychoanalysis as a science. Could such a utilitarian defense succeed? I argue that the profession bears two burdens of proof: justify this exemption from medicine's prevailing, autonomy-based ethic; and produce evidence that traditional practice causes greater benefit than harm. Neither burden has been met, but the need to do so is obviated by my further claim. The traditional practice will not produce scientific advances. For scientific progress, methodological reform-a systematic methodology-is needed. Thus, by qualifying as scientific research, psychoanalytic investigations would also qualify as human subject research-and qualify for the consent requirements that govern it.

 

Locke on Substratum: A Deflationary Reading (III-H)

Daniel Z. Korman, University of Texas_Austin

I defend an interpretation of Locke's remarks on substratum according to which the substratum that supports an object's sensible qualities just is the object itself and the support-relation is the ordinary relation of instantiation. So, for instance, to say that there is a substratum that supports redness and roundness is just to say that there is a thing that has this color and this shape, a thing that is red and round. There is no sense whatsoever in which the substratum lacks sensible qualities. I show how this interpretation (unlike leading interpretations) permits a satisfactory explanation of the acquisition of both the idea of substratum and of the complex ideas of substances within a Lockean framework. I then explain how the alleged obscurity of the idea of substratum is to be understood on the proposed interpretation.

Oak Trees and Ashes: An Argument that Identity is Vague and Non-Transitive (V-F)
Robert Lane, University of West Georgia
I argue that diachronic identity (i.e., numerical identity across time) is vague and non-transitive. I begin by showing that the widely discussed Evans-Salmon argument against vague identity is not sound. I then consider a case of extreme biological change-the transformation of an ovary within a female oak tree flower into a mature oak tree. I use this example to argue that such change involves more than one numerically distinct concrete particular; that the transformation from one particular into another yields cases of indeterminate identity; and, finally, that as a result of those indeterminacies, identity is non-transitive.

Courage without Fear (VI-H)

Lawrence A. Lengbeyer, United States Naval Academy

Contrary to the Classical View of the virtue of courage as a disposition to withstand and overcome reasonably experienced fear, I argue that the only persons properly regarded as unqualifiedly brave are those who experience no fear while handling fearsome circumstances. However much we praise, and are impressed by, those who overcome their fears, these persons are not exemplars of ideal courage, but occupy an imperfect state that is somewhat defective. By a process of "shallow" cognizing, the ideally or fully brave person prevents the arousal (or perhaps continuation) of fear, while yet neither suppressing the knowledge or ongoing awareness that is needed
for rational practical reasoning and action, nor losing the benefit of alertness and physiological arousal.

 

Husserl's "Hermeneutical Phenomenology" (I-G)

Sebastian Luft, Marquette University

This paper presents a "hermeneutical" reading of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Disregarding his otherwise "epistemological" concerns in attempting to find an ultimate foundation, one can also find another strain in Husserl's late thought that makes his reflections akin to philosophical hermeneutics. These reflections center on the concepts of "understanding," "prejudices," and "tradition." What makes this approach especially interesting is that Husserl connects it to the question of founding an "unprejudiced" foundation through the Epoché. In this light, the idea of "bracketing" the presuppositions of the natural attitude takes on a new meaning. It is not about putting previous prejudices out of action for the sake of establishing an "absolute" foundation. Instead, a hermeneutical reading sees these prejudices as prejudices and clarifies how they came about from previous subjective activities within the life-world. This idea of genetically reconstructing prejudices from previous activities suggests an interesting alternative to other forms of philosophical hermeneutics.

 

Kant's Theory of Synthesis and the Problem of Universals (III-H)

Mary C. MacLeod, Indiana University of Pennsylvania

I argue that Kant is reasonably read as endorsing a subtle variant of Conceptualism. Even a cursory examination of Kant's theoretical philosophy discovers the thesis that all of nature is mind-dependent, in some sense; after all, he calls his philosophy Transcendental Idealism. Attempting to solve the Problem of Universals, the Standard Conceptualist maintains that generality is to be found only in minds-not in an extra-mentally real order, but only in a conceptual one. Standard Conceptualism faces a familiar objection, but I argue that insofar as Kant's idealism is transcendental his Conceptualism is superior and avoids this objection. It takes work to express the familiar objection in a fashion commensurate with Kant's framework. The objection is still serious, and it is instructive to discover its Kantian projection, but in its new Kantian guise the objection can no longer be posed intelligibly.

 

The Ontology and Scope of Human Rights-Forward with Ockham (VI-F)

A.S. McGrade, University of Connecticut

In this paper I argue that Ockham (1285_1347), sometimes regarded as the chief source for an idea of rights as arbitrary powers of radically isolated individuals, in fact provides a quintessentially "reasonable" conception of natural or human rights which suggests a promising answer to the question of what such rights are, namely, capacities for reasonable activity. "Forward with Ockham!" will not solve all of our problems with rights, but attention to his ideas could help with some of them.

 

A Wave in the Stream of Chaos: Life Beyond the Body in Heidegger's Nietzsche (I-G)

William McNeill, Depaul University

This paper attempts to trace Heidegger's reading of the human body in Nietzsche, as presented in two key sections of Heidegger's 1939 lecture course "The Will to Power as Knowledge." These sections present the body in terms of a "bodying forth" (Leiben) that emerges from chaos and is continually permeated by chaos, the latter comprising the fundamental character of the world, according to Nietzsche. Suspended in the stream of chaos as in the great stream of becoming, the bodying forth of the body attains a steadfastness and stability only in the ongoing schematization of perspectival horizons: a process of schematization that constitutes the fundamental operation of what we call "knowledge." Yet such knowledge, as in each case a fixation of becoming, is surpassed by art, which, conceived metaphysically as a transfiguration of apparently stable, already schematized beings, raises beings into new possibilities and is thus more in harmony with becoming.

 

Emotional Intentionality: Living Meaning in Emotional Experiences (V-G)

Jen McWeeny, John Carroll University

In this paper, I argue that the mechanism of emotional intentionality follows Merleau-Ponty's theory of operative intentionality as described in his Phenomenology of Perception. First, operative intentionality, like emotional intentionality, is necessarily tied to the perspective of an embodied subject. Second, although operative intentionality is tied to a particular perspective, it is constituted by one's practical engagements with a world that is beyond one's total control. Thus, like emotional intentionality, operative intentionality maintains the ontological tension inherent in Brentano's intentionality thesis, namely that the intentional object is experienced as both mind-dependent and mind-independent at the same time. Third, operative intentionality, like emotional intentionality, admits of meaning that is non-propositional and not always present to conscious awareness. Lastly, thinking of emotional intentionality in terms of operative intentionality can explain two phenomenological features that sometimes characterize emotional experiences, namely their urgency and their foreign character.

 

Berkeley's Mental Architecture: A Coherent Account of Intentionality (II-F)

Genevieve Migely, Claremont Graduate University

Berkeley's theory of intentionality has raised much controversy over whether or not his account is structurally and ontologically sound. Some, like David and Alan Hausman, argue that he has no theory of intention since Berkelian ideas are not intentional. Others, like Robert Muehlmann, argue that he may indeed have a theory of intention but it is logically incoherent. Still others, like Charles McCracken, argue that his theory of intention makes his mental ontology implausible. In order to provide a coherent account of intentionality, I will offer a linguistic interpretation of Berkeley's mental architecture consistent with his ontology. Berkeley presents an innovative spiritual structure in which the soul is simple in form yet complex in function. It is this psychic complexity that belies the true nature of Berkeley's intentionality.
A Mêlée without Sacrifice: Jean-Luc Nancy's Ontology of Offering against Jacques Derrida's Politics of Sacrifice (IV-E)
Marie-Eve Morin, University of Freiburg_Germany
In this paper I explore the dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy on community. I propose to compare their concept of singularity and their views on the plurality of singularities. For Derrida, a singularity is something secret and ab-solute, and the plurality of singularities is always sacrificial. For Nancy, singularities are bodies exposed on their limits, constantly involved in a process of entangling and disentangling with others. Only in Nancy is there a place for a genuine plurality, but this conclusion can be downplayed by underlining the difference of level of both projects, namely politics and ontology.

 

Knowing a Name (IV-H)

Geoffrey Pynn, Yale University

Millianism about proper names is often associated with the claim that being a competent user of a name does not require possessing any descriptive knowledge about the name's bearer. In this paper, I offer a reductio of the latter view and an explanation of where it goes wrong. However, this does not mean that Millianism is false. On the contrary, the bad view about competence turns on a premise that is independently threatening to Millianism. By rejecting it, Millians can work to develop a plausible account of competence without tinkering with the semantics of proper names.

 

A Decisive Refutation of Epistemicism (V-F)

Greg Ray and Ivana Simic, University of Florida

We offer a decisive refutation of reliabilist-externalist epistemicism-the view of vagueness held by Timothy Williamson-which is founded on three tenets: 1) reliability of belief is a necessary condition on knowledge, 2) social externalism is true, and 3) vague predicates have precise, non-trivial borderlines. From these, a margin for error doctrine follows: "Where knowledge is inexact, a margin for error principle applies." This in turn yields the characteristic thesis of epistemicism, namely that the apparent lack of borderlines for vague terms is unavoidable ignorance of real borderlines. We give proof positive that the margin for error doctrine, and hence reliabilist-externalist epistemicism, is false. Naturally, it also follows that one of the three tenets is false. Finally, the fact that the epistemic view has the particular weakness which our proof exploits can be seen to rob Williamson's (1994) argument for the borderline thesis, (3), of much of its apparent force.

 

Some Experienced Qualities Belong to the Experience (III-F)

Paul Raymont, Trent University

I argue against a representationalist view of conscious states, a view that has been promoted by Fred Dretske, Gilbert Harman, and Michael Tye. According to this view, an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes me conscious. The experience makes me conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them. Against this, I argue that
some of the properties of which I am conscious in perceptual experience are had by the conscious state, or experience, itself. Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that while one can see a stick as being bent while feeling it to be straight, one cannot at once see a stick as being both bent and straight. I claim that this latter case is impossible because it would involve an experience's having, not just representing, incompatible features.

 

Common Sense, Proper Sensibles, and the Senses (VI-G)

Peter Ross, California State University_Pomona

In "Making Sense of the Senses: Individuating Modalities in Humans and Other Animals," Brian L. Keeley sharply separates two general strategies for distinguishing sensory modalities in human beings and other creatures: a commonsense strategy which relies on qualitative properties of either physical objects or sensory experiences, and an eliminativist strategy which rejects this reliance on qualitative properties and instead distinguishes modalities in purely nonqualitative terms. Taking the eliminativist side, Keeley claims that neither qualitative properties of physical objects nor qualia are necessary for distinguishing modalities.
I'll argue that Keeley's attempt to sharply distinguish between commonsense and eliminativist strategies fails. Keeley underestimates how effectively science, in particular psychophysics, can shore up the claim that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing modalities. Moreover, I'll argue that if we acknowledge the necessary role of qualitative properties, we can chart a middle way between commonsense and eliminative strategies.

 

Knowing the Answer (III-I)

Jonathan Schaffer, University of Massachusetts_Amherst

How should one understand knowledge-wh ascriptions? That is, how should one understand claims such as "I know where the car is parked," in which the complement clause is an indirect question? The received view is that to know-wh is to know that p. I will argue that the received view is false, and suggest that knowledge-wh includes irreducible reference to the question Q-to know-wh is to know that p, as the answer to Q. Knowledge-wh is question-relative. To know is to know the answer.

 

Knowledge and Certainty: A Speech-Act Contextualist Account (III-I)

Elka Shortsleeve, University of Florida

Contextualists of David Lewis's stripe endorse that "know" and its cognates are context dependent so as to heed their infallibilist intuitions while avoiding skepticism. I argue that the plausibility of infallibilism can be explained away as arising from two other facts, i.e.:
(KA) For any speaker, A, and proposition, p, if A asserts that p, then A incurs a commitment to know that p, and
(KKC) For any doxastic agent, A, and proposition, p, if A knows that someone knows that p, then A's evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-p. I propose that contextualist insights can be incorporated into a semantically neutral theory of speech-act content according to which what speakers typically do by uttering knowledge attributions is to offer their epistemic authority as a guarantee that the putatively known proposition is true in every possible world that is consistent with the proper presuppositions they share with their interlocutors.

 

Does Political Liberalism Rest on a Mistake? (I-I)

Robert Talisse, Vanderbilt University

Rawls's political liberalism rests on a founding premise according to which comprehensive liberalism is incompatible with a due recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism. In this paper, the author argues that social epistemology provides a comprehensive justification for liberal politics. Consequently, social epistemic liberalism is a counterexample to the founding premise of political liberalism, and political liberalism rests on a mistake.

 

The Gap in Kant's Derivation of the Categorical Imperative (III-G)

Crystal Thorpe, University of Florida

We are all familiar with the charge that the categorical imperative is empty in the sense that it cannot generate any particular duties or rule out any maxims as impermissible. Less familiar is the charge that Kant's derivation of the categorical imperative contains a logical gap. Although less familiar, this charge has the same devastating upshot: Kant fails to establish a moral principle that can generate duties and rule out maxims as impermissible. In this paper, I argue against the standard view, which says that the gap involves an illicit move between a weak requirement of rationality and FUL. On my view, the gap involves an illicit move between two substantive rational requirements-the generalization principle and its close relative, FUL. My view is more plausible than the standard view in that it attributes a far less egregious error to Kant.

 

Kant's Moral Idealism: What's Wrong with Constructivist Readings of Kant's Ethics? (III-G)

Lucas Thorpe, Bilkent University_Turkey

Kantian ethics today is dominated by moral constructivists who define the good in terms of the reasonable. Such readings give priority to the first formulation of the categorical imperative and argue that the other two formulations are (ontologically or definitionally) dependent upon this formulation. I argue, in contrast, that Kant should be understood as a moral idealist, for although he is clearly not a utilitarian he does believes that the good is prior to the right or the reasonable, for to be virtuous is to strive to instantiate a moral ideal (an ideal that Kant often calls the idea of a holy being). I argue that constructivist readings mistake a methodological or epistemic priority for an ontological or definitional priority and that they do not adequately pay attention to Kant's important distinction between holiness and virtue.

 

Some Problems for Contextualism (III-I)

Christopher Tillman, University of Rochester

This paper argues that epistemic contextualism is false. First, I briefly present Kaplan's (1989) account of indexical expressions and use this to give a precise characterization of contextualism. I then argue that either "knows" is an indexical expression or that sentences that contain "knows" also contain an indexical element. I then present a recently popular objection to contextualism based on the behavior of sentences that contain "knows" within the scope of attitude verbs. A forthcoming reply by Peter Ludlow is considered and rejected, and a more sophisticated version of contextualism based on double-indexing of context is formulated. A reply is offered on behalf of this view that should be successful iff a popular view about propositions, eternalism, escapes a parallel objection. I conclude that this response, though initially promising, is ultimately unsuccessful. I then turn to considering whether contextualism can provide a fully general diagnosis of the skeptical paradox. I employ Kaplan's "dthat" device to argue that they cannot. Finally, I consider a currently popular general reply to semantic objections to contextualism. According to this reply, objections that appeal to speakers' intuitions about the content of "knows" fail since speakers lack the requisite semantic self-knowledge to determine what is meant by their utterance of a knowledge ascription. I conclude by arguing that this move is in serious conflict with a plausible principle concerning the way in which an expression acquires its linguistic meaning. I conclude that epistemic contextualism is false.

 

Sophrosune from Top to Bottom (V-H)

Roslyn Weiss, Lehigh University

In Book 4 of Plato's Republic, Socrates locates sophrosune not in the producer class of the polis and the appetitive part of the soul, but disperses it throughout the polis and soul. In light of the fact that this odd and unexpected move threatens the uniqueness of justice and, moreover, virtually assimilates justice to moderation, the question arises why Socrates defines sophrosune in this way. I suggest that Socrates wishes to make clear that not only do the lower parts of the city and soul dislike being ruled, but philosophers and reason dislike ruling. Since all parts of the city and soul are asked to do what they don't want to do, all must restrain themselves, curbing their desire to do what they would prefer to do. In other words, what they all must exhibit is sophrosune.

 

Spinoza's Theory of Motivation (V-E)

Andrew Youpa, Southern Illinois University

In the Scholium to 3p9 of the Ethics, Spinoza states, "From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it." This passage might seem to be evidence that, for Spinoza, value judgments are motivationally inert. However, in this paper I try to show that, contrary to what he might appear to say in 3p9s, Spinoza holds that in some cases a motivational state results from a value judgment. On my reading, Spinoza's
theory of motivation contains two accounts of the psychological order of judgments and motivational states: an account their order in those in bondage as well as an account in those who are free.

How to Start and Stop: A Discussion of Walter Burley's Solution to the Problem of Transition (VI-F)

Yiwei Zheng, St. Cloud State University

Suppose I will die at a certain moment T. Before T I am alive. After T I am dead. But at the very instance of T, am I alive or dead? In this paper I discuss and develop an interpretation of Walter Burley's solution to the problem of transition: whether an object is in the new state or in the old state at the moment of transition.